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1 *Introduction*

GLOBAL INCIDENTS of conflict, terrorism and violent crime are all rising, some quite significantly. Yet understanding and responding to the drivers of this insecurity is becoming increasingly challenging, whether in relation to insurgencies, violence related to ideology or a return to inter-state conflict. The impact is felt in the form of chronic humanitarian needs, unprecedented migration flows and growing inequality, which can in turn exacerbate the root causes and drivers of insecurity.

Violent extremism is a global problem, which can manifest itself in all places, amidst all cultures and ideologies, but with different, localised characteristics. Recruiters work by pointing to social, political and economic injustices and playing on the grievances, real or perceived, of their followers. They capitalise on grievances resulting from a corrupt system of politics or ideologies, which they incite their followers to fight against. To be persuasive, many of the arguments put forth are based on facts but portrayed in a highly selective and incomplete way, thus distorting reality. The means by which these recruiters incite followers to seek redress for injustices is through violence and oppression.

The challenge for policymakers has arguably never been greater; the international community needs to bring all its tools to the table both to resolve ongoing crises and to prevent their reoccurrence. The European Union (EU), with its member states, is the world's largest development actor, with a comprehensive global reach and a range of instruments to allow it to engage on continental, regional and national levels. These cover a range of different approaches, from long-term preventive engagements on trade, infrastructure and development-orientated service delivery, to short-term stabilisation, targeted humanitarian relief and recovery measures.



'A diverse range of stakeholders need to be empowered'

Addressing both manifestations of, and the conditions conducive to, violent extremism is a developmental challenge. A core part of addressing this threat lies in strengthening the fundamental building blocks of equitable development, human rights, governance and the rule of law. A diverse range of stakeholders need to be brought into the process and empowered, including state actors and security institutions, local municipalities and government actors, as well as members of communities and civil society who can speak courageously and compellingly about truth, tolerance and acceptance. While a strong response to violent extremism is required, this should be based on civil liberties and should address insecurity, inequality and marginalisation. The EU is committed to working with partners across the globe to achieve this in the interests of all citizens.

Over the last decade, the European Commission has invested heavily in combating this threat by addressing conditions conducive to violent extremism, building capacity to reinforce the rule of law, promote development and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable communities. This brochure highlights projects funded or supported by the European Commission worldwide that contribute to this effort.

'While a strong response to violent extremism is required, this should be based on civil liberties and should address insecurity, inequality and marginalisation'

2 Concepts and Definitions

TERRORISM, RADICALISATION and extremism are subjective concepts that have different meanings for different people. Their definitions are constantly evolving as they manifest themselves in diverse ways across various parts of the world, exploiting new vulnerabilities, technologies and approaches. When engaging in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programmes and initiatives, it is important to understand and be sensitive to the disparate ways in which such terminology is used and understood in different localities. That said, at the policy level it is vital to develop common definitions in order for the EU and its partners to work together in a coordinated, effective manner. This lexicon, which deals with very sensitive issues, has to remain neutral and non-emotive to avoid confusion, prejudice, stigmatisation or pre-emptive conclusions. This chapter provides a brief outline of the most important concepts

'Terrorism, radicalisation and extremism are subjective concepts that have different meanings for different people'

Defining Terrorism

Terms associated with terrorism, including violent extremism and radicalisation are **complex and controversial** because of their political implications. The former United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged this difficulty in his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2015), which states at the outset that violent extremism (much like terrorism) is a 'diverse phenomenon, without clear definition'.¹ The Plan of Action concedes that defining terrorism and violent extremism is 'the prerogative of Member States and must be consistent with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law'.²

The European Parliament has acknowledged this challenge, stating that 'the positions adopted by individual countries, regional and international organisations have resulted in a patchwork of approaches'.³ To circumvent any discursive difficulties, the EU instead

1 UN General Assembly, 'Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General', 24 December 2015.

2 *Ibid.*

3 European Parliament, 'At a Glance: Understanding Definitions of Terrorism', November 2015.

shapes its policy approach in response to ‘terrorist offences’. What constitutes a terrorist offence has developed over time. A recent definition, provided by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism, is:

attacks against a person’s life, as intentional acts that can qualify as terrorist offences when and insofar as committed with a specific terrorist aim, namely to seriously intimidate a population, to unduly compel a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.⁴

This latest directive builds on earlier delineations proposed in the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, which criminalised ‘public provocation to commit terrorist offences, and recruitment and training for terrorism’.⁵ An Additional Protocol was included in 2015, criminalising recruitment for terrorism, training for terrorism, travel to another state for purposes related to terrorism, and the provision or collection of funds for such travel.⁶ A 2017 directive expands these parameters further by criminalising both the organisation and facilitation of travel for the purpose of terrorism. It similarly adds the receipt of training to the existing offence of providing training, including the obtaining of knowledge, documentation or practical skills to perpetrate terrorist acts. The boundaries of what constitutes ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’ were also revised in the new directive to include the glorification and justification of terrorism through the online and/or offline dissemination of messages, and a series of additional crimes were identified as terrorist activities, for example: aggravated theft with a view to committing a terrorist offence; extortion with a view to committing a terrorist offence; and/or drawing up or using false administrative documents with a view to committing a terrorist offence.⁷

‘What constitutes a terrorist offence has developed over time’

Extremism and Violent Extremism

Extremism is generally understood as ‘activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary’.⁸ Though this is clearly a relative term which invites disagreement regarding benchmarks, it is broadly agreed that extremist views are not necessarily illegal and do not automatically lead to violence or harm. Indeed, those with extremist views, who may also choose to observe

4 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ‘Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA’, *Official Journal of the European Union* (L 88/6, 31 March 2017).

5 Council of Europe, ‘Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism’, 16 May 2005.

6 Council of Europe, ‘Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism’, Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 217, 22 October 2015.

7 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ‘Directive (EU) 2017/541’.

8 Peter T Coleman and Andrea Bartoli, ‘Addressing Extremism’, International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Columbia University, p. 2.

extreme practices with no impact on the civil liberties of fellow citizens, are rightly protected under fundamental freedoms and human rights norms.

Extremism becomes a concern when those views threaten the democratic rule of law and promote the use of violence to achieve their objects or coerce their followers. This form of extremism is described as ‘violent extremism’, a contested term generally referring to the creation of ideologically motivated or politically motivated violence, as well as support for such acts. Much like the UN, the EU does not offer an official definition of violent extremism. However, a working definition is: the use of and support for violence in pursuit of ideological, religious or political goals.⁹

Radicalisation

Like terrorism and violent extremism, radicalisation is a contested term with various definitions.¹⁰ It is commonly understood, however, as the social and psychological process of incremental commitment to violent extremist ideologies.¹¹ This usually manifests in non-linear, fluid and idiosyncratic ways, and does not necessarily mean that those affected will become violent. Often ‘radicalisation’ merely describes a process where an individual’s beliefs move from being relatively mainstream to seeking a drastic change in society: this is not synonymous with terrorism. However, when a decision is made that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, radicalisation to violent extremism occurs. This is a complex and problematic process and three issues need to be understood:

1. Some authorities take the concept to imply that the end point of radicalisation is violence, whereas others take it to mean that the end point may be merely ‘extreme’ views (that is, without necessarily advocating/being involved in violence).
2. ‘Radicalisation’ tends to imply unwarranted degrees of consistency and linearity in the trajectory from ‘non-radical’ to ‘radical’ (that is, downplaying the extent to which everyone has their own pathway).
3. ‘Radicalisation’ implies that a change in behaviour is the result of a change in belief. Mainstream psychology, however, shows that the relationship between beliefs and behaviours is surprisingly weak, and research into terrorism

‘The term “recruitment” is often used in conjunction with radicalisation. However, the two cannot always be used interchangeably’

⁹ See Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al., ‘Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review’, Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, Defense Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Department of Defence, March 2011, p. 9; James Khalil, ‘Know Your Enemy: On the Futility of Distinguishing Between Terrorists and Insurgents’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (Vol. 36, No. 5, May 2013), pp. 419–30.

¹⁰ Alex P Schmid, ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review’, Research Paper, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, March 2013.

¹¹ John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement From Radical and Extremist Movements* (London: Routledge, 2009).

reveals it is possible to hold extreme beliefs and to be non-violent. Some violent extremists have not been influenced strongly by ideology at all.

The term 'recruitment' is often used in conjunction with radicalisation. However, the two cannot always be used interchangeably. 'Recruitment' acknowledges the presence of an external influence enticing individuals into violent extremism, while the term 'radicalisation' has been criticised for assuming that the individual develops extreme views (almost in isolation) *before* searching out terrorist groups, rather than vice versa.¹² In contrast, members join violent extremist groups and movements for many different, often non-ideological, reasons and can be retrospectively indoctrinated through the mechanics of 'group think' and 'group identity'. These dynamics are pervasive in conflict environments, for example, where individuals tend to initially align themselves with terrorist organisations due to pragmatic, rational or opportunistic considerations.¹³

'It is essential to acknowledge that violent extremism is multi-factorial, extremely diverse, and cannot be predicted by a single variable'

When discussing both radicalisation and recruitment, it is therefore essential to acknowledge that violent extremism is multi-factorial, extremely diverse, and cannot be predicted by a single variable. Indeed, the growth of violent extremist movements depends on particular contextually-dependent configurations of situational, social, cultural and individual factors, playing out at the macro (national, regional and global), meso (community or identity group), and micro (individual) levels, with the precise combination of motivating factors varying by location.¹⁴

A useful typology clusters these influences into four categories to provide greater scope for diagnostic nuance and precision: structural motivations; enabling factors; group and network dynamics; and individual incentives.¹⁵

- **Structural Motivators** – for example: repression; corruption; unemployment; inequality; discrimination; a history of hostility between identity groups; external state interventions in the affairs of other nations.
- **Individual Incentives** – for example: a sense of purpose (generated through acting in accordance with perceived ideological tenets); adventure; belonging; acceptance; status; material or financial enticements; fear of repercussions by violent extremist entities; expected rewards in the afterlife.
- **Group-Based and Network Dynamics** – for example: peer pressure; values and norms of groups that contribute and encourage recruitment; radicalisation and support for violent extremism.

¹² Mark Sedgwick, 'The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion', *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Vol. 22, No. 4, 2010), pp. 79–94.

¹³ Sarah Ladbury, 'Testing Hypotheses on Radicalisation in Afghanistan: Why Do Men Join the Taliban and Hizb-I-Islami: How Much Do Local Communities Support Them?', *Cooperation for Peace and Unity*, 14 August 2009.

¹⁴ Harriet Allan et al., 'Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review', RUSI, 16 October 2015.

¹⁵ USAID, 'The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice', September 2011, pp. 3–4.

- **Enabling Factors** – for example: the presence of ‘radical’ mentors (including religious leaders, individuals from social networks, among others); access to ‘radical’ online communities; social networks with violent extremism associations; access to weaponry or other relevant items; a comparative lack of state influence; an absence of familial support and so on.


P/CVE Concepts

The primary aim of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Development and Cooperation assistance is to promote sustainable development. However, in many parts of the world, basic development goals have not been met due to insecurity, including that caused by violent extremism. In turn, violent extremist ideologies often find space to thrive in fragile communities suffering from a lack of development. It is for this reason that the EU is committed to promoting development approaches alongside dedicated efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism around the world. This is in line with the UN Secretary-General’s 2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which recognises **the need for a practical and comprehensive approach to address factors contributing to violent extremism** wherever they arise.

‘The EU is committed to promoting development approaches alongside dedicated efforts to prevent and counter extremism’

It has been acknowledged that there is a need for an increased focus on preventive approaches to violence as a core component of counterterrorism in order to be successful over the long term. This is driven by recognition in recent years from both policymakers and practitioners that a holistic response is necessary to address the complex nature of violent extremism.

The European Commission’s P/CVE projects span eight themes: development of education; media awareness; empowerment of women; youth work; socioeconomic inclusion; governance capacity building; transitional justice; and inter-communal activities including sport and inter-faith dialogue.



P/CVE can therefore be considered a broad umbrella term categorising activities that seek to prevent or mitigate violent extremism through various non-coercive measures united by the objective of counteracting the factors of violent extremism. P/CVE is widely understood to include, for instance, community debates on sensitive topics, media messaging, inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues, training of state governance and security actors, and a variety of initiatives with individuals deemed to be ‘at risk’ of joining or being attracted to violent extremist groups, such as vocational training and mentorship programmes. It therefore overlaps with efforts to prevent violence and conflict by supporting development, strengthening institutions, and strengthening appropriate policy frameworks

Development organisations, practitioners and scholars have individual preferences for applying ‘preventing violent extremism’ (PVE) and ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE), and others tend to use them interchangeably. Initially there was little difference in terms of the objectives, actions and programmatic logics of interventions on the ground.¹⁶ Within the UN system, for example, the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) use the terms CVE and PVE respectfully, despite both agencies sharing a relatively synonymous understanding of the steps necessary to diminish the threat of violent extremism. Some development actors, however, insist on only engaging in PVE, at times shying away from conversations framed around CVE, due to lingering

‘P/CVE can therefore be considered a broad umbrella term categorising activities that seek to prevent or mitigate violent extremism through various non-coercive measures united by the objective of counteracting the factors of violent extremism (CVE)’

¹⁶ CIVIL.POL and RUSI, ‘Operational Guidelines on the Preparation and Implementation of EU Financed Actions Specific to Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Third Countries’, European Commission, 2017.

concerns that the ‘C’ is too closely associated with security-led approaches.¹⁷ The citation and reiteration of distinct labels by different stakeholders has gradually led to two overlapping but discrete categories of intervention that have developed practical variations over time. PVE tends to focus on upstream, often broad-based prevention programming. In contrast, CVE is much more parochial, targeting ‘at-risk’ recipients, or individual incentives, enabling factors and/or structural motivations specifically identified as contributing to violent extremism.¹⁸

‘The externalities of an upstream, society-wide capacity-building programme may have negative outcomes for CVE objectives’

The prospect of a relatively artificial, discursively led differentiation is nevertheless problematic as it potentially lends itself to bolstering indiscriminate, mass programming under the label ‘prevention’ without any relevance to the specific factors contributing to violent extremism. This not only generates opportunity costs through the misallocation of resources, but also risks overlooking the individuals or areas most susceptible to recruitment or accentuating underlying drivers. Education-based interventions are a good example. Without a rigorous needs assessment and context analysis, intuitively appealing projects strengthening the national school system in country X may precipitate a backlash from highly educated postgraduates with frustrated expectations if they are subsequently unable to find a job.¹⁹ The externalities of an upstream, society-wide capacity-building programme may therefore have negative outcomes for CVE objectives if, in this instance, it is not appropriately tailored to the demands of the national labour market, or if it fails to include ‘at risk’ populations unlikely to participate in the mainstream school system.

‘CVE is parochial, targeting “at risk” recipients, or the individual incentives, enabling factors and/or structural motivations specifically identified as contributing to violent extremism’

¹⁷ Eric Rosand et al., ‘A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda’, Prevention Project and RUSI, September 2018.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Orlandrew E Danzell, Yao-Yuan Yeh and Melia Pfannenstiel, ‘Does Education Mitigate Terrorism? Examining the Effects of Educated Youth Cohorts on Domestic Terror in Africa’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, August 2018, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1506336.

To help navigate these complexities, some policymakers, including those in the EU, tended to differentiate 'CVE Specific'²⁰ from 'CVE Relevant' programmes, acknowledging a discrete set of goals and operational priorities. However, this failed to manage confluences between CVE and the similar fields of peace-building, education and development, nor adequately capture the nuance of different intervention types. A better schema is provided by an adapted version of the public health model, which stratifies between three types of intervention: Primary, Secondary and Tertiary.

- **Primary:** broad-based, mass prevention programmes addressing a range of social grievances including, but not specifically focusing on, factors contributing to violent extremism. This would include, for example, conventional development initiatives and national-level education reform.
- **Secondary:** 'counter violent extremism' activities that either identify 'at-risk' populations/individuals or address individual incentives, enabling factors and/or structural motivators diagnosed as contributing towards radicalisation or violent extremist recruitment. These are contextually defined interventions and may, in certain environments, include more conventional developmental or structural-level programming if they respond to, and ameliorate, factors specifically feeding violent extremism across particular geographic and/or demographic sites. Projects could also integrate capacity-building modalities if designed to build or strengthen resilience to violent extremism. 'Resilience' is a contentious and complex term but refers here to a wide range of factors (ideas, institutions, trends and values) that enable individuals and/or communities to resist, or recover from, the specific contributory dynamics feeding violent extremism.
- **Tertiary:** counterterrorism, disengagement and deradicalisation initiatives engaging with violent extremists or members of terrorist organisations.

'The public health model delineates between the varied objectives, dynamics and recipients of different intervention types'

While each strand reflects a valuable mode of programming that often complements, overlaps and reinforces another in a broader system of violence prevention, the public health model more accurately delineates between the varied objectives, dynamics and recipients of different intervention types.

Alongside developmental initiatives, deradicalisation and disengagement are often subsumed under the CVE label, but, as demonstrated in the framework above, both these processes in reality operate as downstream mechanisms to mitigate recidivism by targeting individuals with a previous involvement in violent extremism or related forms of violence, for instance defectors or those convicted for terrorism offences.

²⁰ 'CVE-Specific' programming was defined as the creation of new activities explicitly designed to address the factors and enabling conditions facilitating radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in a given context and will focus on 'at risk' or 'vulnerable' groups. In contrast, 'CVE-Relevant' programmes focused on adapting existing developmental programmes, either by adding a P/CVE dimension/activity or by tailoring the intervention to focus on a particular 'at risk' or 'vulnerable' group. The programme is then aimed at addressing the factors of violent extremism that have been identified and becomes 'CVE-Relevant'.



Alongside radicalisation and recruitment, deradicalisation and disengagement have important conceptual discrepancies that need to be understood:

- Deradicalisation is a social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to violent extremism is reduced and they neither subscribe to radical ideological views nor engage in violent activity. Crucially, this implies a cognitive shift – that is, a fundamental change in understanding. This can be problematic if treated as a specific objective (a) as not all individuals who contribute to violence hold 'radical' attitudes in any case, and (b) as it is not always necessary to change attitudes to adapt behaviours.²¹
- In practical terms disengagement is often conflated with deradicalisation, but in contrast to deradicalisation, disengagement refers to behavioural change, such as leaving a group or changing one's role within it. It does not necessitate a cognitive change in values, ideals or attitudes, but requires relinquishing the objective of achieving change through violence. It is associated most commonly with the specific process of leaving violent extremist entities.

'Deradicalisation and disengagement have important conceptual discrepancies'

'It is important to understand and be sensitive to the disparate ways in which P/ CVE terminology is used and understood in different localities'

21 Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model* (The Hague: Clingendael, 2009).

3

EU Counterterrorism and P/CVE Policy

THE EUROPEAN Union has long recognised the need to address the threat of terrorism, both at home and abroad. In June 2016, the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy²² was presented as a new overarching foreign and security policy framework and reference document for the EU. This paper identifies terrorism as one of the key threats facing the EU and highlights the need to further develop cooperation with the EU's neighbourhood and other regions on countering terrorism and violent extremism. The need for enhanced international cooperation on countering terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, is also emphasised in the European Council Conclusions of 9 February 2015.²³ This is further reinforced in the Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism released in June 2017, which lays out clear guidance on how counterterrorism and P/CVE should be embedded across EU strategies and policies.²⁴ The 2018 Council Conclusions on Strengthening Civilian CSDP similarly emphasises the role of civilian CSDP missions for preventing and countering violent extremism as a component of broader EU responses.²⁵

'The European Union has long recognised the need to address the threat of terrorism, both at home and abroad'

In 2005, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted with the aim of 'combating terrorism globally, while respecting human rights'. The strategy is based on four pillars:

- **Prevent:** to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment.
- **Protect:** to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce vulnerability to an attack.

22 European External Action Service, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', June 2016.

23 Council of the European Union, 'Council Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism', 6048/15, 9 February 2015.

24 Council of the European Union, 'Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism', 10384/17, 19 June 2017.

25 Council of the European Union, 'Council Conclusions on Strengthening Civilian CSDP', 9288/18, 28 May 2018.

- **Pursue:** to pursue terrorists, bring them to justice, and build local capacity to do so.
- **Respond:** to prepare for and minimise the consequences of a successful terrorist attack.

Under the 'Prevent' pillar, the EU has been developing policy frameworks and implementation measures both within Europe and across strategic locations worldwide. It is now widely accepted that 'hard' counterterrorism measures from the 'Pursue' and 'Respond' streams cannot, in isolation, address the complex nature of terrorism, or ameliorate the enabling environment for violent extremism. Proactive prevention work is therefore vital and has been integrated as a key priority of the EU's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

The basis of the EU's 'Prevent' work is the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, which was most recently revised in May 2014.²⁶ The revised strategy identifies priority areas for EU action, both within and outside the EU, including the promotion of equal opportunities, community-level efforts, counternarratives and capacity building. It calls for a joint effort between relevant stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to support vulnerable countries to counter terrorist recruitment and build community resilience to radicalisation. The need for a comprehensive approach in preventing radicalisation to violent extremism was also highlighted in the Communication from the European Commission of June 2016.²⁷ Moreover, the revised strategy encourages the EU to consider radicalisation, and raise awareness of counter-radicalisation work, within its development programming.

The High-Level Expert Group on Radicalisation, established in July 2017 to offer recommendations on how to improve coordination and collaboration between all relevant stakeholders, presented its final report on 18 May 2018.²⁸ It includes a broad range of recommendations for concrete action to address challenges in priority areas such as radicalisation in prisons (including follow-up after release and the management of sentences), communication and online propaganda, multi-stakeholder cooperation at the local level, education and social inclusion, support to groups which require particular attention (including in particular youth radicalisation and child returnees), as well as the external dimension. Recognising the added value and achievements of EU initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the European Strategic Communication Network (ESCN) and the EU Internet Forum, the report calls for strengthening these initiatives and the coordination between them, while creating closer links between all stakeholders involved, including front line practitioners, policymakers and researchers. The report stresses the importance of actions at EU level being geared closer to member states' needs.

'The EU's "Prevent" work calls for a joint effort between relevant stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to support vulnerable countries to counter terrorist recruitment and build community resilience to radicalisation'

²⁶ Council of the European Union, 'Draft Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism', 9956/14, 19 May 2014.

²⁷ European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions on Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism', COM (2016) 379 final, 14 June 2016.

²⁸ European Commission, 'High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCERG-R)', Final Report, May 2018.

The EU has been conducting counterterrorism political dialogues with many affected countries. These dialogues help identify, at an early stage, some of the needs of the local partners to be addressed by development programming. In addition, as part of the integrated approach, several civilian CSDP missions contribute through capacity-building mandates to the EU's wider efforts in this area.

The European Commission has long recognised the so-called 'security–development nexus' which dictates that there can be no security without development, and vice versa. Fragile states, weak governance, socioeconomic and sociopolitical grievances provide uninhibited operating spaces for violent extremists and fertile ground for recruitment and radicalisation. Armed conflicts also offer compelling images and narratives that can be used to radicalise. P/CVE, and the stabilising impact that building resilience to violent extremism can have, is therefore both directly and indirectly relevant to improving the delivery of assistance and development aid in vulnerable countries.

The EU has recognised this interdependency between sustainable development, humanitarian action, peace and security, and many of its programmes promote shared solutions to violence and instability, including by supporting the democratic governance of the security sector in order to promote its effectiveness in providing human security, and capacity-building.²⁹

Similar synergies are reflected in the UN's Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peace and security, which states that the international community should '[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development' and '[s]trengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.'³⁰

'Programmes that contribute to CVE are drawn from the full range of European thematic and geographic instruments'

The European Commission's P/CVE programming follows a number of general principles:

- It must be evidence based.
- The local context must be considered, and programming tailored accordingly.
- The principles of 'Do No Harm' and 'Do Maximum Good' must frame interventions to ensure they do not cause human rights violations, exacerbate divisions between institutions and communities, and worsen existing grievances. Crucially, however, this should not lapse into the temptations of risk aversion as this may impinge on the programme's ability to achieve its intended impact.
- A multidisciplinary, 'whole of society' approach must be adopted, involving a range of actors beyond traditional law enforcement and military services, including public health, mental health and social service providers, parents and families,

²⁹ Council of the European Union, "The New European Consensus on Development: "Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future", Joint Statement by the Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, June 2017.

³⁰ UN, 'Sustainable Development Goals', Goal 16, Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, Target 16.a.



researchers, education institutions, businesses and the private sector, ministries of education, social welfare and health, municipal authorities and local government, peacebuilders, correctional and probation officials, human-rights agencies and civil society.³¹

EU-focused initiatives are an important component of the European Commission's P/CVE work. However, there has long been a recognition that P/CVE work at home needs to be aligned with efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism further afield. A number of EU member states also maintain their own internal and external P/CVE policies and programmes with similar principles and objectives. In light of this, both the EU and its member states have increasingly sought to draw on each other's experiences.

EU programmes that contribute to P/CVE are drawn from the full range of European thematic and geographic instruments, such as the European Development Fund (EDF), sub-regional and regional instruments, thematic funds on governance and justice, and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which addresses transnational and cross-border challenges.

³¹ Rosand et al., 'A Roadmap to Progress'.

4

EU Action on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

RECOGNISING THE global challenge posed by violent extremism, this chapter showcases a non-exhaustive list of current EU-supported P/CVE-relevant and P/CVE projects from different regions around the world. The European Commission's P/CVE activities cover a wide and expanding geographic area, including West, North and East Africa; the Middle East; and South and Southeast Asia.

P/CVE initiatives in these regions generally fall under three categories, broadly reflected by the 'Primary' and 'Secondary' strands of the public health model.

The first category is **public engagement**, which focuses on reaching broad audiences with key messaging through media campaigns and intercommunal cultural activities.

The second category involves more **targeted interventions** aimed at vulnerable communities or individuals. These include improving socioeconomic inclusion and services, providing educational programmes, developing female and youth leaders and transitional justice. These complement 'tertiary'-level targeted interventions focusing on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) initiatives.

The third broad category involves efforts to **enhance the P/CVE capacities** of relevant governmental and non-governmental actors. These forms of capacity-building include work carried out specifically with police, civil society and the media, as well as conflict mitigation and peace-building experts and policymakers.

Under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, various global P/CVE actions have been launched around the world under the Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (**STRIVE**) programme. These **STRIVE** actions aim to facilitate innovative P/CVE projects in collaboration with local communities, to create conditions conducive to development and resilience towards violent extremism. Several of these actions are included in this chapter, followed by regional and national actions that similarly aim to build resilience to violent extremism.

'STRIVE actions aim to facilitate innovative P/CVE projects, in collaboration with local communities, to create conditions conducive to development and resilience towards violent extremism'



Since 2013, over €29 million has been allocated to projects in over 20 countries across the globe to prevent and counter violent extremism. The key common factor is that the specific actions under the programme are innovative, testing new ground and creating a platform for learning which can feed into the larger traditional cooperation instruments of the EU.

‘P/CVE activities cover a wide and expanding geographic area, including West, North and East Africa; the Middle East; and South and Southeast Asia’

STRIVE Kenya

Strengthening resilience to violent extremism in Kenya

DURING STRIVE Horn of Africa (HoA) it became evident that there was an interest and need for continuing CVE efforts in East Africa, leading to the launch of a follow-up programme, STRIVE Kenya, in October 2016. Designed to last 36 months, the project's geographic scope has become more concentrated, with all initiatives focused exclusively on Kenya, although stringent efforts have been made to incorporate and reflect the experiences and lessons learned from STRIVE HoA.

The overarching objective of this second incarnation is **'to contribute to increased peace, stability and inclusive economic opportunities for youth in marginalised areas in Kenya'**. More specifically, it seeks to understand local sources of conflict and exclusion, leading to informed policy and interventions that alleviate needs and grievances; provide youth with vocational skills to improve employment and livelihood prospects; strengthen capacities to manage and prevent conflict; and build trust between the state, civil society and local communities.

These aims have been divided into four central result areas:

- **Result Area 1:** Research to understand the causes of conflict, including: the role of women in violent extremism; the relationship between clan conflict and recruitment in North Eastern Kenya; the relationship between land conflict and radicalisation in the South Coast; and the relationship between violent extremism and crime in Majengo and Eastleigh (Nairobi).
- **Result Area 2:** Mentorship with a specific focus on women.
- **Result Area 3:** Law enforcement training.
- **Result Area 4:** Preventive communications.

These four areas have been deliberately designed as sequels to the output of STRIVE HoA, drawing on important lessons learned to develop a set of new and expanded pilot programmes to enrich the CVE knowledge base, and contribute towards best practice. This includes scaling up the mentorship scheme, increasing the number of mentees and building a complementary referral system predicted on the recommendations outlined in the external evaluation of STRIVE HoA. The STRIVE team has similarly incorporated a theory of change (TOC) approach to strengthen their methodology. By explicitly stating the programming's underlying assumptions, objectives and expected outcomes, the TOC can provide a framework for learning and adapting projects, and help identify gaps in its underlying logic. STRIVE Kenya therefore explicitly builds on the lessons of STRIVE HoA and will continue to contribute towards improving the understanding and implementation of CVE on a local, regional and international level.



STRIVE Afghanistan

Strengthening resilience to violent extremism in Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN IS a context of continuing conflict and fragility and faces a range of different violent extremist threats. In the attempt to reduce the vulnerability of 'at risk' populations including high-risk returned migrants and host communities in Afghanistan to recruitment by violent extremist groups, under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the EU has launched a new 40-month STRIVE action worth €3 million which started in January 2019.

This will be achieved by two specific objectives:

1. Host and returned migrant communities identified as "at risk" demonstrate more desirable attitude and behaviours.
2. Afghan government understands and effectively responds to recruitment to violent extremist groups.



The project is focused on four results areas:

1. Knowledge and understanding of the factors which contribute to vulnerability of returned migrants and/or host communities to violent extremism at individual and community level increased.
2. Interventions to increase the resilience of returned migrants and host community members to joining violent extremist groups piloted and impact measured.
3. Government understanding of, and capacity to implement, strategies to reduce risks posed by violent extremism in Afghanistan enhanced.
4. Ensure that the visibility of the EU and the programme is increased within the EU and its member states as well as partner and beneficiary countries and organisations and ensure that lessons learned are integrated into the broader P/CVE field, which suffers from limited evaluation data about the impact of P/CVE interventions.

Based on the EU STRIVE model, this innovative action puts strong emphasis on research and learning. The experience generated through previous STRIVE actions will be reflected in STRIVE Afghanistan.

The action is implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in partnership with Seefar.

PVE Burkina Faso

Restore social cohesion in the north of Burkina Faso through improved understanding of the drivers of radicalisation, promotion of dialogue and revitalisation of the pastoral economy

SINCE 2015, the communities in the areas of Burkina Faso that border Mali and Niger, in particular those of the north, have been confronted with growing insecurity and other pressures contributing to greater vulnerability, including limited economic opportunities. National authorities are finding it difficult to provide the right response because of the volatile political and security situation, their limited capacities and lack of an integrated approach to date.

'National Authorities are finding it difficult to provide the right response because of the volatile political and security situation, their limited capacities and lack of an integrated approach to date'

The €7-million action is included in the EU Strategy for Sahel and the Regional Plan of Action for Sahel (2015-2020), and it aligns with the linked elements financed by the EU Trust Fund for Africa. The action complements the Emergency Programme for Sahel 2017-2020 and will focus on the same areas.

Over a period of 36 months the project will contribute to:

- Strengthening monitoring and the evolution of areas at risk.
- Strengthening intra and inter-religious dialogue and dialogue between communities and with the state for reinvigorated social cohesion.
- Revitalising activities linked to local pastoral economies in the sensitive areas as a vector of peace and resilience, with the aim of maintaining dialogue and social cohesion among communities.

STRIVE Horn of Africa (HoA)

Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) in the Horn of Africa

Aims and Objectives

STRIVE HORN of Africa (HoA) represented the first dedicated effort by the European Commission to implement a project outside the EU with the specific objective of countering violent extremism. The initiative was designed to help develop best practice for delivering and monitoring preventive activities, adopting a pilot approach to experiment and test assumptions associated with radicalisation and recruitment. Launched in January 2014, STRIVE HoA had a 36-month timeframe that integrated research assessment (6 months), pilot programme implementation (24 months), and evaluation (6 months) phases spread across four work packages:

1. Building the regional capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting violent extremism.
2. Strengthening the capacity of women's organisations in Puntland and Somaliland to fight violent extremism.
3. Increasing understanding of the challenges faced by EU-born Somali youth in Somaliland.
4. Increasing understanding of the drivers of radicalisation among youth in Kenya.

A fifth result area was subsequently included focusing on preventive communications.

These projects sought to both identify 'effective' approaches to preventing violent extremism in different contexts and strengthen the evidence base around P/CVE programming. While key findings are highlighted below, a detailed breakdown of conclusions drawn from STRIVE HoA can be found both in an independent evaluation³² and a follow-up lessons-learned report.³³

³² Julian Brett and André Kahlmeyer, 'Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism – STRIVE (Horn of Africa)', Evaluation Report, European Union's Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), Tana, CMC Conflict Management Consulting, January 2017.

³³ RUSI, 'STRIVE Horn of Africa: Lessons Learned', 2017.

Result Area 1: Relationship Between Law Enforcement and Civil Society

'There was evidence of greater cooperation between law enforcement personnel and civil society organisations in certain precincts following the programme's conclusion'

Result Area 1 engaged law enforcement authorities in structured 'Prevent' activities by enhancing their capacities to build partnerships with relevant civil society stakeholders in fighting violent extremism. The focus was particularly on how the excessive use of force, ethnic profiling and lack of rule of law can contribute to increases in radicalisation. Developing a curriculum in partnership with the Kenyan government, RUSI delivered a series of training workshops bookended by perception surveys.

The evaluation data indicated a concerted change in perspectives, with only one participant out of 80 objecting to the involvement of civil society in the implementation of P/CVE, and there was evidence of greater cooperation between law enforcement personnel and civil society organisations in certain precincts following the programme's conclusion.

However, the work stream flagged difficulties in delivering sustainable reform across intra-governmental silos, necessitating the coordination between disparate departmental branches, elements of which may be less receptive to the P/CVE curriculum and its emphasis on cooperation between the state and civil society. The independent evaluation of STRIVE activities similarly emphasised the importance of sensitisation and capacity-development initiatives distilling down to front line officers in hotspot areas, and the need to supplement this training with interchange cooperation and institutional reform.

Result Area 2: Strengthening the Capacity of Women's Organisations to Counter Violent Extremism

Research-based pilot actions were developed with the aim of including and empowering female voices in Somaliland's pre-existing security mechanisms.

With the help of STRIVE HoA, 11 women's peace committees were established in the Togdheer, Saahil and Sool regions to raise awareness of violent extremism. They also sought to improve the circulation of information between law enforcement and community actors and women were instructed in methods for effectively presenting themselves when interacting with local authorities. STRIVE HoA also trained policewomen and members of women's police forums in how they could actively participate in P/CVE programmes, identify security issues in their local precincts, and design targeted solutions.



A concerted increase in the employment rates of policewomen was traced in recipient areas, although female recruits continued to be largely relegated to administrative tasks and, due to logistical constraints, it was not possible to monitor the sustainability of these trends.

Similarly, there was significant hesitation across segments of the community about the inclusion of women in discussions on peace and security, especially among religious groups and traditional leaders. Nevertheless, resistance can be mitigated partially by involving village authorities in the pre-assessment phases of P/CVE activities. This provides an opportunity to avoid the perception that such initiatives are vehicles for foreign interests to challenge local norms.

'STRIVE HoA also trained policewomen and members of women's police forums in how they could actively participate in P/CVE programmes'



Result Area 3: Understanding the Challenges Faced by EU-Born Somali Youth in Somaliland

These activities sought to strengthen resilience against violent extremism through sport and education for EU-born Somali youth in Somaliland. The pilot programme's various strands prioritised three critical areas: 1) developing confidence and mutual familiarity between different youth groups; 2) occupying their time; and 3) expanding their cultural and social horizons.

Discussion groups were highlighted as efficient mechanisms for facilitating cross-societal engagement, although the impact was greatest when meetings were smaller and included panellists in their teenage years. This was because young audience members were able to better relate to their advice.

In contrast to the more structured focus group sessions, sport provided effective opportunities for 'breaking the ice' through informal interactions between expat and local youths. It was highlighted as a particularly useful introductory exercise. However, coordinators emphasised the need for additional projects capable of operating across gender lines, as female participation was severely hampered by conservative social norms.

Result Area 4: Understanding Drivers for Violent Extremism Among Youth

During the programme's implementation, several independent but mutually reinforcing pilot projects were developed to specifically target youth radicalisation in Kenya. These involved: mentorship sessions; interfaith dialogue; capacity-building for media and religious authorities; and the production of radio broadcasts.

The most successful of these initiatives was the mentorship scheme delivered to vulnerable youths in Manjengo and Eastleigh (Nairobi) in partnership with a Nairobi-based civil society organisation. The selection criteria for potential beneficiaries targeted key 'at risk' demographics, including school dropouts, recent converts to Islam, individuals involved directly in criminal activity/violence, and individuals with peers involved in criminal activity/violence.

Its positive results demonstrate the advantages of engaging with vulnerable youth on a personal and individual level. This was particularly evident when mentors were relatable role models for young Kenyans (such as entertainers, athletes and doctors who had carved new lives for themselves despite their deprived economic backgrounds) and were contactable outside the course's formally scheduled meeting sessions. Formers/Returnees also generated significant traction and positively influenced 'at-risk' youth, and involving mentors already known to the community helped both reduce barriers to participation and assuage concerns over foreign funding.

However, there were limitations as the scheme depended on sourcing credible mentors capable of both building relationships with young Kenyans and sustaining a long-term commitment to the project. This requires thorough vetting procedures and an ongoing monitoring process to mitigate any vulnerability the programme has to infiltration by malign actors. Recruiting from within local communities also elevates the risk for individual mentors.

'The most successful of these initiatives was the mentorship scheme delivered to vulnerable youths in Manjengo and Eastleigh (Nairobi) in partnership with a Nairobi-based civil society organisation'

Selected Recommendations

Emerging from STRIVE HoA in relation to P/CVE project design and delivery:

- It is recommended that P/CVE projects systematically assess risk and adopt a theory of change approach during the project design phase to make assumptions explicit and integrate the necessary sensitivities.
- The adoption of a pilot project approach for the first engagement in a new geographical location would allow for trial and error, provided that sufficiently rigorous monitoring arrangements are in place to learn from it.
- It is recommended to have funding available to immediately extend successful pilot projects and thereby maintain the momentum generated (thus strengthening the scope for achieving sustainable results).
- As implementing partners may experience capacity constraints (P/CVE-related and/or project management), the project team should be prepared to also provide a capacity-development and/or mentoring role in these respects.
- It is recommended to ensure maximum cohesion with other EU funding instruments. This includes disseminating lessons learned and sharing information within and outside the EU system.



STRIVE Asia

Strengthening resilience to violent extremism in Asia: A joint EU-UN partnership

THE SPREAD of violent extremism over recent years poses a significant threat to the international community's efforts in promoting peace and security, as well as undermining progress made towards fostering sustainable development and upholding human rights. Mitigating the appeal of violent extremism amongst communities and vulnerable groups, particularly young people, is becoming a high priority for many countries around the world, including in Asia, where terror attacks began increasing in the early 2000s, especially in south Asia and southeast Asia.

Under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the United Nations Development Office (UNDP) and the United Nations Organizations for Drugs and Crime, the EU has recently launched a new action aimed to contribute to prevent and counter violent extremism in Central, South and Southeast Asia through a whole of society/multi-stakeholder approach including governments, security actors, civil society and the private sector. The Project will be implemented within a period of four (4) years commencing in January 2019 and ending December 2022.



The Project's geographical focus will span a limited number of beneficiary countries in Central Asia and South and Southeast Asia to be selected in the inception phase.

The specific objective is that key government (executive and its security agencies and legislative bodies, where appropriate) and non-government actors are better prepared to contribute to P/CVE objectives in targeted regions and countries. This will be achieved by enhancing: the capacity of national and local authorities, legislative bodies, civil society and the private sector for P/CVE policy-making, in particular, the capacity to develop and implement PVE national action plans; the role of law enforcement actors in preventing violent extremism in close collaboration with non-government actors; and local resilience of at-risk communities strengthened through the support of community-led initiatives in the P/CVE area.

Key lessons learnt from previous STRIVE actions calls for efforts in this area to be evidence-based, tailored according to the local context, and adopting a multi-disciplinary approach. These aspects have been considered in the design of STRIVE Asia which has also benefited from the UN's experience working in over 81 countries in all regions in providing P/CVE assistance to beneficiary countries upon their request.

STRIVE Asia also seeks to develop further knowledge throughout its implementation to facilitate learning in this domain, and to ensure that steps taken are coherent with other endeavours and interventions. Through this knowledge generation, the Project can identify gaps and best practices and create a window of opportunity to examine cutting edge issues such as engaging with private sectors in dealing with P/CVE.

P/CVE in the Sahel-Maghreb Region

Countering radicalisation and violent extremism in the regions of Sahel and Maghreb

Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia

'Harnessing the efforts of civil society and non-state actors is crucial to both P/CVE and broader development'

IN LIGHT of the many factors contributing to conditions conducive to radicalisation and violent extremism in the Sahel-Maghreb region, this project was launched in July 2015 to complement the Targeted Regional Support programme under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The €5-million project was launched under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and is set to run for four years.

The aim of the programme is to launch, implement and evaluate innovative P/CVE projects and to disseminate lessons learned and best practices, in collaboration with civil society and non-state actors. As of September 2018, activities are being implemented by more than 60 partners in eight countries across the Sahel-Maghreb region.

Harnessing the efforts of civil society and non-state actors is crucial to both P/CVE and broader development. Within this project, triangular (South-South) cooperation is actively encouraged and facilitated. As in STRIVE Horn of Africa, a thematic approach to developing counter-radicalisation programmes is taken, with this project prioritising actions relating to the media, education, religion, culture and arts, and ecology. All activities are context-specific and designed to promote a 'vivre ensemble' at the grassroots level. Depending on the projects, the location and/or the audience, the emphasis may be placed on human rights (including women's rights), conflict management, religious tolerance, and/or youth empowerment. To illustrate actions conducted in the area of the media, this programme supports a range of activities that focus on CVE messaging, the use of the Internet and social media, disengagement, awareness-raising and sensitisation of front line workers. Furthermore, in light of the problem posed by foreign fighters, there is a focus on preventing their radicalisation and recruitment across the Sahel-Maghreb region.

As in other EU-funded programmes, there is also an emphasis on data collection and the identification of best practices to inform future programming. This project consequently seeks to provide an inventory of existing and previous programmes, which draws out the lessons to be learned. Through a qualitative and quantitative mapping study, this will result in the production of a comprehensive report outlining best practices and lessons derived from current and recent P/CVE activities. To increase access to this information, project leaders will facilitate dissemination sessions and workshops with EU delegations in a range of countries.

P/CVE: Middle East and North Africa

Strengthening Resilience in MENA

Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia with the possibility of extending activities to other countries in the region

OVER THE last generation, the MENA region has experienced the fastest rate of population growth of any region in the world. In 1950, the population was around 100 million; today it is around 380 million. One third of the region's population is under the age of 15, with 70% under the age of 30. Research suggests that large youth populations such as these are often correlated with conflict, posing a distinct challenge to government and civil society as they seek to address their needs. The conflict in Syria, the scale of recruitment to Daesh from Tunisia particularly, as well as recent terrorist attacks in the country have made this situation even more challenging.

To address the specific challenges relating to violent extremism and youth in the MENA region, the EU is funding the second phase of 'Strengthening Resilience in MENA' under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The project has a budget of €11.5 million, and runs over a 36-month period, from January 2018 to January 2021. As compared to the first phase, the geographical scope of the project has expanded to include Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, with the possibility of developing activities elsewhere in the region where particular communities are also experiencing the departure of large numbers of foreign fighters for Syria, suggesting a heightened vulnerability to radicalisation and recruitment.

The main activities undertaken under the project include:

1. Research into Youth Recruitment and Radicalisation

Through this activity, desk-based research will be supplemented by original research into surface community-level radicalisation dynamics and recruitment processes. The outcome of this research will be the production of recommendations on the most effective means to engage youth target audiences through relevant communications and programming.

2. Capacity Building in Strategic Communications and Campaigns with Civil Society Organisations

As a second activity, practical training will be delivered to help civil society organisations to clarify their mission and vision in relation to their target audience. Assistance will then be provided in the communication, monitoring and evaluation of these organisations' strategies.

'Research suggests that large youth populations such as these are often correlated with conflict, posing a distinct challenge to government and civil society as they seek to address their needs'



3. Capacity Building with Governments in Strategic Communications and Campaigns

Mentoring, research and workshops will also be held with government officials to allow them to develop effective cross-government communication strategy and campaigns, including those that target civil society.

4. Youth Empowerment and Skills Building

Trained civil society facilitators will enhance the critical-thinking skills of young participants, as well as empower them to use these new skills to deliver their own community-based social-action projects. The intervention provides an immediate and short-term response that combines targeted youth programming and communications campaigns, which are adapted to local contexts and generate learning on how to address radicalisation in different contexts.

P/CVE: West Africa and Lake Chad Region

Support to the Preventing Violent Extremism Programme in West Africa and Lake Chad Region

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo

WEST AFRICA and the Lake Chad Basin have some of the most fragile states in the world. The vulnerability of these countries and their border areas stems from a range of factors, including weak governance, corruption, food and socioeconomic insecurity and inter-ethnic tensions. All these have contributed to the creation of an environment conducive to the spread of a truly transnational form of radicalisation, which has allowed terrorist groups to infiltrate and de-stabilise the region, leading to a deeper destabilisation of those states and societies.

To help address these challenges, a targeted €4-million EU regional support project is being implemented under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The project runs from February 2018 to August 2019, with an objective of strengthening the policy decisions of governments, local authorities and donors as they tackle radicalisation and violent extremism in the peripheries of the Sahel and Maghreb regions and their border areas.

The aim is to provide decision-makers at all levels with a toolbox to assist them in addressing the conditions conducive to radicalisation. The approach draws on detailed local analysis to help design more substantive policy and strategic recommendations.

By establishing a regional network of experts (scholars and practitioners), the project integrates knowledge and experience on radicalisation and P/CVE from a range of sources. It further aims to support practitioners in the region by contributing to the compilation of strategic and academic resources from local, regional and international perspectives.

The implementation of structured and commonly agreed methodologies for ‘action-research’, analysis, mapping, early warning and the formulation of recommendations

‘The aim is to provide decision-makers at all levels with a toolbox to assist them in addressing the conditions conducive to radicalisation’



'The project integrates knowledge and experience on radicalisation and P/CVE from a range of sources'

for operational actions is of great value given its contribution to a better understanding of P/CVE at both academic and practitioner levels. A virtual regional platform has been created to facilitate this process. The provision of training and workshops on violent extremism and radicalisation also offers a deeper understanding of the local and regional dynamics of violent extremism and how they are sustained. Finally, the project finances the production of counter-radicalisation tools using new technologies and the media.

The combination of all these elements contributes to fostering a greater understanding of the challenge posed by radicalisation, and to empowering regional decision-makers with the analytical ability, capacity and tools to engage in effective CVE policymaking and implementation.

P/CVE: Southeast Asia

Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Tolerance and Respect for Diversity in Southeast Asia

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, with the possibility to extend some of the activities to other countries in the region

SOUTHEAST ASIA has a long history of violent extremism, much of it based on a complex and often localised interaction between socioeconomic and political contexts. However, from the Bali Bombings in 2002 to the Marawi siege that ended on 23 October 2017, killing over 1,000 people and displacing 1.1 million, the growth of transnational terrorism has brought new violent extremism strategies, methods and risks to the region. In particular, it has opened up local conflicts to transnational forces and dynamics and increased the risks and destabilising potential of localised extremist groups.

To help address these challenges, a targeted €3-million EU regional support project is being implemented under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The project runs from August 2018 to February 2020, and its objective is to reduce the vulnerability of Southeast Asian countries (particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) to violent extremism, reduce the danger of radicalisation, and increase the resilience of local communities and wider societies towards terrorist threats. The aim is to promote through research a better comprehension of violent extremism phenomena in Southeast Asia, so that actions dealing with prevention are grounded on real research-based evidence. The project will also facilitate preventive diplomacy, mainly by influencing policymaking through support of the conception of National Action Plans on PVE in the region. In addition, it will strengthen the capacity of civil society, young people and women to connect, communicate and advocate for peace, tolerance and mutual respect, notably through the development of alternative narratives.

Research-based understanding of the phenomena will be supported through contributions to existing efforts to establish a regional network of practitioners conducting research, holding regional forums and developing policy

'The aim is to promote, through research, a better comprehension of violent extremism phenomena in Southeast Asia, so that actions dealing with prevention are grounded on real research-based evidence'



recommendations for preventing and countering violent extremism in Asia. A series of national workshops in the four countries will support the development of national action plans on preventing and countering violent extremism. The project will strongly promote that these plans are developed within strict human rights and gender-equality frameworks as well as promote full civil society integration. Online and offline regional networks (for platforms and tools) to promote alternative narratives and stories to extremist ones will be established. The project will also support the production of social media videos advocating respect for diversity as well as supporting local civil society organisations in all four target countries to address the challenges around extremist narratives. This will include training and workshops for video producers, development of a training manual to produce video content for civil society actors, regional networking events and sensitisation campaigns.

Youth and P/CVE

THE INSTRUMENT contributing to Stability and Peace has funded a range of smaller initiatives to address the contextually defined grievances, anxieties and interests of young populations, with a particular focus on empowering youth voices in the fight against violent extremism.

EU-Kofi Annan Foundation Youth Initiative on Countering Violent Extremism

Youth in many regions of the world face serious socioeconomic challenges that often lead to disaffection with and marginalisation from society. High youth unemployment, growing levels of economic inequality, and a lack of voice in decision-making and democratic processes are just some of the factors that fuel youth disaffection and marginalisation worldwide. As a result, youth can be especially susceptible to ideological radicalisation and recruitment by violent extremists.

The EU-Kofi Annan Foundation Youth Initiative on Countering Violent Extremism seeks to increase peer-to-peer engagement on the question of the role of young people in preventing and countering violent extremism, with the aim of improving young people's capacity to prevent and counter violent extremism in their communities in line with international best practice and policy. The initiative is supported by the European Commission under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

Under the Extremely Together initiative, the EU and the Kofi Annan Foundation worked together to increase peer-to-peer engagement with the aim of improving young people's capacity to prevent and counter violent extremism in their communities in line with international best practice and policy.

The EU-Kofi Annan Foundation Youth Initiative reflected the belief that those best placed to prevent and counter violent extremism are informed and empowered young people in communities across the globe. It advocated for action by young people, for young people, facilitated by the expertise and networks available through the Kofi Annan Foundation. Under this initiative the world's first counterextremism flagship guide for young people by young people was produced.³⁴



³⁴ Extremely Together, 'Countering Violent Extremism: A Peer-to-Peer Guide for Young People', Kofi Annan Foundation, <www.extremelytogether-theguide.org/>



One Young World Peace Ambassadors

‘Encourage young leaders to play an active role in building peaceful and cohesive societies’

The One Young World Peace Ambassadors initiative is run in partnership with the European Commission and is dedicated to preventing and countering violent extremism, promoting peace-building efforts and conflict resolution. It is intended to encourage young leaders to play an active role in building peaceful and cohesive societies. When the project was launched in 2017, Neven Mimica, European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, spoke of the importance of young people taking a more proactive role in improving the situations of the 600 million young people who live in fragile or conflict-affected areas. The Peace Ambassadors initiative, he said, would ‘empower young leaders to effectively contribute to the promotion and achievement of sustainable peace across the world’.

Open Mind – HIT Radio

In 2017, an innovative new project, ‘Open Mind’, costing €300,000, was launched in Morocco, promoting cultural diversity through social media to strengthen youth resilience towards radicalisation and violent extremism. Its various components were implemented by HIT radio, a popular local broadcaster, and were designed to encourage active citizenship and inclusivity, catering to a young audience.

Prevention of Violent Extremism in Prisons

Supporting the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalisation to violence in prisons

TODAY, EVER-INCREASING numbers of individuals are imprisoned for terrorist-related offences across the globe, making the effective managing of the wider prison population and the implementation of measures to prevent radicalisation from spreading through the system important priorities for many governments. Violent extremist prisoners can network in prisons, radicalise other prisoners, gain access to a large pool of potential recruits, or coordinate violent extremist actions outside their prison. Certain prisons have become incubators for radicalisation and recruitment, while others have managed to contain the problem and promote reform through implementing positive prison standards and practices.

The UN Secretary-General's January 2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism emphasises the risk of radicalisation in prisons, including acknowledging that this can stem from inhumane detention conditions and the maltreatment of inmates. The Plan stresses the need for the development of safeguards to prevent the spread of violent extremist ideology in prison settings.

As a joint EU and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) initiative, the Violent Extremism in Prison Project aims to increase the capacity of selected countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in prison systems. The European Commission is supporting the project with €4 million between 2018 and 2021 under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

'Certain prisons have become incubators for radicalisation and recruitment'

This project combines concurrent P/CVE and tertiary-level disengagement and deradicalisation work streams to support the management of violent extremist prisoners and prevent the proliferation of violent extremism in vulnerable prison populations, in line with international standards and norms. In order to maximise impact, the geographic focus of the project is limited to three pilot countries from the Middle East and Gulf, North Africa and Asia (Kazakhstan, Tunisia and a third one to be selected).

Specific activities include:

- Dissemination and awareness raising on the UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons.
- Fostering of cooperation among relevant national stakeholders.
- Training of front line prison staff on issues such as dynamic security and prison intelligence.
- Development of individual assessments of prisoners upon admission.
- Initiation and promotion of prison-based disengagement programmes for violent extremist prisoners.
- Support for the development of a national rehabilitation and social reintegration strategy and corresponding programmes for violent extremist prisoners.
- Strengthening of the social reintegration of violent extremist prisoners following release.
- Support for the establishment of post-release services for former violent extremist prisoners in close coordination and consultation with relevant agencies in the community.
- Exploration of alternatives to imprisonment for foreign terrorist fighters in suitable cases.

'This project combines concurrent P/CVE and tertiary-level disengagement and deradicalisation work streams'

In all beneficiary countries, the project will follow a two-stage approach, based on: (i) effectively managing violent extremist prisoners and developing rehabilitation, disengagement and/or deradicalisation programmes; and (ii) preventing those prisoners who may be vulnerable from being influenced by violent extremism.



Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund

STRIVE Global – Support to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund

Aims and Objectives

THE GLOBAL Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) is a public-private partnership dedicated to preventing and countering violent extremism. Its aim is to support community-level and targeted initiatives that strengthen resilience against violent extremism, an idea first mooted at the Global Counterterrorism Forum meeting in September 2013.

GCERF was formally established in November 2014 as a not-for-profit Swiss foundation with a secretariat in Geneva. Its work is guided by a multi-stakeholder governing board, with representatives from governments (both donors and beneficiaries), the private sector, foundations and civil society.

The EU is part of the governing board and is committed to working closely with GCERF, under the **STRIVE** Global action, to support grassroots P/CVE initiatives around the world. The EU supports GCERF with €6 million from the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

'The GCERF's aim is to support community-level and targeted initiatives that strengthen resilience against violent extremism'





Methods and Activities

GCERF seeks to fund community-level initiatives in areas such as education, youth, women's advocacy, media, social entrepreneurship and vocational training. This is carried out through two main funding mechanisms:

- A Core Funding Mechanism, which provides targeted support to a range of community-level initiatives in beneficiary countries.
- An Accelerated Funding Mechanism to facilitate swift international responses to violent extremism.

'The Core Funding Mechanism was launched in Bangladesh, Mali and Nigeria in 2015, and in Kenya and Kosovo in 2016'

Through the Core Funding Mechanism, GCERF is committed to working in partnership and consultation with governments, civil society and the private sector in beneficiary countries to support national strategies to address the local drivers of violent extremism. Through this mechanism, GCERF provides targeted support in response to grant applications from Principal Recipients, who represent a consortium of local grassroots organisations. The Core Funding Mechanism was launched in Bangladesh, Mali and Nigeria in 2015, and in Kenya and Kosovo in 2016. The Accelerated Funding Mechanism is a secondary funding mechanism intended for the delivery of swift and flexible responses to violent extremism through the provision of micro, small and medium-sized grants to support local projects by non-governmental organisations. The programme's focus is being scaled up and has been already extended to other countries, such as the Philippines and Tunisia.



The Hedayah International Center of Excellence for CVE

STRIVE Global Hedayah

Aims and Objectives

HEDAYAH, MEANING ‘guidance’ in Arabic, was first conceived in 2011, during a ministerial-level launch of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), a multilateral platform comprised of 29 countries and the EU, which focuses on providing a venue for counterterrorism officials and practitioners to share experiences, expertise, strategies and capacity needs. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) offered to host Hedayah and it was officially launched in December 2012 during the GCTF’s Third Ministerial meeting in Abu Dhabi.

Hedayah grew out of an increasing realisation within the international community that there was a need to prevent individuals from becoming radicalised and to find means to counter violent extremism. It also grew out of the realisation that ‘hard’ security measures alone were insufficient to counter the growing threat posed by terrorism.

Methods and Activities

The Hedayah Center is an international institution dedicated to serving as a global hub of expertise and experience in CVE training, methods, dialogue and research.





The EU funds Hedayah under the **STRIVE** Global action, providing €5 million from January 2015 to December 2020 through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace to support local partners to design, implement and develop approaches to prevent and counter radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. These approaches focus on four key areas:

'The Hedayah Center is an international institution dedicated to serving as a global hub of expertise and experience in CVE'

1. **Capacity-Building:** Developing and delivering training programmes to raise awareness of CVE among public officials and civil society organisations.
2. **Empowering Civil Society:** Funding civil society projects that offer a clearly formulated evidence-based response to violent extremism.
3. **Media:** Addressing the challenge faced in ensuring appropriate media coverage of terrorism through capacity-building and awareness raising among state and media actors.
4. **Research:** Developing research resources to provide an evidence base to guide practical work that reduces radicalisation to terrorism.

The innovative sub-granting mechanism put in place under STRIVE Hedayah allows EU to reach the 'unusual suspects' at local level and involve the most vulnerable groups in P/CVE activities, whose work at the community level was not being given enough recognition. Several locally led initiatives are ongoing in different countries from the Western Balkans and Central Asia.

CT Morse

Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism

THE SPECIFIC objective of this facility, funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, is to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various counterterrorism projects (including P/CVE projects) financed by the European Union as well as to reinforce the EU engagement within the Global Counterterrorism Forum framework.

The activities of CT MORSE are concentrated in six areas/components:

1. **Expert Analysis and Awareness Raising:** Expert analytical advice is provided to the EU on reports delivered under the different components of the counterterrorism and P/CVE Programme as well as on current trends of terrorism phenomena in the concerned regions; an information gateway and regular updates on national, regional and international initiatives/events/activities/projects planned or carried out in domains relevant to the Programme are provided to the EU.
2. **Visibility, Liaison and Information Sharing:** The visibility of the EU and of the counterterrorism Programme is increased within the EU, member states, beneficiary countries, partner countries and organisations; regular liaison and information sharing with all the components of the Programme, as well as with relevant stakeholders, is ensured.
3. **Counterterrorism Training:** A specialised counterterrorism training course is delivered to senior EU Delegation staff. The goal is for participants to be better equipped to engage on counterterrorism-related policy analysis and political dialogues as well as have the skills and knowledge to explore the pertinence and feasibility of counterterrorism-related projects. Moreover, the course will provide the basis for participants to take counterterrorism-related considerations into account for future projects. Given counterterrorism's wide-ranging policy reach, this training will be beneficial to a broad audience with a limited background in counterterrorism.

P/CVE Training

AS PART of the European Commission's efforts to mainstream P/CVE across the EU's development programming, a series of training courses, led by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), are being conducted with EU delegations, member-state embassies and stakeholders from local governments and non-governmental organisations. These have been developed for non-P/CVE experts with the aim of increasing their understanding of P/CVE concepts and providing methods, tools and approaches to design and implement P/CVE programmes. The curriculum is also aimed for those delivering, planning and resourcing development activities to make them more sensitive to P/CVE issues. These bespoke training courses are designed to enable participants to better recognise the warning signs of radicalisation, and to orientate their programmes to address vulnerable communities and, prevent and counter incipient violent extremism. Each workshop will be tailored to the regional context in which it is conducted and will aim to improve the understanding of challenges faced in the field.

The curriculum supplements a set of counterterrorism and P/CVE Operational Guidelines published by RUSI, which provides a publicly available, practical framework for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU-financed counterterrorism and P/CVE specific interventions in third countries.³⁵

The objectives of the training sessions are to increase understanding of P/CVE concepts, terminology and policy, as well as to provide methods, tools and approaches to design and implement P/CVE programmes. The training is based on international development and P/CVE good practice and has a distinct operational focus. It includes user-friendly guidelines on, and constructive ideas for, P/CVE programming and implementation, especially in relation to how third countries could be effectively supported in their own efforts.

Since 2013 region-specific three-day workshops for practitioners have been delivered in East, West and North Africa, Central, South and Southeast Asia, in the Middle East and the Western Balkans. One-day courses for EU policy and strategy staff in Brussels and half-day briefings for EU senior staff in Brussels are also covered. A new set of trainings intended to be country specific and targeting national governmental and non-governmental stakeholders will be piloted in 2019.

The workshops consider what kinds of P/CVE engagement may be suitable in each country or region, how existing development programming in different areas may contribute to addressing the challenge, and the way in which specific interventions can reduce the appeal and recruiting potential of violent extremists. These workshops are tailored to the region in which they are conducted. Each one looks to map activities already being carried out and to address issues such as opportunities for strengthening the rule of law, promoting youth engagement, and supporting the media, women and civil society to address violent extremism.

³⁵ CIVILPOL and RUSI, 'Operational Guidelines on the Preparation and Implementation of EU Financed Actions Specific to Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Third Countries'.



Through case studies, the practitioner workshops are designed to draw on practical examples and experience to guide participants in developing effective interventions.

Teaching and reference material provided contains the following:

- **Background on P/CVE**, providing an overview of the issues in context, including an explanation of the drivers of extremism.
- **Terminology**, which plays an important role in P/CVE. The course explains the importance of sensitivity and the need to develop a common non-emotive lexicon in designing effectively targeted programmes whose impact can be more easily assessed.
- The **elements of successful** P/CVE programming.
- **P/CVE programming in practice**, which is examined through examples of programming in context, showing core competencies in the fields of development, security and project evaluation.
- **Case-study exercises**, presenting scenarios involving violent extremism, and exploring a series of steps that can be taken to address those threats through programming that builds on development-related principles.

The training process employs continuous improvement techniques. Participant feedback during and after each workshop or course is combined with the observations of course deliverers to produce a report to improve future courses.

RAN and TerRa

ALTHOUGH THE EU supports programmes and projects worldwide, it is also actively engaged in these issues at home, with the European Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs in the lead.

Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence (RAN CoE)

Aims and Objectives

Countering radicalisation and preventing individuals – particularly the young and vulnerable – from joining terrorist groups remains an essential part of EU counterterrorism efforts. Increasingly it is understood that it is at a local level – in schools, communities, youth centres, and the healthcare sector – where this work can most effectively be delivered.

It is in this spirit that the European Commission's Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs established the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2011, bringing together a range of different actors, from psychologists to educators, social workers, community leaders, NGOs, police, prison and probation officers, as well as representatives from government ministries. The RAN provides the opportunity for these actors to exchange experiences, pool knowledge and identify best practices in tackling radicalisation.

Practitioners are grouped in nine working groups, each targeted at a specific group of stakeholders. These groups include: education; prison and probation; exit; health and social care; youth, families and communities; communications and narratives; local authorities; police and law enforcement; and remembrance of victims of terrorism. Today the RAN connects over 6,007 practitioners, with over 940 having attended 328 RAN events/activities since 2012. In October 2015, the European Commission bolstered the RAN by establishing it as a Centre of Excellence and committing a further €25 million over four years.

The main objectives of the RAN Centre of Excellence are:

- To facilitate and enhance the exchange of experiences and cooperation between relevant stakeholders (inside and outside the EU), in particular through the RAN.

- To support the EU and the relevant stakeholders in member states in their 'Prevent' efforts, through support services, practical tools and policy contributions.
- To consolidate, disseminate and share expertise, best practices and targeted research in the field of preventing radicalisation.

Description of Activities

The RAN Centre of Excellence:

- Brings together practitioners across its nine working groups, with 20–40 practitioners attending each event.
- Helps to identify and evaluate best practices through the RAN 'Collection of Approaches and Practices'.³⁶
- Maps out the latest research findings of relevance to the work of RAN practitioners and authorities within each working group.
- Translates lessons learned and insights from practitioners into policy recommendations.
- Supports stakeholders and member states in establishing policy frameworks and structures to maximise the effectiveness of 'Prevent' measures and projects.
- Offers tailor-made support in the development and implementation of specific interventions adapted to local circumstances.

'The RAN offers its expertise to member states wherever this is requested'

The RAN offers its expertise to member states wherever this is requested. Since 2014, the RAN has provided expertise to 21 member states at their specific request, supporting, inter alia, the launching of new CVE programmes and strategies, and the establishment of national networks of practitioners. In 2016, 20 such deployments were offered to member states. In addition, the RAN Centre provides outreach and support to a select number of priority third countries.

³⁶ RAN, 'Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices', RAN Collection, 2018 Edition, <www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection_approaches_and_practices_en.pdf>.

Key Points/Lessons Learned

It is crucial to:

1. Invest in prevention, by removing the breeding ground for radicalisation.
2. Involve and train front line practitioners as the first professional points of contact for individuals at risk.
3. Develop multi-agency approaches to prevent radicalisation and safeguard individuals at risk.
4. Implement tailor-made interventions adapted to local circumstances.

Radicalisation Awareness Network



'The European Commission's Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs established the Radicalisation Awareness Network in 2011, bringing together a range of different actors, from psychologists to educators, social workers, community leaders, NGOs, police, prison and probation officers, as well as representatives from government ministries'

Terrorism and Radicalisation, Europe

Aims and Objectives

Terrorism and Radicalisation, Europe (TerRa) has four main objectives: first, to support front line workers who come into daily contact with groups who may be vulnerable to radicalisation; second, to support victims of terrorism and former radicals in using their testimonies to contribute to prevention work; third, to integrate state-of-the-art knowledge on radicalisation and deradicalisation into the European Citizenship Programme through a curriculum for high-school and university students; and, fourth to deliver practical policy advice to European governments based on in-depth research and expert consensus.

Description of Activities

TerRa is a European programme supported by the European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, comprising a European network-based prevention and learning programme. It is now in its second phase – TerRa II, initiated in 2014 upon completion of TerRa I.

From the start, the basis of the programme has been a focus on research, conducted with the aim of advancing existing knowledge around processes of radicalisation. The theory is that this research can then be used to enhance the effectiveness of ongoing prevention and deradicalisation programmes, and to feed into the development of new ones.

Based on this research, TerRa's aim has been to make a practical contribution to the prevention of radicalisation and political violence in a European context. As part of this, one of TerRa's objectives was to support target groups coming into professional contact with individuals vulnerable to radicalisation by providing practical tools for use in their daily work. One of the main tasks was to identify these target groups, who mostly comprise teachers, youth workers, social workers, police officers, prison, probation and parole officers, journalists and religious leaders.

TerRa I also involved a focus on the personal experiences of victims and those previously involved in terrorism. The aim was to assess how the testimonies of these individuals might offer an effective platform from which to engage in dialogue with at-risk individuals.

Building on these experiences, TerRa I aimed to provide a broad platform for member states and other stakeholders to exchange available materials, lessons and experiences, as well as practical tools, advice and policy input.

This platform was designed to allow network coverage in all member states, in close cooperation with the network of Associations of Victims (nAVT) and the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). Other outputs, developed on the basis of the initial research phase, include: an overview and description of methods and approaches to screening victims and recognising signs of radicalisation; a manual with recommendations for a broad group of front-liners; and guidance for journalists and policymakers.

Similarly, TerRa II seeks specifically to develop a citizenship curriculum for European secondary students, deliver policy advice to European governments on radicalisation and deradicalisation, and provide training to professionals across Europe.

Key Points/Lessons Learned

- All activities are based on an initial research phase that aims to advance existing knowledge around processes of radicalisation to feed into the development of new prevention and deradicalisation programmes.
- The programme provides target groups with practical guidance, highlighting the positive role that victims and former terrorists can play in improving and establishing deradicalisation programmes.
- Results of the programme to date include: network coverage; education packages; manuals for front line workers; and an overview of approaches to recognise signs of radicalisation.



‘The objective of TerRa is to reinforce the positive impact that victims and those previously engaged in terrorism can have in preventing radicalisation through the provision of practical guidance to targeted vulnerable groups.’

