GCERF Regional Strategy for Investment in the Western Balkans
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Accelerated Funding Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>Communities of Practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Country Support Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTF</td>
<td>Foreign Terrorist Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRD</td>
<td>The International Center for Religion and Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISG</td>
<td>Western Balkan Integrative Security and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum Of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/CVE</td>
<td>Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAFP</td>
<td>Regional Accelerated Funding Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Returned Foreign Terrorist Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNA</td>
<td>Regional Needs Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>Rehabilitation(^1) and Reintegration(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRR</td>
<td>Repatriation(^3)/Return, Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVIC</td>
<td>Trauma-And-Violence Informed Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCT</td>
<td>United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
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\(^1\) GCERF considers "rehabilitation" as the process that an individual should go through to recover from developmental, mental, and physical injuries and restore his/her physical, mental and spiritual health.

\(^2\) GCERF considers "reintegration" as the process of reentry into society by individuals who return to their country of origin after travelling to a State other than their State of residence. The purpose of this process is for these individuals to be functioning members of the society, where they can control and direct their own lives, with respect to economic, social, and psychosocial dimensions. While "resocialization" - a term widely used in the Western Balkans region – refers to the final stage of reintegration, when reintegrated persons are functioning in society and involved in broader social engagement.

\(^3\) Repatriation is the process of returning individuals who travelled to a State other than their State of residence, to their country of origin or citizenship.
Overview

GCERF’s Regional Strategy for Investment in the Western Balkans is GCERF’s first-ever regional approach with a specific focus on community-based reintegration of returned foreign terrorist fighters (RFTFs) and their families⁴. The strategy is intended to cover Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia with a possibility for later expansion into Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro, and Serbia with a focus on community-based reintegration and prevention of violent extremism as relates to Far-Right Extremism and Ethno-Nationalism. The investment strategy is valid from June 2020 through June 2023. If additional funding is available to include BiH, Montenegro, and Serbia, GCERF will revise this strategy to include the context and needs of new countries.

The strategy is based on needs identified: by government institutions and representatives responsible for P/CVE and initiatives related to returned foreign terrorist fighters (RFTFs); by a third-party Regional Needs Assessment (2020), which was commissioned by GCERF; through extensive consultation with regional representatives of GCERF donors and a Theory of Change workshop attended by the Government of Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo, CSOs as well as international organisations working in the P/CVE space (the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)).

In implementing the strategy, GCERF will coordinate with the national governments and local authorities in Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo, as well as other key actors involved in rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) of RFTFs and their families, to include UNOCT, IOM, OSCE, CSOs, and regional and in-country donors. To ensure ownership, grants for impact, and effective coordination, GCERF will establish a Regional Accelerated Funding Panel (RAFP). More information on the mandate, constituency, and operational modality of this panel is outlined in the “Alignment and Coordination” section below.

Guiding Principles

The following principles will guide GCERF’s investment in WB:

1. Cross-border programming is essential and must be coordinated by the Regional Accelerated Funding Panel (RAFP)
2. Nurture a synchronous ecosystem composed of committed and motivated individuals
3. Sustainability and cross-country collaboration are cornerstones of all grants to CSOs
4. Intersectionality of programming is *sine qua non*
5. Catalyse support to structures, not activities
6. Do No Harm and Do More Good

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⁴ Foreign terrorist fighters are defined by UN-Security Council Counterterrorism Committee as individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist-fighters/ RFTFs therefore refer to men those who have returned or been repatriated to their country of citizenship.
Who:

- **Men who returned from Syria and Iraq** to the Western Balkan countries – so-called returned foreign terrorist fighters (RFTFs), both voluntarily (2012-2018) and repatriated (2019-2020), including those in detention centres and prisons;
- **Women who returned voluntarily or were repatriated from Syria and Iraq**;
- **Returned Children**;
- **Family members** of individuals who joined the war in Syria and Iraq; and
- **Communities** receiving RFTFs and their families.

Where:

- **Albania** (countrywide, with some focus on Pogradec)
- **North Macedonia** (From Skopje to the border with Kosovo)
- **Kosovo** (border areas between Kosovo and North Macedonia as well as border areas between ethnic-Albanian and ethnic-Serbian communities, such as Mitrovica)

First investments in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. With additional funding and request for partnership, consideration will be given to BiH, Serbia and Montenegro.

What:

GCERF will fund CSOs to implement programmes that facilitate safe, healthy, and dignified rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) of returning foreign terrorist fighters (RFTFs) and their families, while creating resilience to extremism over the long-term. CSO actions will be

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5The three countries expect to repatriate FTFs and their families from Syria and Iraq, who will reside in different areas of these countries. Therefore, specific municipalities will be determined during the strategy implementation.
implemented in collaboration with government authorities and aligned with existing R&R strategies. R&R interventions will contribute to the following objectives:

- Strengthen the network and enhance capacities of relevant actors throughout the ecosystem to guide and sustain R&R efforts, and effectively contribute to preventing violent extremism in the long run;
- Provide access to physical, mental, and psychosocial support services to RFTFs and their families to recover from developmental, mental, and physical injuries and to maintain physical, mental, and spiritual health;
- Promote family cohesion for RFTFs, through offering family education, counselling, and therapy support;
- Contribute to advancing the social and economic capital for RFTFs and their families to address basic needs and enhance the quality of life;
- Increase access to educational and development opportunities through providing formal education and soft skills for RFTFs and their families;
- Foster an enabling environment for resocialisation of RFTFs and their families, while strengthening community resilience to radicalisation and preventing recidivism to violent extremism, including Far-Right Extremism and Ethno-Nationalism; and
- Inform the broader field of practice and create and sustain a national ecosystem of actors capable of assessing, preventing, and countering extremist reengagement and other forms of violence over the long-term.

How:

R&R activities will be implemented through grants to CSOs. Some of the channels for facilitating R&R of RFTFs include: facilitating partnerships and collaboration between global psychosocial associations and local CSOs to provide capacity building to front-line workers (such as psychologists, sociologists, social workers, teachers, prison and probation staff, and staff in local government offices) on trauma and violence informed care (TVIC)\(^7\); provision of soft skills, profession skills, and income-generating activities for RFTFs and other community members, including pre-detainees, prisoners and individuals under probation, their families, and other members in their social circle; extracurricular activities to foster an enabling environment in receiving communities; capacity building among local authorities and institutions; working with and through families, teachers, religious leaders, social workers, and other local structures that are one part of a holistic programme; and working with CSOs and committed front-liners to develop a team based approach to case management.

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\(^6\) Approaches to rehabilitation, resocialization, and reintegration are different and are further fleshed out in the Proposed Approaches section below.

\(^7\) Front line workers are members of the synchronous ecosystem who deal directly with RFTFs and their families. They are typically professionals such as psychologists, sociologists, prison staff, and teachers. CSOs who provide support to the focus population may also be considered front line workers. The term “front-liners” is used interchangeably throughout this strategy document.
Context Analysis

Current dynamics of radicalisation and recruitment in Western Balkans and the Returned Foreign Terrorist Fighters (RFTFs) challenge

The region of Western Balkans includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Historically, the region is considered politically volatile, especially after the end of Ottoman rule in the late 19th century, but also more recently following the violent post-Cold War breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars of Yugoslav succession (1991-2001). Although the region experienced several violent episodes, the global foreign fighter phenomenon has been the single most obvious manifestation of violence in the Western Balkans with fighters departing to Syria and Iraq and to a lesser extent Ukraine.

Extremism in the WB has evolved over the last ten years in two main forms, including Ethno-national and the Far-Right movement, and militant (takfirist\(^9\)) Salafism. The propaganda used by far-right extremist groups in the region is focused on ethnically based politics and ethnic victimisation, including the glorification of war criminals and ethnic cleansing, xenophobia, as well as anti-feminist and anti-LGBT views. These groups have, in many instances, used violent actions to denounce their beliefs, as well as joined foreign wars in Ukraine. While the central locus of the ideology used by militant Salafism is based on perceived victimhood of Muslims throughout the world, in response to which it calls Muslims for a Jihad to establish and live in an Islamic “Caliphate.”\(^{10}\)

For countries in the region, including Albania, BiH, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia, identity is muddied by a mix of ethnicity and religion, which has lead to conditions fostering “reciprocal radicalisation,” where these radical movements feed off one another making the views and actions of opposing groups more radical and the potential destabilisation impact even greater. Therefore, extensive research on root causes of violent extremism in Western Balkans suggests that to effectively prevent radicalisation, interventions should target a broader pool of individuals of all identity groups who are vulnerable to a variety of subversive influences that may lead to violence.

While the impact of all forms of extremism in WB should be considered for long term prevention of radicalisation and security, the challenge with R&R of RFTFs and their families is most prominent. The foreign fighter phenomenon and the security risks associated with this development dates back to 2012. These individuals, whether returning voluntarily or repatriated,
pose serious risks to security. If not managed properly, they could very easily radicalise and recruit new members and launch an attack in WB and elsewhere in the world.

From 2012 to 2016, an estimated 1,100 individuals from the Western Balkans travelled to Syria and Iraq. More than 450 have returned, around 300 have been killed in the battlefield, and over 400 men, women, and children are awaiting deportation to their respective countries. The majority of individuals waiting to be repatriated are men and children, and a small proportion of this group involves women. While the precise timing of deportation for this group remains unknown, sources familiar with the process suggest that repatriation will happen soon and at the same time for all countries. This takes into consideration the global health pandemic as a circumstance which will delay repatriations by a few months.

Table 1: Overall Departures from the Western Balkans to Syria and Iraq (2012–2016\(^1\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Macedonia</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1106(^2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Overall Returns 2012–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Macedonia</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Still in Syria and expected to be repatriated home (April 2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{1}\) The last such departure was registered in November of 2016.
\(^{2}\) This number was probably higher, as it now seems that nearly 160 new children have been born to the Western Balkans contingent in Syria and Iraq.
The countries in the Western Balkans region rank among those with the highest number per capita in the world of FTFs joining the war in Syria and Iraq. They are also among the few who are repatriating this group back home. The Western Balkan contingent in Syria and Iraq is composed of 66% men of military age and 34% non-combatants – women (19%) and children (15%)—although it is reported that some children as young as eight years old have attended military training. The return of foreign fighters is associated with security challenges across the region but also in the continent of Europe, given the geographical proximity. Theoretical deliberations infer that RFTFs and their families can be engaged in a number of roles, including: (i) returning to normal life; (2) attempting to radicalise and mobilise new volunteers; (3) providing logistical, financial, and other support to the process of radicalisation to violent extremism; (4) travelling to the next war theatre; (5) planning and perpetration of terrorist attacks in their respective communities or elsewhere; and (6) utilising their skills in handling weapons and explosives to join a criminal group. Effective rehabilitation and reintegration of this group requires a closer look at their profiles, reasons for departing to Syria and Iraq, and individual needs.

### The profiles of RFTFs

Across the Western Balkans, evidence suggests that the motives of RFTFs for travelling to Syria and Iraq include: existing post-traumatic stress and “fictive kin” identifications with a global community of Sunni Muslims being under attack; humanitarian concerns and altruistic motivations; a wish to build and live inside an Islamic “Caliphate” and under Shariah law; the desire for personal significance; poverty, unemployment; material benefits of joining; and the desire and need to keep familial ties intact when one member of the family is convinced to go to Syria.\(^{13}\)

GCERF’s RNA highlighted that socio-demographic profiles of the Western Balkans foreign fighters revealed that many came from low-income families, possessed little education or marketable skills, and suffered from underlying psychosocial and mental health conditions. The most common vulnerabilities among RFTFs for joining foreign warzones was a mix of personal drivers and overarching ideological objectives, as follows:

**Men:** A combination of criminal history and substance abuse, and a perceived feeling of poverty and un- and under-employment as a consequence of discrimination for being Muslim; personal and community-level identity crisis; and lack of trust in state institutions. Evidence shows that more than one-third of men already had criminal records before departure. While more than one-quarter resided, worked, or spent time in Western Europe as part of the WB diaspora, typically in German-speaking countries. For men, the most prevalent influences to

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join ISIL were friends, face-to-face recruiters, and watching videos on the Internet and social media.

**Women:** prior trauma; feelings of being harassed and discriminated for being Muslim, motivating them to pursue a deepened Islamic identity; and a desire to follow their husbands or parents. For women, the most common influences for travelling to Syria and Iraq were spouses, internet recruiters, and parents.

The lack of prior religious knowledge was noted among foreign fighters and their family members throughout the region, suggesting that a shallow understanding of religion makes one vulnerable to radical propaganda. The mobilising narrative of VE groups often thrives on lack of religious knowledge coupled with victimhood mentality. These narratives aim to fuel radical views by highlighting the historical (and current) oppression inflicted on Muslims by their non-Muslim neighbours at home and abroad.

**Cluster of Returnees**

While the vulnerabilities, motives, and recruitment networks are common across RFTFs and their families in the region, their level of radicalisation and R&R needs upon return are different, pointing out to two distinct clusters of individuals. GCERF plans to support both clusters through the R&R interventions proposed in the regional strategy. With respect to the two clusters, the level of acceptance in receiving communities differs from one location to another. Thus, approaches in focus areas must be tailored to foster an optimal enabling environment for R&R. CSOs will assess community perceptions on R&R prior to implementing activities.

**Cluster one: FTFs and their families who returned voluntarily to their country of origin.**

The first and largest cluster to date is comprised of individuals who voluntarily returned from Syria and Iraq to their respective countries between 2012 and 2018. Most of the FTFs and family members in this cluster returned because they felt disillusioned and disappointed to find realities on the ground in conflict zones to be in stark contrast with what they had been initially promised during the recruitment process. Others returned because they believed that they had done their share of fighting for a noble cause. Male fighters were often experienced police arrests, prosecution, and incarceration in their respective countries, except in Albania, where the government did not convict RFTFs leading them to have greater trust in authorities and allowing for more effective monitoring of RFTF. Women were not indicted in any of the countries in WB. The countries most affected by this early outflow of RFTFs and their families were: Kosovo 120 (109 men, 5 women, 6 children); Albania 45 RFTFs; and North Macedonia 76 RFTFs.

The first cluster of RFTFs and their families have, in some respects, reintegrated in communities. While some express significant grievances due to the treatment they received upon return, others have folded into their neighbourhood of origin where they received support from host families. However, this self-driven process towards R&R has neither addressed their initial vulnerabilities, nor their psychosocial and economic needs, nor has it addressed receiving

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14 For more on this, see Anne Speckhard and Molly Ellenberg: *ISIS in Their Own Words: Recruitment History, Motivations for Joining, Travel, Experiences in ISIS, and Disillusionment over Time – Analysis of 220 In-depth Interviews of ISIS Returnees, Defectors and Prisoners.* Journal of Strategic Security 13, no. 1 (2020): 82–127.
communities’ concerns about RFTFs and the ongoing threat that may be posed by unreformed radicals.

There is also insufficient credible evidence to support the notion that these individuals have disowned the ideology that led them to join the war in Syria and Iraq in the first place. Based on the findings of the regional needs assessment, this group requires more psychosocial support, medical attention, occupational therapy, additional education, vocational training, and access to job opportunities.

Additionally, some in-person interviews conducted by GCERF staff in January 2020 suggest that individuals were further aggravated by the lack of government support upon their return, the judicial process, and their continued discrimination by government authorities in offices of employment. The lack of trust that these returnees express toward government offices illustrates the need for a team based approach involving CSOs and government offices working together to provide support and rebuild trust with individuals and micro-communities.

**Cluster two: RFTFs and their families repatriated to their countries of origin.**

The second cluster of returnees includes individuals who are repatriated to their respective countries from the Al’Hawl camp. The majority of them were captured or detained following the fall of Baghouz in March 2019, the last ISIL stronghold in Syria. This group, with few exceptions, seemed totally committed to the ideology of ISIS and determined to defend the self-proclaimed Caliphate. Repatriated men are immediately investigated and detained. While a mixed approach is used for repatriated women. Although they refuse to take any responsibility for travelling to Syria, anecdotal evidence from the camps shows "there are hardcore ISIL ideologues among them." Therefore, a thorough risk management operation will be conducted in collaboration with responsible government institutions during the implementation of this strategy to assess the risk that some women may pose, both in terms of security and propensity to radicalise others.

In April 2019, Kosovo received the highest number of RFTFs and their families in the region (4 men, 32 women, and 74 children, of which 44 were born in the conflict zone) and plans to repatriate the remaining 97 individuals (46 men, 8 women, and 43 children, although some are likely to have died in the war zone) in the months to come. Based on interviews and discussions with government representatives, Albania and North Macedonia will repatriate FTFs and their families following the COVID-19 crisis. There are still 73 FTFs from Albania (23 men, 20 women, 30 children), and 40 (13 men, 4 women, and 23 children) from North Macedonia residing in the Al’Hawl camp.

WB countries have already repatriated most of the RFTFs and their families and have provided them with basic services upon return such as access to social services, birth certificates, and registration in schools for children. Individuals have also received some psychosocial counselling. Psychologists in the region engaged with the second cluster reported that individuals have symptoms that can last a long time and, as such, need proper long-term treatment. Women have shown visible signs of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety,

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16 In early 2020, one man, one woman and two children were also repatriated to North Macedonia.
frequent panic attacks, depression, and sleep deprivation. Some of them expressed constant fear from the stigmatisation of both themselves (as many still wear a full niqab) and their children.

Repatriated children show signs of PTSD and separation anxiety disorder. Psychologists reported widespread fear in children of overflying commercial aircraft. The sound of an aeroplane prompts some children to scream in panic and run for shelter. Disorders observed in children also include selective mutism – a consistent failure of children to speak in certain situations, such as school, even when they can speak in other situations, such as at home with a close family member. Repatriated children risk becoming radicalised in the future due to trauma experienced because of separation from their Islamic State-affiliated parent(s), or if custody is granted to other family members also holding extremist views. It has been documented that children in Kosovo have demonstrated resilience to trauma to date; however, problems may manifest after a delay, and research indicates their resilience is drastically compromised when they experience recurring trauma in multiple environments. This can happen when repatriated children receive messages of radicalisation at home in Kosovo or if their host family is too abusive to the child or insensitive to the trauma the child experienced in the war theatre. In Kosovo, the situation of children is often compounded by their remaining in custody of their mothers, who were also repatriated from Syria and may still be radicalised. Therefore, assessment of the parameters of repatriation and rehabilitative needs for minors is required on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, response measures must include a whole of family approach to supporting children to heal.

According to the RNA, this cluster of returnees needs psychosocial treatment (including individual and group psychotherapy), support from local Centers for Social Welfare (including financial and logistical), educational and professional skills through vocational training, and small grants to set up small businesses or farming activities (as most returnees live in villages or suburban areas that typically encompass some land). More information on the approaches required for the R&R process is provided in the section “Proposed Approaches.”

**GCEF Positioning**

The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCEF) began its first investments in the Western Balkans in November 2017 with two rounds of funding in Kosovo. Out of the first two rounds of funding, GCEF signed 5 grants for a total commitment of USD 2.5 million over three years. Of the five grants, two are scheduled to close before the end of 2020 while the other three are expected to conclude in mid-2021. The five grants cover a wide range of prevention topics, focusing on all four of GCEF’s leverage points (Social Cohesion, Community Agency, Sense of Purpose, and Equal Access to Opportunities). The grants have been supported along the way by a dedicated Country Support Mechanism (CSM) that includes members of the Government of Kosovo, civil society, and the donor community. Despite numerous changes in the leadership of the CSM at the political level, grantmaking and grant-management activities went well without significant delay.

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17 For example, when trauma lived in the war zone is replicated, perhaps in another form, in the community where the FTF child returns to.
GCERF learned from the Kosovo experience that community-based reintegration programming for Returned Foreign Terrorists Fighters (RFTFs) and their families is a new field for both governments and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). One grant in the Kosovo portfolio was intended to provide reintegration support for families of RFTFs; however, it took two years and careful manoeuvring to even get access to the families. This is because the Government of Kosovo, as a fiduciary for these individuals, managed the process cautiously. It was also necessary to build trust between the government and CSOs.

In the year 2020 the situation is starkly different. The Government of Kosovo has received hundreds of returnees, illustrated in the table above, and the needs of returnees are more clearly defined. The Government of Kosovo, at the same time, realises that rehabilitation, especially for children, is an ongoing process that cannot take place in a detention centre or at home. R&R of children and families requires a whole of community approach, with intensive support to the individual, as well as tailored support to communities. In the same breath, the CSOs that GCERF support, and the GoK, have come to recognise that R&R programming requires an extremely measured and careful approach in coordination with the GoK.

The experience outlined above has helped GCERF to establish prerequisites for R&R programming. These prerequisites are outlined in the strategy paper that GCERF’s Secretariat presented to the Governing Board during the 11th Board in November 2019 in Geneva, Switzerland (BM.11 DOC.03). During this Board Meeting, the then-National CT/CVE Coordinator for Kosovo indicated that it would be useful for GCERF to attend the IISG coordination meeting in Skopje to showcase the work of GCERF, meet stakeholders, and discuss regional expansion.

GCERF attended the meeting and delivered a presentation to the national CT/CVE coordinators from the Western Balkans as well as a group of donors and the IOM. Donors were most impressed with the flexibility of GCERF as a fund that is able to quickly adapt programmes to address pressing needs. GCERF also had a brief discussion with the National Coordinator for CT/CVE of North Macedonia, who expressed interest to learn more about the work of GCERF. Later in December 2019 GCERF engaged in discussions with the National Coordinator for CT/CVE of Albania, who similarly expressed interest to learn more about GCERF.

Discussions with Albania and North Macedonia advanced rapidly, and by January 2020, the GCERF Secretariat shared information on how to become a partner country. GCERF then arranged a visit to Albania in February 2020, as well as a visit to Sarajevo to consult with donors and other stakeholders. By February/March 2020, partnership request letters were received from both Albania, and North Macedonia, and the decision by no objection for the partnership was sent to the GCERF Governing Board. Both Albania and North Macedonia were approved in early April 2020.

The discussions that GCERF had with Albania and North Macedonia were informed by the preceding years of experience in Kosovo. Additionally, the Kosovo experience was well communicated by the National Coordinators in Albania and North Macedonia, meaning that many lessons from Kosovo can be applied in other WB countries preparing to receive returnees and their families.
GCERF has already discussed with National Coordinators and bilateral donors how to expedite grantmaking through a Regional Accelerated Funding Panel, which is described in more detail in the coordination and alignment section below. Future members of the funding panel, including the Country Support Mechanism in Kosovo, discussed that in order to expedite grant making in Kosovo, GCERF will pursue cost extensions of current grants that already focus on community-based reintegration programming. Grantees in Kosovo have built trust with the GoK’s Department for Prevention and Reintegration as well as the Ministry of Education. These partnerships will facilitate grantees to quickly take up the lead to implement high priority activities. It is expected that existing Principal Recipients in Kosovo will identify and recruit new Sub-Recipients as needed to ensure that necessary skills are sourced, and CSOs most closely linked to local communities are directly involved in programming.

It is recognised, however, that in Albania and North Macedonia, there will be a competitive tender to identify grant recipients. North Macedonia has proposed funding a consortium to implement priority activities, and Albania suggested that a Principal Recipient approach might be employed, but that it is also worth considering direct grants. In both cases, the National Coordinators have expressed strong interest to work with CSOs, and both Albania and North Macedonia are confident that grants can be signed before October 2020.

During April and May 2020, GCERF contracted the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) to support the development of a Theory of Change (ToC) for community-based reintegration programming in Kosovo. Virtual consultations took place with members of the government from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia to socialise the ToC document. The ToC was widely appreciated and accepted by stakeholders from all three countries. The ToC was then further socialised with a wider group of stakeholders, including GCERF’s grantees in Kosovo, members of the Kosovo Country Support Mechanism, members of the regional donor community, the National Coordinators for Albania, and North Macedonia, and the IOM. The ToC will be finalised in June 2020.

These milestones have positioned and prepared GCERF to hit the ground running.

**Country Alignment and Coordination**

During the last three years of investing in Kosovo, GCERF strengthened collaboration with key stakeholders and coordination mechanisms in Kosovo. In the last six months, GCERF established new linkages with partners in Albania and North Macedonia. The Secretariat is now well connected with the Western Balkan Integrative Internal Security Governance team, and the Regional Network of National CT/CVE Coordinators (RNNC) presided by the EU Regional CT/Security Expert. GCERF also strengthened collaboration with the IOM on a country-specific and regional level.

GCERF will ensure both country and regional level alignment and coordination through the four mechanisms below:

1. **The Regional Accelerated Funding Panel (RAFP).** The RAFP is the mechanism to be established by GCERF. GCERF discussed the RAFP approach with stakeholders in the Western Balkans and there is a consensus that the RAFP will strengthen the coordination
function among National CT/CVE Coordinators and reinforce government ownership to lead Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration programming. The RAFP will be composed of the following members:

- One member from each partner country (Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia), who is likely to be the National Coordinator for CT/CVE or his/her delegate. Each National Coordinator will co-chair RAFP meetings on an alternating basis.
- One representative from each donor agency contributing to the Accelerated Funding Mechanism for community-based reintegration in WB.

2. **The United Nations Office of Counter-terrorism and the affiliated UN agencies.** GCERF signed an MOU with UNOCT in 2019 that covers a wide range of global collaboration. Over the last six months, GCERF and UNOCT have had a monthly call to discuss coordination and collaboration in terms of reintegration programming. GCERF has contributed to UNOCT’s strategy paper on managing repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration programming. As the IOM is currently supporting repatriation and reintegration work in WB, the IOM will be an important interlocutor for coordination. Coordination with IOM will be especially important for interventions focused on capacity building of central and local authorities due to their past and current work on this area.

3. **The Western Balkan Integrative Security and Governance team.**

4. **Communities of Practice (CoP)** with GCERF grantees and other actors involved in community-based reintegration programming to exchange information and share lessons across the region.

GCERF will work with National Coordinators to ensure that grant activities are aligned with existing R&R strategies as well as National and Local Strategies for prevention of violent extremism.

**Existing programs**

A number of international actors and local CSOs have implemented programs to counter and prevent radicalisation to violent extremism in the region. Most programs were focused on capacity building of government and local institutions, including the penal system, and some concentrated on P/CVE initiatives at the community level. There are few if any R&R programs in the region addressing the needs of both returnees and their families and fostering an enabling environment. The Government of Kosovo was a pioneer in organising R&R interventions meeting the initial needs of this group. Based on consultations with governments in the region, there is a consensus that no one organisation, institution, or government can tackle violent extremism and engage successfully in R&R of former fighters and their families alone. With the governments managing and leading the process, support from civil society is essential.

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17 [https://wb-iisg.com/](https://wb-iisg.com/)
18 National R&R plans and strategies are under development. However, GCERF will rely on working documents during the initial phase.
A key objective of GCERF’s RNA was to harvest lessons from previous P/CVE and R&R programming in the region\(^{20}\) and to ensure that GCERF funded R&R interventions will build on lessons learnt. The findings of the RNA suggest that P/CVE and R&R efforts in the region still suffer from a number of problems, such as:

- overly politicised, securitised, and bureaucratised approaches;
- a lack of strategic coordination between activities and goals;
- a lack of regional awareness, understanding, and capacities;
- an over-centralisation of P/CVE R&R efforts on the national level;
- short-term projects and activities;
- ill-informed and disengaged local authorities;
- an inadequate role of think tanks and researchers;
- involvement by various entities that fail to understand the context and are pursuing unclear goals, thereby undermining the coherence of the R&R ecosystem; and
- insufficient coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of ongoing projects, both domestically and regionally.

The following sections provide more detailed analysis regarding how the proposed R&R programming intends to address these issues.

**Proposed Approaches**

**Rehabilitation and Reintegration Needs**

The process of radicalisation and recruitment had similar patterns across the region and was built to some extent upon ethnic ties. Similarly, FTFs and their families maintained and strengthened their relations on the battlefield, by living together in the same compounds and sharing similar experiences throughout their journey. However, the Western Balkan countries are in different stages when it comes to the process of repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of RFTFs and their families. National and local level capacities to tackle the R&R process are also diverse among the countries. Therefore, this section will focus on three WB countries approved by the GCERF Board as partner countries, namely Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo. This section provides an overview of where these countries stand in the process and their country-specific needs as evidenced through RNA and GCERF’s consultations with dozens of stakeholders in the region.

The three countries have made significant progress in preventing and countering violent extremism. They established coordination mechanisms such as the National CT/CVE Coordinators and the CVE Center in Albania to oversee and ensure a whole-of-society approach to the implementation of P/CVE Strategies and Action Plans. At the same time, international organisations (such as IOM, OSCE, etc.), as well as local CSOs, have contributed to national P/CVE efforts through implementing programs that address drivers to violent

\(^{20}\) The list of activities is annexed (Annex 3).
extremism at the community level, while building greater local capacities to address radicalisation. This is not the case with the R&R process of RFTFs and their families, which is still in its very initial phase and requires context-specific programming while guaranteeing public safety over the near and long-term. Additionally, more coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of R&R efforts, both domestically and regionally, must be undertaken to ensure the efficiency of activities, to avoid overlap, and to guarantee that gaps are addressed adequately and in a timely manner.

Governments in Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo have established designated structures such as the CVE Center in Albania, the Division for Reintegration and Prevention within the Department for Public Safety under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kosovo, and Interagency Working group in North Macedonia, to ensure a whole-of-government approach to this effort. While many of the activities below focus on capacity strengthening, it is essential for the National Coordinator for CT/CVE to shepherd the policy reform process, ensure inter-governmental coordination of R&R activities, and ensure that CSOs are included as key implementors in R&R programming.

The GoK repatriated 110 FTFs and their families in April 2019 and has organised few rehabilitation activities for this group. There are lessons and good practices generated from the repatriation process and shared among governments in the region, but very little on R&R programming. This is because R&R activities were limited both in terms of quantity and appropriateness. Government resources to undertake a comprehensive R&R approach are insufficient, and there is a lack of committed and motivated front-liners on trauma and violence informed care (TVIC). The three governments have continuously highlighted the need for experts in TVIC in the region to share expertise with other local practitioners, expanding in this way, the ecosystem of actors involved in the process. Some details on needs are in the table below.

Table 3: R&R Needs in Western Balkans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rehabilitation and Reintegration Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Developing and sustaining local capacities on R&amp;R of RFTFs and their families, through:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capacity building of front-liners regarding the process and their role in R&amp;R of RFTFs and their families. Front-liners include teachers, psychologists and psychiatrists, social workers, prison and probation staff, community policing officers, and local government staff. Capacity-building activities should include extensive, tailored, and certified training for:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, frequent panic attacks, depression, sleep deprivation and selective autism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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21 The DPR is an operational unit and is not responsible for strategy development and reform and coordination among international actors, CSOs, and donors. A clear risk in R&R programming is overwhelming operational actors with roles should be designated to political authorities. In the case of the DPR, it is crucial for the department to remain operational in function, instead of serving as a coordinator of actors and policy.
- Teachers in schools and those graduating from the Faculty of Education in PVE and R&R of returned children
- Prisons and probation staff on R&R of prisoners convicted of terrorism

- Capacity building on R&R for inter-institutional working groups, local community structures (such as Local Public Security Councils and Community Policing Officers), as well as the Mobile Team;
- Sensitisation of government institutions to the needs and grievances of returnees. Policy reform might also be necessary through the revision of national reintegration strategies and associated plans;
- Strengthening the role of central and local institutions in R&R process and long-term prevention of violent extremism through tailored training and advocacy actions. These institutions involve Local Public Security Councils, CVE Center and its networks, educational institutions, and religious universities. Examples of interventions identified for this purpose are: mobilise and strengthen capacities of religious universities to design a joint program on inter-religious dialogue; support educational institutions in integrating PVE in the school curricula; support CVE centres and Local Public Security Councils to establish an online referral mechanism; develop capacities of central and local institutions to effectively monitor and evaluate the R&R process.
- Establish and sustain the research capacities of the CVE Center on P/CVE and R&R

**Community-based R&R of RFTFs and family members:**
- Psychosocial support to RFTFs and their families;
- Direct support to the reintegration of RFTFs and their families by providing educational and vocational training, as well as income-generating activities;
- Increase the capacities of mothers and other custodian members to support returned children in their educational development;
- Community engagement activities to strengthen cohesion among RFTFs and their families and the receiving communities;
- Support pre and post penal reintegration programs for convicted RFTFs; and
- Mobilise and increase the capacities of religious leaders to play a more active role in PVE R&R.

**Strengthen the role of Media in R&R and P/CVE:**
- Capacity building of media actors on R&R and P/CVE;
- Strengthening local voices to disseminate positive alternative narratives online; and
- Build the capacities of central and local authorities in using technology and strategic communication in preventing and addressing online radicalisation.

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22 A team created under the auspices of the CVE Center to coordinate and manage the process of the repatriation, rehabilitation and re-integration of the RFTFs and their families.
### North Macedonia

**Developing and sustaining local capacities on R&R of RFTFs and their families:**

- Support the establishment of a research and policy development centre to support the work of the National Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Working Group on R&R and P/CVE;
- Strengthen cooperation and share expertise and lessons on R&R among stakeholders at the national and regional level, including front-liners, CSOs, central and local institutions, etc.;
- Capacity building for local multidisciplinary teams on strengthening team working skills and effective information sharing during R&R process;
- Capacity building and support to R&R practitioners in establishing a case management manual and conduct individual case management for RFTFs and their families;
- Capacity building of front-liners, especially psychosocial workers on post-traumatic disorders for women and children;
- Capacity building of local actors, including local authorities, CSOs, and penal institutions, on R&R of RFTFs and their families; and
- Sensitisation of government institutions to the needs and grievances of returnees. Policy reform might also be necessary through the revision of national reintegration strategies and associated plans.

**Community-based R&R of RFTFs and their family members:**

- Direct support to RFTFs and their families upon repatriation through food and non-food items;
- Support the reintegration process of RFTFs and their families through providing educational and professional training, as well as support them with income-generating activities;
- Strengthening collaboration and trust between state authorities and RFTFs and their families;
- Awareness-raising for receiving communities to reduce stigmatisation and build community cohesion;
- Strengthen the role of women in the R&R process, through organising joint activities between the female social workers and returned women;
- Strengthen the role of and collaboration among religious leaders in R&R process;
- Provide schools with technical equipment to ensure safety and security to decrease cold weapons violence among youth; and
- Research on the community perceptions on R&R process of RFTFs and their families.

**Strengthen the role of Media in R&R and P/CVE:**

- Strengthen capacities of central and local authorities in strategic communication on R&R;
- Capacity building for journalists and media practitioners in reporting or P/CVE and R&R cases; and
- Capacity building of CSOs to produce positive alternative narratives through documentaries, videos, and stories focused on communities, RFTFs and their family members, as well as monitor and evaluate the impact of these media materials.

### Kosovo

**Developing and sustaining local capacities on R&R of RFTFs and their families:**

- Support the revision of the National P/CVE Strategy, to include R&R objectives and actions;
- Capacity building for the staff of the Division for prevention and reintegration/MIA;
- Capacity building for the front-liners (training on PTSD for psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers, including those working in schools, communities, and prisons, as well as R&R training for community policing officers and local government staff);
- Capacity building for the staff in probation services on R&R;
- Build capacities of mobile mental health teams on providing psychosocial education to family members of RFTFs;
- Support mobile teams to conduct consultations with RFTFs;
- Establish a regional network to share expertise and lessons on R&R among stakeholders; and
- Sensitisation of government institutions to the needs and grievances of returnees. Policy reform might also be necessary through the revision of national reintegration strategies and associated plans.

### Community-based R&R of RFTFs and their family members:

- Provide educational programs for RFTFs, their families, community members, and school psychologists;
- Soft and professional skills training for RFTFs in prisons;
- Professional skills training and access to income-generating activities for RFTFs and their families;
- Support critical thinking, educational skills, and cohesion among returned children and their peers through soft and educational skills training and extracurricular activities; and
- Direct support to RFTFs and their families by providing food and non-food items, medical support, educational materials, etc.

### Strengthen the role of Media in R&R and P/CVE:

- Support central authorities with the development of a Communication Strategy for external audience focused on the R&R process of RFTFs and their families.

### Approaches to R&R of RFTFs and their families

Countries in WB are grappling with questions about how to rehabilitate and reintegrate FTFs and family members that have returned to their country of origin from what were once ISIS strongholds in countries like Syria and Iraq. WB countries and communities are also grappling with whether and how to repatriate and reintegrate those that remain in detention and displacement centres in north-east Syria. For this reason, GCERF contracted "The International
Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), to support the development of a Theory of Change (ToC) which identifies objectives and approaches specific to the reintegration and rehabilitation of RFTFs and their family members that have returned or repatriated to WB, and Kosovo specifically. The ToC is informed by the regional needs assessment (2020), detailed documentation of the community-level initiatives funded by GCERF, as well as through extensive consultations with governments, donor community, international organisations, CSOs, and researchers and practitioners working in P/CVE and R&R in the region.

The approaches to R&R of RFTFs and their families set forth in this strategy are largely based on the ToC narrative, outlining an evidence-based framework for programming that will facilitate better measuring and evaluation from the onset. The following section provides a conceptual framework within which this work is understood to occur, setting out the most important elements and how these might be activated by GCERF’s network in the region. It also provides details on how interventions can produce a series of results in divergent spheres crucial to achieving the intended goal.

**Approach 1. Trauma-informed Rehabilitation Support for RFTFs and their families**

The rehabilitation process of RFTFs and their families will be based on two key interlinked elements: (i) access to trauma-and-violence informed care (TVIC) while enhancing local capacities on providing TVIC; and (ii) empowering and offering family support through family education, counselling, and therapy.

**Capacity building and access to trauma-and-violence informed care (TVIC):** GCERF’s funding will provide individualised trauma and violence-informed services to RFTFs and their families to recover from developmental, mental, and physical injuries and to maintain physical, mental and spiritual health and psychosocial support. The trauma-informed approach shifts the perspective away from “what’s wrong with you” to “what happened to you.” This is not, however, meant to relieve one of culpability for decisions and behaviours, but to establish a better client-centred system that can preserve dignity, establish trust and rapport, and appreciate that individual agency is impacted by experiences outside one’s control, context, environmental, structural, and inter- and intrapersonal factors. The TVIC approach allows for tailored individual-based support to address the specific drivers and needs of both RFTFs and their families who returned voluntarily and those repatriated from respective governments.

The trauma-informed approach is particularly appropriate for the RFTF population group in WB, where the majority of those that will engage in R&R programming are women and children. Assessing agency regarding decisions to travel and/or to remain throughout the conflict in Syria is of crucial importance. The ideological commitment of returned women varies from traumatised survivors to committed fanatics who may indoctrinate their children and others they come into contact with—a potential continuing source of radicalisation and violence.23 While children pose another great challenge – although they are considered innocent victims, that does not mean they haven’t absorbed radical

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worldviews and ideologies or witnessed wanton barbarity and other PTSD-inducing experiences. For children, the reintegration experience will doubtlessly impact mental and emotional well-being, especially their ability to adjust to very different norms.

A trauma-informed approach recognises the interplay between trauma and symptoms of trauma with the aim of providing tailored individualised support through advancing skill sets so survivors can function and cope with anxiety and reintegrate effectively. Recognising trauma can help interrupt the cycles of inter- and intra-personal violence and therefore has implications for building individual and community resilience. This approach can help to address these complexities, and if provided in a culturally sensitive manner, can be an effective method to identify sustained support and mechanisms that might facilitate disengagement while enhancing full-fledged ‘deradicalisation.’

GCERF intends to support the rehabilitation process by increasing the capacities and enhance the ecosystem of front-liners involved in TVIC, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and other actors involved in R&R of RFTFs and their families. This approach is of paramount importance. As indicated in the regional needs assessment, introducing other actors at this stage may backfire as the newcomers could disrupt and undermine the confidence-building process and introduce a new dynamic into a group that is in a desperate need of tranquillity, trust, and continuity. At the same time, capacity building of front-liners is one of the key needs identified by the government as they currently lack experience in this area, especially with PTSD.

The role of CSOs is crucial in this process for two key reasons:

1. To ensure and organise a structured capacity building process for front-liners while expanding the ecosystem of actors, as well as facilitate sharing of knowledge and lessons among practitioners from and within different fields of expertise; and
2. To facilitate, in collaboration with government partners, a team-based approach to case management to ensure that program beneficiaries receive individualised one-on-one services that address different elements of trauma and individual needs and target healthy (physical, mental, and spiritual) reintegration while reducing the risk of recidivism. GCERF also aims to build a regional network among front-liners involved in R&R to share their experiences, expertise, and lessons on the R&R process among them and sustain capacity building process in TVIC in the long run.

Empowering and supporting families of RFTFs: The RNA highlighted that families and micro-communities play a crucial role in RRR. Family connections are very important in traditional WB communities. For many RFTFs, families played a key role in assisting them with basic needs and enabling their reintegration in local communities. At the same time, strong family bonds make parents and surrogate families influential in supporting and educating children. Successful R&R programming must, therefore, entail empowering and strengthening resilience within the family unit. It is important to conduct some baseline research into the role of extended family members in R&R programming.

Interventions to empower and strengthen family cohesion will focus on providing trauma-informed care to nuclear and extended family members. Programming for RFTF’s and their
families should facilitate family education, therapy, and counselling. Pairing family counsellors and religious leaders to generate a paradigm for culturally sensitive, spiritual, and TVIC interventions to families is imperative for the R&R process. GCERF’s approach will capitalise on education and engagement of community members to support families with R&R efforts.

CSOs, in partnership with government authorities and front-liners, will assist with case management for each individual or family. The case management team will outline family-specific responses aiming to provide TVIC care to RFTFs by strengthening the bond within the family and among the family and community members, and strengthening capacities of family members to support the rehabilitation process. A key element of this intervention will be on capacity building of family members in expanding the psychological awareness of returned children to address their emotional disorders through activities such as physical exercises, story-telling to explain complex information received at school, mapping of emotions, and mindfulness exercises.

**Approach 2: Support the whole community approach to reintegration and P/CVE**

GCERF aims to create a bridge between the process of individual/family-focused full-fledged rehabilitation to whole-of-community based reintegration through interventions that address four key elements: (i) decrease community resistance and minimise stigmatisation while facilitating resocialisation; (ii) enhance formal and informal educational skills of RFTFs and their families; (iii) address social, spiritual and economic capita for RFTFs and their families to address basic needs and enhance their quality of life; and (iv) strengthen community resilience to all forms of extremism.

**Decrease community resistance and minimise stigmatisation, while facilitating resocialisation:** Access to TVIC care for RFTFs and their family members must concentrate on translating rehabilitative gains at the individual and family level, into effective resocialisation and reintegration with the extended community. The trauma-informed approach, used for the rehabilitation process, seeks to prepare program participants for broader social engagement. The approach aims to initiate small interactions with core and extended family members, and neighbours, and then navigate outwards into broader spheres of social engagement in villages, with religious communities, and informal and formal collectives in the broader community. GCERF will support resocialisation under the framework of asset-based processes, which remove the focus from activities that are focused on discussing or solving individual and community problems, to concentrating on identifying common skills and interests among RFTFs and community members and cultivating these talents to achieve a common goal, e.g. a business such as a wood processing factory or a community asset such as a sport field.24

GCERF funded CSOs will work simultaneously towards two key intervention areas: implementing initiatives that minimise stigmatisation, while increasing community acceptance to RFTFs and their families; and facilitate activities that aim to bring together RFTFs with community members while enhancing their sense of purpose. To achieve this, CSOs, in collaboration with

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front-liners, will identify grievances of the broader community with respect to RFTFs and assess RFTFs experience of actual discrimination and perceived internalised stigma. This assessment will help to design effective online and offline awareness-raising campaigns involving a wide range of actors, to change broader social attitudes towards the reintegration of RFTFs and their families. At the same time, CSOs will organise events to bring RFTFs and community members together in activities that promote their skills and unite them towards common interests. While increasing cohesion, these interventions will also aim to offer an alternative meaning, purpose, and significance to RFTFs and their families, that erode the black-and-white thinking that contributes to in-group-and-out-group biases that underly narratives of VE groups.

**Enhance formal and informal educational skills of RFTFs and their families:** The reality surrounding the reintegration of RFTFs and families underscores not only the complexities of (de) radicalisation and rehabilitation but the need for multidisciplinary interventions. The education of returned children, formally at schools and informally at home and in-community, represents a crucial component of realising safe, healthy, and dignified reintegration. Children and mothers are dealing with fear, stigma, and animosity within their communities. School is likely to be a source of anxiety. This tension could cement radicalisation and push children away from schools and toward indoctrination at home and in religious institutions. RFTF children experience significant development delays and learning disabilities which contribute to further decrease children’s self-confidence and their progress in schools.25

To address these concerns and impeding factors to reintegration, GCERF funded CSOs will work closely with R&R partners in the ground, especially teachers, to monitor and assess the development of children and identify developmental delays and learning disabilities. Based on the individual needs of returned children, GCERF interventions will connect specialists in development and learning disabilities to strengthen the capacities of teachers in effectively supporting returned children. In consultation with teachers, reintegration programming will connect returned children with other peers through innovative activities to enhance informal learning while strengthening resilience and cohesion among them.

Additionally, GCERF funded initiatives will involve educating the parents and family members about healthy engagement and involvement in children’s schooling based on identified barriers to school readiness. CSOs and R&R partners will closely work together to provide access to education for men and women returned to enhance their quality of life, employability opportunities, and critical thinking skills. To achieve successful reintegration, interventions will have to be sensitive to the culture and norms of the population. CSOs will also facilitate the involvement of religious leaders, such as imams, in the process of rehabilitation of RFTFs and their families. However, this will be done cautiously, considering the contextual risks and perceptions of focused population groups.

**Address economic capital for RFTFs and their families:** Evidence shows that one of the key driving factors for recidivism among extremists is the lack of viable and licit alternative sources of income. When they leave these VE organisations, they often return to the same circumstances – even the same communities – that they left. Moreover, those circumstances expose the same structural motivators, individual incentives, and enabling factors that brought

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25 This is well documented in the RNA and corroborated through GCERF’s discussions with front-line workers and administrators in Kosovo.
the individuals to VE in the first place, which can include economic hardship. GCERF funded programs will provide RFTFs and their families with a successful and sustainable vocational path through access to vocational skills training and income-generating activities. CSOs in collaboration with local partners, including private sector actors, will be engaged to bolster economic capital with opportunities and avenues to strengthen social engagement and strengthen sense of purpose and belonging of RFTFs – that will collectively provide the RFTF or VE supporter with enough meaning in a context free of violence as to make recidivism unpalatable.

Documented experiences in other contexts demonstrate that economic and vocational programs provided to RFTFs but not to the broader receiving community can result in community resentment. Since social rejection is one of the main structural motivators leading to recidivism, it is critical that resentment is carefully avoided. GCERF interventions will respond to this potential conflict by offering training and funds for economic projects to both RFTFs and their families, as well as the members of receiving communities, tailored in such a way as to create pathways for collaboration between RFTFs and members of the receiving community. Bringing RFTFs together with community members, particularly those at economic risk and key influencers, will also increase a sense of shared purpose, bring individuals into constructive contact with one another, and open pathways for communication. If they are supported in conducting joint economic programs, community members and formers come to rely on one another and see that their self-interest is tied up in the well-being of the other.

**Strengthen community resilience to all forms of extremism:** The growth of violent extremism in the region must be given ample attention and addressed through long-term interventions. While the issue of R&R of RFTFs and their families is the most imminent need, the reality highlights the importance of addressing the mix of structural motivators and overarching ideological objectives that led these individuals to join the war in Syria and Iraq in the first place. This is of paramount importance since RFTFs, and their families were just a portion of the population committed to the VE ideology, who had the opportunity and resources required to join the war in Syria and Iraq.

At the same time, to achieve the successful prevention of recidivism and radicalisation, the programs should address all forms of violent extremism, including ethnonational and far-right movement. Both far-right and Salafi-jihadi extremism share commonalities in terms of ideology, which lead these two movements to feed off one another. Therefore, R&R approaches will be counter-productive if programing does not address ethnonational extremist ideology and ideologies which justify violence as a means to respond to grievances. GCERF funded programming will involve a multidisciplinary approach to strengthen community resilience to violent extremism and target a broader pool of individuals of all identity groups who are vulnerable to a variety of subversive influences that may lead to violent behaviours. This approach will involve interventions around reconciliation among communities.

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26 This strategy focuses at the Salafi-jihadi dimension, under the umbrella of “Violent Islamist Extremism”, given that the majority of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) who left for Iraq and Syria originate from this ideological strand. Salafi-jihadi extremism refers to the Salafi-jihadi school of ideological thought, which is part of the Sunni manifestation, that groups such as ISIS adhere to. The use of this term aims to recognise that not all Salafists are jihadists. **GCERF DOES NOT AFFILIATE VE WITH A SPECIFIC RELIGION, BUT RECOGNISES THE USE OF THE TERMINOLOGY IN WESTERN BALKANS.**
of different faiths, ethnicities, and ideologies, including RFTFs and their families, to bridge dialogue among groups and individuals who hold extremist views that may lead to confrontation and violence.

**Approach 3: Create a Synchronous Ecosystem of Networks on P/CVE and R&R**

This Investment Strategy is based on the logic that sustainable R&R programming in WB requires the creation of a regional synchronous ecosystem of Networks on P/CVE and R&R. The network must be composed of motivated and committed stakeholders. This regional network will facilitate dissemination of knowledge and awareness to all stakeholders, where the ecosystem of actors will promote cohesion in the network, through formulating a community of practice linking professional practitioners across the region dedicated to the same domain.27 At the same time, GCERF will use its Accelerated Funding Panel (AFP) to share good practices and lessons from R&R programming with government institutions, donor community, and international organisations working in this field. Any success of the network or ecosystem will rely on “collective knowledge construction,”28 one that can synchronise and activate new understanding by taking up each other’s contributions and combining them into new insights.

**Capacity building**

**Facilitate Capacity Building on R&R by linking global experts to local practitioners and actors**

To maximise the benefits of capacity development, GCERF will strengthen networks and partnerships between global experts and local R&R practitioners and actors. GCERF will evaluate potential partnerships with global R&R specialists and associations in the fields of psychosocial support focused on TVIC and learning disabilities, artificial intelligence, and strategic communication, research institutions, and think-tanks, etc. GCERF aims to link these global partners with local CSOs to facilitate the capacity development of local actors, including front-liners and central and local institutions, within and across countries in the region. GCERF will ensure that these capacity building services address the needs identified by the respective governments in the section above. At the same time, GCERF will approach private sector actors to support niche functions where GCERF and existing partners may have more limited expertise, such as digital activities, and interventions related to professional skills training. Partnerships with the private sector may lead to the provision of knowledge or advice, staff or resources, or collaboration on tools and resources for capacity development.

**Sharing and Learning across the Western Balkans region**

GCERF has a strong commitment to strengthen the P/CVE and R&R sector in the WB, share lessons learned to contribute to the regional and global P/CVE and R&R knowledge, and build the capacity of the organisations it funds. While GCERF funded CSOs will utilise sharing and learning among different practitioners (front-liners) involved in R&R at the local level, the GCERF Secretariat will apply both a horizontal (front-liners from different countries) and vertical (exchanging learning with actors with different specialisations and functions) approach

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toward exchanges at the regional level. The RAFF will support these exchanges through an annual workplan. GCERF will also create platforms to bring different actors from the ecosystem across Western Balkans countries to safely share knowledge, expertise, information, and lessons. The Webex consultations during April and May 2020 illustrate an important first step in operationalising these exchanges in a digital, post-COVID world.

At the same time, GCERF will use its Community of Practice approach to connect and exchange good practices and learnings among actors from different levels of the ecosystem, ranging from practitioners/front-liners in the field to government and law enforcement agencies, as well as other stakeholders, including donor community and think tanks working in the P/CVE and R&R space. Coordination, sharing, and learning among and between the wider psychosocial, development, peacebuilding, and security actors can lead to opportunities for broader partnership, pooling of resources and cross-sector, and cross-country learning. The approach of sharing and learning on R&R will carefully and diligently take into consideration protection, confidentiality, and preservation of civil liberties.

**Thematic Capacity Building**

A core objective of GCERF funding is to enhance the capacities of local actors on key thematics around P/CVE and R&R. The thematic capacity building process starts from the grantmaking stage and evolves significantly during the grant-management cycle. Initially, GCERF’s Independent Review Panel, a group of global experts on P/CVE and R&R, together with the Secretariat, and members of governments, donor community, and other stakeholders provide feedback to proposals submitted by CSOs to ensure quality, impact, as well as alignment and coherence with national strategies and action plans, as well as with GCERF’s theory of change on R&R. To deliver impactful R&R programming in WB, GCERF will engage CSOs and other actors of the broader ecosystem in sequential and comprehensive training and workshops on R&R. This training will provide CSOs and other actors with support on areas such as safety and security, including assessment and management of risks involved in programming, PVE with regards to different forms of extremism and their intersections (ethnonational, far-right movement and Salafi-Jihadi extremism), as well as cross-cutting issues such as Gender or Safeguarding and Child Protection.

**Technical Capacity Building**

GCERF works with partners to support a process of reflection and to identify the needs of grantees. GCERF begins this process with a process of Due Diligence assessment of potential grantees, which contributes towards understanding partners’ existing organisational capacities. This capacity assessment also includes assessing the monitoring and evaluation capacity of the organisation. As grants and proposals are agreed, capacity building will be mapped with grantees so that capacity building actions are linked and follow a logical sequence. This road map may include GCERF initiatives such as in-country workshops with grantees to develop their R&R Theories of Change, Results Frameworks, and related budgets and work plans. Grantees are empowered from the beginning to identify their own capacity gaps and plan how best to address gaps. Capacity building needs change over time, and so should be reviewed periodically. GCERF’s global capacity building guideline (BM.12 DOC.04
Annex.01) will be applied to ensure a comprehensive and multidimensional plan to enhance capacity in R&R and sustainability.

Monitoring and Evaluation

GCERF recognises that effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is challenging given the complexity of programming towards P/CVE. Specifically, GCERF will aim for prospective grant recipients to submit well-developed M&E systems as part of their proposals for GCERF funding. This will involve GCERF providing guidelines on how to develop effective M&E systems as part of those proposals. These guidelines may also be supported by in-country visits. These in-country visits would use these guidelines as a platform on how to develop the five core elements of an effective M&E system. Those interconnected, interdependent five core elements are:

1. Theory of Change (align with the overarching ToC developed with ICRD);
2. Results Framework (RF) including Output and Outcome Indicator Design and Indicator Target Estimation;
3. Data Collection & Analysis Plans to produce the RF Indicator values;
4. Research Design for the Outcome Indicators to support claims of project/grant achievements; and
5. Data Quality Assurance (DQA) to ensure project/grant Indicator values are reliable and valid.

It should be recognised that these five core elements are highly interdependent and that the absence of any one element can impede effective GCERF performance and impact monitoring of grant recipients. Hence, the GCERF Performance & Impact Unit will work closely with the GCERF Portfolio Management and Finance Units to ensure that these five core elements are developed with prospective grant recipients and are contained within their concept paper submission (i.e. Theory of Change) and subsequent grant proposals.

GCERF also recognises that the production and reporting of project/grant M&E Indicator data are necessary but not sufficient for overall effective grant/project management. The complexity and context-specific nature of programming towards P/CVE demands that these M&E Indicator data be used on a quarterly basis to proactively monitor the achievement of those Indicators against their Targets. For example, this monitoring should encourage GCERF, in collaboration with its grant recipients, to be flexible on a quarterly basis in adapting its programming by either scaling up an intervention (i.e. Output) or even closing down a particular intervention as warranted by this monitoring.

Finally, GCERF aims to deliver learning events online and in-country as well as between countries to share an understanding of what has been relatively effective for grant recipients in achieving their project Outcomes.

Funding

Through a ringfenced Accelerated Funding Mechanism (AFM), GCERF has already committed USD 1.7 million in initial grant funding for community-based reintegration programming in WB. Another USD 750,000 is expected by the end of May 2020, which would bring the amount
available for grants to USD 2.5m. It is expected that this grant funding will be allocated to new
and existing grantees before the end of 2020 and that grant funds will be implemented within
24 months of signing grant agreements. GCERF is expecting to sign grants with Principal
Recipients in Kosovo, Principal Recipients in North Macedonia, and a mix of Principal Recipients
and direct grantees in Albania.

USD 2.5m, however, is a starting point for grantmaking. GCERF is partnering with several
members of the Governing Board to raise additional funding by the end of 2020. The needs
outlined in this investment strategy suggest that at least USD 5.5m is needed to make a
significant impact in the Western Balkan region. Additional funds would also allow for strategic
expansion into Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to support community-based
reintegration programming and focus on PVE programming intended to address the growing
threat of Far-Right Extremism and Ethno-Nationalism in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia.

GCERF is also looking at ways to expand its partnership with United Nations Office of
Counterterrorism to engage in joint fundraising efforts in the Western Balkans.

If and when GCERF is able to raise USD 5.5 million for grants, and if BiH and Serbia are interested
in becoming partner countries, GCERF will explore further expansion of grantmaking activities.

**Operational Implications**

GCERF's experience funding grants in Kosovo and its subsequent travels around WB have
helped to elucidate some of the risks entailed with community-based reintegration
programming. GCERF is planning to maintain a risk matrix in each country that grantees and
the Regional Accelerated Funding Panel will feed into. An example of the proposed risk matrix
can be found in the sections below. GCERF will review the risk matrix quarterly and will provide
grantees with feedback on how risks are being managed.

**Risk Analysis**

**Basic Assumptions**

It is understood that programme participants of the FTF programmes will consist of the
following:

- Returned foreign terrorist fighters
- The spouses/partners of FTFs - either those who have returned themselves, or who are
  still engaged in combat abroad, or whose whereabouts are unknown
- The children of FTFs

The following expectations must be satisfied for the above to participate:

- Their attendance is voluntary and is not as a result of coercion or enforcement by
government security agencies;

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29 This is the amount available for grant funding after GCERF’s Board approved operational expenses and grant related expenses are
withdrawn from contributions.
30 GCERF is expecting to sign 2-3 grants in Kosovo, and a maximum of 2 grants in both Albania and North Macedonia.
They have been screened by the relevant national security agencies, and documented confirmation is given that they are no longer considered a risk to society;

They do not actively promote the work of any VE organisation, through social media or other relevant channels;

They are subject to continued screening by the host government national security agencies;

Assurance is given that GCERF is able to operate independently and is not identified as operating on behalf of the host government; and

A mechanism exists whereby security concerns regarding programme participants can be raised with the relevant authorities, without compromising the impartiality of GCERF.

## Risk Management

With respect to risk management, the following groups should be assessed:

1. The FTFs, spouses/partners and child participants
2. Frontliners – Psychologists, teachers, community leaders and other personnel leading the programmes
3. Grantee personnel
4. GCERF staff
5. GCERF as an organisation (reputational risk)

The risk management matrix which follows will primarily consider the safety and security risks to the above-mentioned groups, with the exception of GCERF, for which reputational risk will also be considered.

Foreseeable scenarios which are considered as part of the risk matrix are:

- Violence or threat of violence against FTFs, spouses/partners, or children participating in the programmes, by extremist groups or sympathisers;
- Violence or threat of violence against front-liner personnel;
- Violence or threat of violence against communities hosting activities;
- Violence or threat of violence against grantee and visiting GCERF personnel;
- Publication of programme activities on social media by VE groups for the purpose of encouraging attacks against them;
- Infiltration of programmes by active FTFs, partners/spouses or children for the purpose of gathering information or for targeting other programme participants;
- Infiltration of programmes by active FTFs, partners/spouses or children for the purposes of promoting radicalisation and recruitment;
- Reputational risk to GCERF of an attack on programme participants or grantee personnel;
- Reputational risk to GCERF of a programme participant discovered to be engaged in terrorist activity;
- Reputational risk to GCERF of a grantee group/organisation discovered to be promoting/supporting an extremist group; and
- Reputational risk to GCERF of funding being misappropriated to support a VE group
Institutional Risks for GCERF Secretariat

Contextual Risks

The COVID-19 pandemic presents a few risks to RRR programming. The first is that FTFs in North-east Syria may never be deported. The second is that delays in deportation might stall programme start-up. GCERF discussed these risks with the government in WB countries, and the risks will be closely monitored.

The political situation in Albania and North Macedonia is relatively stable compared to the current situation in Kosovo. Across the region, elections are conducted periodically, and the result is that government positions are rotated often. GCERF will keep sustaining and building new relationships with both politically appointed government officials and civil servants working on the R&R process to secure political buy-in and programme continuity. GCERF will also be in close contact with grantees and will ensure that political risks are clearly outlined in the quarterly reports submitted by grantees.

Programmatic Risks

Perhaps the most significant and unknown category of risks is programmatic risks. Working with RFTFs and their families, especially working with individuals who were repatriated from the battlefield, is high-risk programming for the front-liners and the returnees. If matters are not handled properly and delicately, individuals are at high risk of psychological trauma and recidivism. It is for this reason that GCERF plans to manage the grants in tight coordination with the Ministries and Divisions designated for management of R&R of RFTFs and their families. As noted in the approaches section above, GCERF’s funding support will go to both capacity strengthening of government front-liners as well as to CSOs to implement community interventions.

A few known risks which will need to be monitored carefully are regularly are as follows:

1. Stigmatisation of RFTFs and their families;
2. Income-generating activities provided to RFTFs and their families pose the risk of fund diversion to support violent extremist groups, including recruiters, or terrorist activities; and
3. Ensuring that support for R&R programmes aligns with regular support provided by government Ministries. If an RFTF receives a small grant to start a business, GCERF grantees must ensure that support is also being provided to non-RFTFs.

A specific security plan specific to each R&R programme will be developed to ensure that all risks are considered, and mitigation strategies are appropriately designed. Mitigation measures will include flexible programme design that can be easily adapted to evolving dynamics.

Security Risks

Other security issues related to some of the proposed zones of intervention, including civil unrest, must be closely monitored. To mitigate potential risks, in addition to soliciting
information from grantees, local authorities, and other stakeholders, a security plan will be developed by GCERF for each intervention area.

Financial Risks
The fluctuation of the various currencies used in WB against the U.S. dollar over the last year and the increasing inflation rates are likely to change in the near future, especially with the current COVID-19 pandemic. As such, these add new financial risks that will need to be addressed as this strategy is rolled out. To mitigate this risk, GCERF will work closely with grantees to monitor the fluctuations of currencies and make necessary changes to the work plans and budgets if necessary.

Fiduciary Risks
As with all funding, there is a risk that funds entrusted to the grantees are not used for the intended purpose and/or in compliance with applicable principles and legal requirements including through fraud and/or unreliable reporting on the use of funds. In each Western Balkan country, GCERF will apply its usual mitigating mechanism processes embedded in its grantee selection, proposal development, grant agreement development, and grant management processes.31

GCERF’s current approach to grant financial management includes: a clear set of financial management guidelines and templates that is regularly updated to respond to lessons learned and changes in the grantee environment; a regular assessment of financial risks, including the risk of loss or misuse, at grantee and GCERF levels; clear processes to support the grantees in the planning and management of programme budgets and cash resources, and the improvement of their internal control systems (including regular monitoring visits and financial examinations conducted by an external audit firm retained by GCERF). GCERF uses every opportunity to meet with grantees during grant development and during the life of the grant, to enhance the capacity of grantees to manage GCERF funds in accordance with GCERF standards.

ANNEX 1a: RISK MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIKELIHOOD</th>
<th>IMPACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certain/imminent (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligible (1)</td>
<td>LOW RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor (2)</td>
<td>MEDIUM RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (3)</td>
<td>HIGH RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly likely (4)</th>
<th>LOW RISK</th>
<th>MEDIUM RISK</th>
<th>HIGH RISK</th>
<th>HIGH RISK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likely (3)</td>
<td>INSIGNIFICANT RISK</td>
<td>LOW RISK</td>
<td>MEDIUM RISK</td>
<td>HIGH RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible (2)</td>
<td>INSIGNIFICANT RISK</td>
<td>LOW RISK</td>
<td>LOW RISK</td>
<td>MEDIUM RISK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely (1)</td>
<td>INSIGNIFICANT RISK</td>
<td>INSIGNIFICANT RISK</td>
<td>INSIGNIFICANT RISK</td>
<td>LOW RISK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 1b: RISK ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Category</th>
<th>Risk Type</th>
<th>Risk Description</th>
<th>Inherent Risk (Likelihood x Impact)</th>
<th>Risk Mitigation</th>
<th>Residual Risk (Likelihood x Impact)</th>
<th>Description of residual risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PROGRAMME SUPPORT | Security | Threats of violence against programme participants as a consequence of involvement | | • Risk and threat analysis for each programme activity  
• Restricted communications on programme activity  
• Information security relating to participant details  
• Use of pseudonyms for participants  
• Confidential reporting mechanism  
• Conduct awareness sessions for programme participants of confidential reporting  
• Conduct awareness sessions in all programmes for staff to increase knowledge of policies and procedures that are in place and to identify signs of victimisation of participants  
• Establish a mechanism for confidential reporting to relevant security forces, while maintaining impartiality  
• Development of a programme incident response plan and associated SOPs | 3 (Likelihood) x 5 (Impact) = 15 | 3 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Threats against grantee staff, including 'front-liner' personnel</th>
<th>PROGRAMME SUPPORT AND COMPLIANCE RISKS</th>
<th>Risk and threat analysis for each programme activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual violence against programme participants as a consequence of involvement</td>
<td>Security Management System in place</td>
<td>Security Management System in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of pre-identified 'safe spaces' for programme activities</td>
<td>Networking with stakeholders and information network for cascading threat information</td>
<td>Networking with stakeholders and information network for cascading threat information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency reporting mechanism to relevant security services</td>
<td>Multiple communications systems in place for alerting</td>
<td>Multiple communications systems in place for alerting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incident response plan and associated SOPs, including 'lockdown' of programme facility and emergency evacuation arrangements</td>
<td>HEIST training for staff</td>
<td>HEIST training for staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-incident counselling</td>
<td>Develop incident response plan and associated SOPs</td>
<td>Develop incident response plan and associated SOPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to engage additional security support where relevant</td>
<td>Information security relating to staff and 'front-liners'</td>
<td>Information security relating to staff and 'front-liners'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of pre-identified 'safe spaces' for programme activities</td>
<td>Robust reporting system in place</td>
<td>Robust reporting system in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency reporting mechanism to relevant security services</td>
<td>No 'lone working'</td>
<td>No 'lone working'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incident response plan and associated SOPs, including 'lockdown' of programme facility and emergency evacuation arrangements</td>
<td>Ability to increase physical security</td>
<td>Ability to increase physical security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 (Likelihood) x 4 (Impact) = 16
| Security | Actual violence against grantee staff, including ‘front-liner’ personnel | (guarding), change venue, conduct remote activities or postpone as necessary  
- Raise awareness of community on humanitarian principles (including awareness material) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Threat of violence against communities hosting FTF programmes (only relevant if programmes have community involvement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- The same as for actual violence against programme participants  
- Risk and threat analysis for each programme activity  
- Community acceptance  
- Security information network  
- Security agencies support  
- Confidential reporting mechanism  
- Development of a programme incident response plan and associated SOPs  
- Ability to engage additional security support where relevant |
| Security | Actual violence against communities hosting FTF |  
- As for actual violence against programme participants |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>PROGRAMMES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat of violence against visiting GCERF staff</td>
<td>• Risk analysis for each trip</td>
<td>• Information security principles (‘need to know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Remainder are the same as for threat against programme staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 1c: Existing P/CVE and R&R Programmes in Western Balkans

### Regional-level Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Implementing Organisation</th>
<th>Programme End date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVE through local voices and initiatives</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>October 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities first: Creation of a civil society hub to address violent extremism</td>
<td>Forum MNE</td>
<td>March 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resocialisation Project</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>February 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalisation in Prisons</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>October 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Country-level Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Implementing Organisation</th>
<th>Programme End date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Psychosocial support for the children of RFTFs 32</td>
<td>Institute for Activism and Social Change &amp; FOKUS Centre</td>
<td>November 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>PVE among youth through social entrepreneurship and active youth community structures</td>
<td>Forum for Civic Initiative 33</td>
<td>July 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Strong and Resilient communities in Mitrovica</td>
<td>Community Building Mitrovica Consortia 34</td>
<td>February 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory Democracy for a Kosovo without Radicalisation</td>
<td>ATRC Consortia 35</td>
<td>December 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Resilience for Individuals and Communities</td>
<td>Community Development Fund Consortia 36</td>
<td>June 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 The programme budget is 129,000 Euro and the programme reach to date is four families.
33 The programme is funded by GCERF.
34 The programme is funded by GCERF.
35 The programme is funded by GCERF.
36 The programme is funded by GCERF.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moving towards sustainable approaches in PVE</th>
<th>IOM</th>
<th>No data available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raising Awareness for Social Welfare</td>
<td>NGO Partners Kosova</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration of Children</td>
<td>Kosovo Centre for Security Studies&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health- Psycho-social Rehabilitation Support</td>
<td>Kosovo rehabilitation Centre Against Torture&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD trainings for psychologists and psychiatrists, who are working with those linked to FTFs and their families.</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Macedonia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Building Reintegration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Association for Civic Activism and Encouraging Social Responsibility Horizon Civitas&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>37</sup> The programme budget is less than USD 100,000  
<sup>38</sup> The programme budget is less than USD 100,000  
<sup>39</sup> The programme budget is 61,754 EUR.