

GCERF Strategy for Investment in Somalia

2025–2028 (4 years)

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Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
AS	Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen, <i>also known as</i> Al Shabaab
AQ	Al Qaeda
AU	African Union
BRA	Banadir Regional Administration
CBR	Community-Based Reintegration
CNA	Country Needs Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSM	Country Support Mechanism
CSP	Capacity Strengthening Partner
CoP	Community of Practice
DDRR	Disengagement, Disassociation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Eoi	Expression of Interest
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member State
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter
GAP	Global Action Platform
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGA	Income Generating Activity
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRP	Independent Review Panel
IS-Somalia	Islamic State in Somalia
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
MVG	Marginalised or Vulnerable Group
NRA	Newly Recovered Area
P/CVE	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism
PR	Principal Recipient
QUIP	Quick Impact Project
RF	Results Framework
RNA	Rapid Needs Assessment
SEAH	Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SR	Sub-Recipient
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
Tubsan	Tubsan Centre for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
VE	Violent Extremism

This document is guided by:

- Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund's (GCERF) Strategy for Investment in Somalia (2021);
- Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Recommendations for Funding and Enabling Community-Level Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE);
- GCERF's original "Strategy to Engage Communities and Address the Drivers of Violent Extremism (2017- 2020) and Updated Strategy for 2022-2025;
- The Somalia National Strategy for P/CVE 2024 - 2027;
- Consultations with the Tubsan National Centre for P/CVE;
- Consultations with Somali civil society and other internationally supported actors contributing to P/CVE efforts;
- Consultations with representatives of GCERF donors and members of the international community in Somalia.

Executive Summary

The GCERF Strategy for Investment in Somalia (2025–2028) is designed to support Somali efforts to **prevent radicalisation and recruitment by Al-Shabaab (AS)**. It considers the rise of Islamic State–Somalia (IS–Somalia) but identifies that AS remains the most destabilising force in the country and that (at present) radicalisation and recruitment by IS–Somalia is unlikely to be effectively prevented or countered by GCERF-funded activity within Somalia. The strategy employs a flexible framework that enables GCERF to adapt to changes in context, enabling adjustments as the security landscape evolves.

Aligned with the Federal Government of Somalia’s National Strategy to Counter and Prevent Violent Extremism, this GCERF Strategy for Investment emphasises support to adaptive **Somali-led solutions**. Investments will support Somali civil society organisations (CSOs) implement community-driven programmes that address the root causes of extremism. GCERF’s work will be overseen by a multistakeholder Country Support Mechanism (CSM), that will include representatives from the federal and member state governments and GCERF donor countries. The CSM will be chaired by the Director of the **Tubsan Centre for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism**, which sits within the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and is the designated focal point institution for GCERF within the federal government.

Addressing the drivers of VE in Somalia requires a multifaceted strategy for investment focused on strengthening governance, promoting economic opportunities—especially for youth—and improving relationships between communities. Thus, **this strategy goes beyond immediate security threats and focuses on the underlying causes of extremism** to contribute to long-term stability and resilience, reducing the appeal of extremist ideologies and building a foundation for lasting peace in Somalia.

The strategy’s overarching goal is to **increase the ability and willingness of youth, women, community leaders and relevant government counterparts to prevent radicalisation and recruitment in Somalia**. This will be pursued through multisectoral programming geared toward three outcomes:

1. Increased **positive engagement between members of different groups** through improved effectiveness of conflict prevention and reconciliation mechanisms;
2. Improved **socio-economic opportunities** for young people and women who are at risk of radicalisation and/or recruitment; and
3. Enhanced production and awareness of messaging that reinforces **positive narratives**.

Our investment will seek to build an area-based approach to programming in which multiple interventions are used to support target communities. Based on the assessed focus on AS, the strategy focuses on the federal member states (FMS) where they pose the most significant risk: **Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland and South West**.

The strategy outlines the process of decision-making and how funding allocated to the portfolio will be prioritised and invested, with the CSM playing a key role in this process. Grants will be tailored interventions that empower communities and individuals’ abilities to improve their resilience through community-driven solutions, conflict resolution, economic development and the inclusion of marginalised or vulnerable groups (MVGs).

The strategy recognises the need for clear, community-led, multidimensional and context-specific beneficiary selection criteria to target the most at-risk individuals. Most of these individuals are likely to be members of MVGs and therefore, programmes will prioritise minority clans, women, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), the urban poor, disabled persons and community and religious leaders. These groups often face systemic exclusion, economic vulnerabilities and social marginalisation, creating fertile ground for the radicalisation and recruitment tactics used by AS.

Integrating learning and collaboration, the strategy draws on **local knowledge and global good practices** to ensure sustainable and scalable outcomes. Recognising the very real risks of doing harm, ensuring that GCERF and all grant activities are **conflict sensitive** will be of paramount importance. **Coordination with in-country stakeholders and donors**, including through the CSM, will be instrumental in identifying gaps in existing P/CVE efforts and avoiding duplication.

GCERF will ensure **effective grant management** through monitoring, financial oversight, audits and third-party monitoring. A key focus will be supporting the capacity of our grantees through tailored training, knowledge sharing and technical and programmatic assistance, supported by our new **Capacity Strengthening Partner (CSP)**. The **sustainability** of P/CVE interventions will be ensured by continuing engagement with partners after grants end and connecting former grantees to other actors.

It is foreseen that over the lifetime of this strategy, GCERF will need to invest \$5m USD in Somalia to create impact.

WHAT: Increased ability and willingness of youth, women, community leaders and relevant government counterparts to prevent radicalisation and recruitment by violent extremist groups in Somalia	
Through grants to Somali CSOs, GCERF will support: WHO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Marginalised and vulnerable groups who are at risk of radicalisation and recruitment ▪ Youth (young women and men between 18 and 35) ▪ Religious, traditional and community leaders (male and female) ▪ Governance actors (federal, state, and local governments, security agencies and justice actors) ▪ Women’s groups ▪ Affected/host communities and IDP camps Brokering partnerships with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Private sector ▪ Research agencies/ universities ▪ Government- and partner-funded P/CVE-relevant programmes and initiatives 	WHERE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Galmudug ▪ Hirshabelle ▪ Jubaland ▪ South West
HOW: Increased positive engagement between members of different groups through improved effectiveness of conflict prevention and reconciliation mechanisms; improved socio-economic opportunities for young people and women who are at risk of radicalisation and/or recruitment; and enhanced production and awareness of messaging that reinforces positive narratives.	

Introduction

Somalia became a GCERF partner country in 2021. To date, GCERF has invested \$5 million USD in five grants, two of which are currently active. These grants seek to expand socio-economic opportunities, support reconciliation and increase tolerance in South West and Hirshabelle. Annex A provides an overview of these grants and results delivered to date.

This strategy provides a framework for GCERF's future investments in Somalia and seeks to identify parameters that will guide how we invest our funding, recognising the role of the reformulated Country Support Mechanism (CSM) and the need to ensure flexibility and adaptation to contextual changes. It captures key lessons learnt from our experience in Somalia to date and how these have informed the approach we will take over the coming four-year period.

Guiding Principles

The principles detailed below will guide GCERF's investment for the upcoming strategic period:

- Understand that the **political dynamics of conflict and security** in Somalia can change significantly in short periods of time – but the 'root' causes of violent conflict and extremism at the community level remain relatively consistent. GCERF is well positioned to deepen support to civil society organisations (CSOs) as well as other actors at the community level to address these issues.
- Align with the National Strategy to Counter and Prevent Violent Extremism ("**National Strategy**") 2024 – 2027, developed by the Government of Somalia, that sets out identified priorities for actors seeking to engage in this thematic space.
- Ensure **country ownership**, bringing civil society, the international community, and the private sector together to support priorities identified by the Federal Government (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS) of Somalia. Moreover, GCERF will prioritise P/CVE coordination at all levels, including District Peace Committees, where they exist, to ensure contextualised and sustainable P/CVE programming.
- Ensure participation of girls, women, boys and men in activities that meet their specific and identified needs.
- Ensure programme design is focused on achieving **sustainable and effective outcomes**. Particularly given the competitive funding landscape, scalability and replicability will continue to be guiding criteria in decision-making on programme activities.
- Recognise that Somali civil society knows best what programming is feasible for them to deliver and what results they can achieve. The **co-creation** process is a key aspect of grant design.
- Maintain a **flexible and adaptive approach to grant management** to ensure that changes in contextual circumstances are effectively managed and opportunities for wider or increased change/ results are realised.
- Mainstream **conflict-sensitive approaches** to identify potentially negative consequences, take steps to prevent them whenever possible, and propose corrective actions when necessary.¹
- Promote a **culture of learning** with national, regional and global communities of practice.


- Strengthen the operational and financial management, as well as technical P/CVE **capacity** of grantees, including conflict and gender sensitivity, to enhance their expertise and implementation capacities.
- Ensure that programming is aligned with the **Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Recommendations** for Funding and Enabling Community-Level P/CVE;² Good Practices in Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in PVE³ and on Women and CVE;⁴ and from other P/CVE actors.⁵

The Context of Violent Extremism in Somalia

Organised militant Salafi jihadist groups have been active in Somalia since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in early 1991, with the first (albeit short-lived) training camp established in Kismayo that year.⁶ Over the 1990s, much of Somalia was ruled by a web of individual warlords, without any overarching governing authority. However, by 2000, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had coalesced with the intention to restore law and order to south-central Somalia. The ICU's perceived links to militant Salafi jihadist groups, such as Al Qaeda (AQ), and alleged harbouring of individuals who had taken part in the 1998 United States (US) Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania led to growing regional and international concern over the security risk they might pose.

Somalia Federal Member States and Regions

- Somaliland
- Jubaland
- South West
- Hirshabelle
- Galmudug
- Puntland
- Banadir Regional Administration



In August 2006, several Salafi jihadist groups came together in agreement that the ICU leadership “did not adhere closely enough to fundamentalist Islamic beliefs”⁷ and decided to form a new umbrella organisation they called *Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen*. This group would become more commonly known as **Al Shabaab (AS)** and would continue to fight the warlords alongside ICU forces.⁸ By the end of 2006, neighbouring Ethiopia had launched a full-scale invasion of Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), based in Baidoa, and remove the jihadist groups from Mogadishu.

Whilst the Ethiopian invasion may have had the desired short-term effect, the two decades that have followed have seen AS establish itself as the most significant violent extremist group in East Africa. Intervention by regional peacekeeping forces remains necessary to support the TFG's successor, the federal government of Somalia (FGS), as well as governing authorities in most of the federal member states (FMS). Supported by the international community, the African Union (AU) has maintained peacekeeping missions in Somalia since 2007.

The FGS was formed by the 2012 Transitional Constitution and includes the Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) and six FMS: Jubaland, South West, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland.⁹ The seat of the FGS is in the capital, Mogadishu (in BRA), but the Transitional Constitution grants the FMSs semi-autonomous status. Each FMS is led by a President and a locally appointed government. At the end of 2024, the FGS announced an intention for one-person, one-vote elections to take place in most of the FMS by the end of 2025.¹⁰

In 2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud became President of Somalia and declared an all-out war against AS, supported by some clan militias as well as the AU troops and international allies. There were notable gains in the fight against AS over the course of 2022 and 2023, although these slowed or have been reversed in 2024 and 2025.¹¹ The 2025 Global Terrorism Index ranks Somalia as the seventh country most-affected by terrorism.¹² In a report published by the United Nations (UN) Monitoring Group in January 2024, Al Shabaab is estimated to have between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters. The group maintains control or an ability to regularly carry out attacks over significant parts of south-central Somalia.

In August 2023, the FGS formed the **Tubsan National Centre for P/CVE** ('Tubsan'), and the revision of the Somali National Strategy to Counter and Prevent Violent Extremism ('National Strategy') was completed in 2024. Tubsan is responsible for coordinating P/CVE efforts across the FGS and with FMS. There are Tubsan focal points based in some of the FMS capitals, assigned by the relevant FMS Presidents, with the remaining appointments intended to take place over the course of 2025.

Whilst there is a growing **Islamic State in Somalia** (IS-Somalia) presence in Puntland, "it poses little by way of a direct threat to security in Somalia, especially when compared to its much bigger and better-established jihadist rival Al-Shabaab".¹³ In early 2025, there remains uncertainty and speculation over the group's capabilities and significance, including whether IS-Somalia's leader Abdulqadir Mumin is Islamic State's global caliph – and indeed, certainty of whether he is alive.¹⁴

At present, GCERF does not intend to make grants focused on preventing radicalisation or recruitment by IS-Somalia. This is due to two factors: first, the majority of IS-Somalia members are foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs);¹⁵ and, second, there are significant ongoing military operations targeting IS-Somalia. As of early 2025, these operations are led by the Puntland security forces, with some international support – primarily from the United States.¹⁶ The collective assessment of GCERF stakeholders is that (at present) radicalisation and recruitment by IS-Somalia is unlikely to be effectively prevented or countered by GCERF-funded activity within Somalia.

The persistence of violent extremism in Somalia is enabled by the country's political, economic and social challenges. AS effectively exploits many of these to maintain control and authority, as explained below.

Service delivery

For nearly 35 years, Somalia has not had a centralised state able to exercise authority over the entire territory. This has meant that there has not been significant, coordinated investment in building the infrastructure that enables service delivery or strengthening of the government's administrative capacity (for example, to collect and manage revenue or build a civil service). This, combined with the urgency of need, has meant that the international development sector has tended to focus funding on the security and humanitarian sectors.

The changeable political dynamics between the FGS and FMSs can compound these challenges. Both state and federal governments struggle to establish and maintain governance structures and delivery of services, particularly in rural areas. AS exploits this vacuum by providing security and justice as well as social services to communities, positioning itself as an alternative to the state authorities.¹⁷

As a result, communities, lacking services, protection and livelihood opportunities, may perceive extremist groups as a source of structure, support or, at the very least, as an unavoidable authority.

Poverty and economic exclusion

Poverty and economic exclusion play significant roles in driving violent extremism in Somalia. Approximately 70% of Somalis live below the poverty line, with limited access to education, employment and sustainable livelihoods opportunities.¹⁸ High youth unemployment leaves young people vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups who may offer promises of financial reward. AS targets these disillusioned youth, offering financial incentives and a sense of purpose that they cannot easily find elsewhere. This economic vulnerability contributes to a cycle in which young people, deprived of viable options, become potential recruits, further fuelling instability and violence.

Clan dynamics

Somalia's estimated population of 19 million people¹⁹ is considered relatively homogenous, with the vast majority of the population thought to be followers of Sunni Islam and ethnically Somali.²⁰ Clan is the main form of social structure and deeply influences political dynamics and alliances, shaping access to power, resources and protection. This has been 'informally formalised' through the 4.5 formula in which the four larger clans (Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahanweyn) are assigned a 'whole' share of power and other, minority clans are assigned a 'half' share.²¹

Marginalised clans and communities often face discrimination and limited access to opportunities and resources, deepening feelings of resentment and exclusion. Extremist groups like AS exploit these grievances, positioning themselves as champions for marginalised groups while stoking inter-clan tensions to further their own agenda. This approach undermines inter-communal relationships and weakens the Somali state's efforts to build a united, inclusive society.

AS's forced recruitment strategies are deeply intertwined with Somalia's clan dynamics and conflicts. The group exploits existing clan rivalries by instigating inter-clan conflicts to divert attention and resources from military operations against them. Al Shabaab aims to exacerbate inter-clan tensions to increase conflict and violence within communities, making it easier to coerce or convince individuals into joining their ranks and disrupt the government's stabilisation efforts.

In some parts of Southern Somalia, inter-clan conflict exists and persists over access and distribution of common resources, such as agricultural and grazing lands. AS positions itself as the ruling authority, giving conflicting communities a 'justice' structure to resolve those conflicts. At times, in return, they force clan elders and parents to provide their children or youth to the group, or face reprisal.

The manipulation of clan dynamics not only aids AS recruitment but is a significant factor in the stability challenges faced by the country, hindering peace and development.

External intervention

Additionally, external factors, such as regional instability and foreign interventions, influence violent extremism in Somalia. The presence of foreign military forces and the involvement of regional powers in Somalia's internal affairs are often viewed with suspicion by local

communities, who may perceive these interventions as infringing on Somalia's sovereignty. Al-Shabaab capitalises on anti-foreign sentiment, using it as a rallying point to gain support and legitimacy. This anti-intervention narrative complicates counterterrorism efforts and hampers regional cooperation, limiting the effectiveness of both Somali and international efforts to address extremism.

The threat and use of extortion and violence

AS uses terrorism, but their "continued resilience can be attributed in great part to the sophisticated and efficient 'taxation' apparatus it has established throughout southern Somalia".²² Key to this is an ability to "project power far beyond areas it physically controls", enforcing the system through the threat of extreme violence.²³ Al-Shabaab seeks to capitalise on climate change events such as drought by using access to water and other natural resources to levy taxes and fees on herders and farmers, as well as to punish communities that resist its control.

Addressing the drivers of VE in Somalia requires a multifaceted strategy for investment focused on strengthening governance, promoting economic opportunities—especially for youth—and improving relationships between communities. Thus, this strategy goes beyond immediate security threats and focuses on the underlying causes of extremism to contribute to long-term stability and resilience, reducing the appeal of extremist ideologies and building a foundation for lasting peace in Somalia.

GCERF's Positioning

Rationale

GCERF will support Somali efforts and initiatives that seek to strengthen community resilience to radicalisation or recruitment by violent extremist groups. This strategy aligns with the Somali National Strategy and is based on consultations with Tubsan, representatives of GCERF donors and civil society. These consultations highlighted a need for GCERF to:

- Focus on the underlying factors that contribute to individuals' and communities' vulnerability to radicalisation and recruitment by VE groups and avoid contextual dynamics that are likely to shift (e.g. related to conflict or politics);
- Consider how activities and programmes can also contribute to enhancing community resilience to climate shocks and natural disasters;
- Identify where CSOs are best placed to intervene geographically, given safety and security considerations; and
- Ensure that GCERF can provide sufficient assurance on programme implementation and results and effectively manage associated risks.

GCERF opted not to commission a Country Needs Assessment (CNA) to inform development of this Strategy for Investment because:

1. A significant body of evidence and research into P/CVE in Somalia already exists; and
2. The Somali government launched the revised National Strategy in 2024, which identifies agreed priorities and areas of focus for P/CVE efforts.

In addition to these factors, it is recognised that over the four-year period of this strategy, it is very likely that contextual changes will require regular revision of priorities and areas of

focus. **A dynamic, flexible strategy has therefore been identified as the most useful tool to enable GCERF to sufficiently adapt to contextual changes.** We view this Strategy for Investment as an overarching framework that will structure GCERF's engagement and funding decisions.

Al Shabaab remains the VE group who pose the most significant threat to peace and stability in Somalia. In consultations undertaken to develop this strategy, GCERF stakeholders were in consensus that P/CVE work targeting **IS-Somalia** is unlikely to bear results at this point, given the high numbers of FTFs. The reliance on FTFs indicates that the current patterns of recruitment or radicalisation by IS-Somalia are not primarily driven by Somali dynamics or issues and therefore, they are unlikely to be effectively prevented or countered from within Somalia. For now, the presence of IS-Somalia is best addressed by the security sector. As a result, this strategy focuses on prevention of radicalisation and recruitment by AS.

In line with the adaptive approach that is fundamental to this Strategy for Investment, GCERF remains cognisant that this assessment may change and influence the assessment of where we should be funding grants. In such a scenario, this strategy will be revised and updated accordingly. The **primary indicator GCERF will monitor to prompt this revision** will be evidence that the group is recruiting significantly increasing numbers of Somalis from within Somalia and cells are spreading geographically.

As funding becomes available, decision-making regarding how it will be invested will be informed by rapid needs assessments (RNAs) commissioned through the Capacity Strengthening Partner and guided by the **Country Support Mechanism (CSM)**. This is explained in further detail in the section on Country Coordination and Resource Allocation, below.

It is foreseen that over the lifetime of this strategy, GCERF will need to invest at least \$5m USD in Somalia to have meaningful results.

GCERF's Added Value

The three decades of insecurity has had a significant impact on Somalia's economic development. Exacerbated by repeated natural disasters and climate shocks, there are also considerable humanitarian needs. Whilst these developmental and humanitarian needs are drivers of violent extremism, GCERF's analysis is that we cannot meaningfully contribute to resolving them given the scale of need in comparison to our resources. We must carefully consider how best our resources can be utilised to achieve results that will directly reduce radicalisation and recruitment by VE groups in the shorter term, whilst contributing to longer term objectives.

The funding landscape in Somalia is highly competitive but there is no question that for P/CVE efforts to be effective, a whole-of-society approach must be utilised. GCERF is uniquely positioned to facilitate this. **Specifically, GCERF's added value in Somalia lies in our:**

- Operational model, which enables structured engagement between Somali government, civil society and international partners on P/CVE – particularly important to enable effective implementation of the National Strategy on P/CVE;
- Technical P/CVE expertise, which enables us to support effective programme design;
- Global reach, which enables us to connect Somali CSOs to entities and initiatives in other countries, and identify learning and experience sharing opportunities; and

- Ability to build and foster partnerships, which allows us to amplify results under the grants we fund.

GCERF's approach to partnerships will enable us to effectively leverage and complement other initiatives. This means that, for example, whilst other funding is invested in technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programmes, GCERF funding may be well-placed to support CSOs identify individuals who have completed training but remain without viable economic activity. These individuals could be supported with specific, tailored engagement, as described in the Portfolio Objectives section.

Whilst GCERF recognises the need for support to strengthen the capacity of FMS and FGS authorities, our organisational structure and mandate mean that we can only offer this support in targeted ways, coordinated with other donor-funded initiatives and our civil society partners.

Lessons Learned and Good Practices

GCERF is committed to a culture of learning and documenting good practices. We undertake quantitative and qualitative monitoring of activities at the country and Secretariat levels. Key lessons learned from our experience to date that inform our approach are:

- **P/CVE is a long-term, structural investment.** GCERF experience highlights the need for a long-term outlook in programme planning, considering the deep and complex root causes of violent extremism. Programming must be conceptualised to enable initiatives to be taken over by Somali actors in the long run. GCERF will, therefore, prioritise multi-year, cost-effective initiatives, with sustainability being a key decision-making criterion.
- **Setting the definition of who is "at-risk" of violent extremism at the programme's onset is a critical design component.** The question of who is at-risk of recruitment or radicalisation by violent extremists is highly debated and context-specific, and there is a need to have a clear definition at the inception of each programme. Beneficiary selection criteria should be community-led, multidimensional and as much as possible, evidence-based.

- **Ensuring active participation of local community actors through an integrated approach is essential for promoting sustainability.** Respective roles and expectations should be established through a sustainability plan at the onset of the programme to ensure buy-in and continuation of interventions after GCERF exits.
- **Acknowledging and understanding the conflict dynamics of clans is an important first step** in seeking to address the potential impact on programming. For example, competing clan interests can hinder the creation of shared beneficiary criteria or the functionality or effectivity of conflict resolution mechanisms.
- **The changeable security situation in Somalia presents challenges of access to programme locations for grantees' implementation of activities and GCERF's monitoring.** This does not mean that we should select where we fund activities solely based on accessibility, but that we need to put in place effective mechanisms to ensure the delivery and monitoring of results. The **Capacity Strengthening Partner** will enable GCERF to address this challenge.
- **Somali civil society is resilient and dedicated.** Despite very tangible and immediate risks to their safety and security, many civil society actors are dedicated to positively contributing to the betterment of the country. Ensuring these actors are effectively supported to access funding opportunities is crucial.
- **The need for adaptation does not signal failure.** As described in the Context section, many of the issues driving VE in Somalia are substantive social and economic challenges that do not have simple or quick solutions. As in the scenario, regarding hiring practices, it is important that GCERF supports grantees to try alternative approaches to address identified entrenched challenges – and remains flexible enough for them to adapt their programmatic responses as needed.

Programme design should effectively identify what cultural norms are within the capacity of the programme to change.

The Somali Wellness and Economic Recovery Consortium (SWERC) programme, which GCERF funded between December 2021 and February 2025, identified that the hiring practices of business owners in Kismayo and Beled Hawa excluded many young people because jobs were usually offered based on their clan or family association. The programme tried several approaches to encourage the business owners to be more inclusive but with limited success. A third-party monitoring (TPM) exercise conducted in 2023 found that the business owners perceived that their reliance on social networks for recruitment decreased the risks to their business and security – and although they had expressed openness, in practice business owners were unwilling to consider alternatives to these social referrals.

Income-generating activities (IGAs) and livelihoods

- **In a context of limited economic opportunities, addressing structural risk factors such as poverty and unemployment can be effective.** However, the relationship between economic deprivation and recruitment is complex, with other factors influencing individuals' decisions to engage in violence. To put it simply, there are unfortunately millions of Somalis who lack sustainable economic opportunities – but relatively few who actively join VE groups. Once again, ensuring that beneficiary

selection is informed by evidence of what makes individuals vulnerable is key. As above, GCERF must consider our value addition in designing such activities.

- **Interventions should be focused on specific geographic areas.** Using an area-based approach to programming in which multiple, layered interventions are used to support target communities is more effective than scattering interventions across several communities.
- **Livelihood support should be based on market-needs assessments and a long-term view.** Such activities should be coupled with mentorship and job placements, financial literacy and enabling access to micro-loans and credits. A holistic approach to livelihoods is essential to generate long-term sustainable income by the beneficiaries themselves.
- **A risk/ vulnerability reduction monitoring approach** is essential to better understand the longer-term impact of IGAs and their relation to addressing the loss of livelihoods.

Peacebuilding

- **Creating and facilitating mechanisms to foster continuous dialogue is critical for conflict resolution, particularly building on and strengthening local and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.** In many contexts, community dialogue platforms (including traditional, religious, ethnic, women, and youth leaders) have proven highly effective for dialoguing on and resolving local conflicts.
- **Cultural norms regarding such dialogue platforms must be considered as they are formed/ supported to ensure they are inclusive.** For example, the 2023 TPM found that women may require a dedicated space in which they can speak more openly.
- **Dialogue should not only be for dialogue's sake.** To be most effective, dialogue or peace platforms must also enable the members to undertake follow up/ activities within the communities to address or act on the identified challenges or conflicts.
- **Understanding conflict dynamics is the first step in addressing them.** Of particular importance will be understanding what existing tensions there may be between groups to ensure activities do not inadvertently deepen existing divides.

Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI)

- **An enhanced understanding of gender roles and norms and their impact on P/CVE is crucial.** As a result of this, gender considerations should be integrated into grant design and implementation to ensure we do no harm.^{24 25}
- **Identifying women champions and implementing peer-to-peer involvement to increase women and girls' participation.** This is particularly important for supporting survivors of violent extremism, many of whom are women and children who may have been exploited. Recognising their roles within the community may support these women to drive social change and increase community resilience.

Portfolio Objectives

As identified above, the key contextual drivers of VE in Somalia are assessed to include poverty and economic exclusion, limited service delivery, the manipulation of clan dynamics and narratives, as well as the threat and use of extortion and violence. As such, a wide range of interventions can be considered to contribute to P/CVE efforts. However, cognisant of GCERF's specific P/CVE mandate and our value addition within the context, we have identified

that we are best placed to fund interventions that seek to increase the ability and willingness of key stakeholders to engage in P/CVE efforts, many of whom are from marginalised or vulnerable groups (MVGs).

The objectives of GCERF's Somalia portfolio are based on the lessons learned from previous rounds of investment and other P/CVE-related programming, an assessment of our positionality, and informed by consultations with external stakeholders and discussions within GCERF.

All GCERF-funded grants will be designed and implemented to effectively ensure conflict sensitivity risks are managed and mitigated. This will ensure that we do not, for example, inadvertently increase tensions between communities and avoid capture by the interests of any particular group. A thorough assessment of conflict dynamics and potential risks will be undertaken during the grant co-creation process to ensure work funded under any of the below objectives does no harm.

The GCERF strategy will contribute to efforts to deliver the National Strategy, under Pillar 2 on Community Engagement and Pillar 4 on Disengagement, Disassociation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR). This section incorporates the National Strategy's objectives, setting out how we foresee GCERF-funded grants contributing towards their achievement.

Objective 1: Increased positive engagement between members of different groups through improved effectiveness of conflict prevention and reconciliation mechanisms

GCERF's funding will align with the following objectives under the National Strategy:

Dialogue, Conflict Prevention and Resolution (Pillar 2, Objective 3)

Violent conflicts within and between communities can often take place over access to limited resources (for example, land) but may also include socialised aspects (for example, being part of a revenge cycle). There have been efforts over several years by a range of actors to develop mechanisms that might prevent or resolve conflict at the community level in Somalia.

GCERF-funded efforts in this area will be underpinned by thorough mapping of existing initiatives and informed by Somali-owned approaches.

Community-Based Reintegration and Reconciliation (Pillar 4, Objective 5)

Somalia has seen significant donor investment in DDRR programming, particularly through the established centres. The overarching strategy has differentiated between high-level and low-level defectors from AS, with different approaches being used for each. Civil society is perhaps not best placed to manage the risks associated with high-level defectors but can play an important role in the ongoing efforts to encourage and facilitate community-based reintegration (CBR). GCERF supports CBR efforts in other contexts and will draw on relevant learning to inform grants funded under this strategy.

Stabilisation of Newly Recovered Areas (Pillar 2, Objective 12)

As territory is regained from AS, there are a range of military and civilian initiatives to stabilise the newly recovered areas (NRAs). These can include both longer term development support and quick impact projects (QUIPs). GCERF sees an opportunity to support efforts in NRAs in which stabilisation efforts have resulted in relatively safe and consistent access, particularly in rural areas surrounding urban centres. Activities would need to be determined by the

dynamics of the geographic location but would seek to include activities identified by communities as part of district committee formation processes.

Objective 2: Improve socio-economic inclusion of young people and women who are at risk of radicalisation and/or recruitment

GCERF's funding will align with the following objectives under the National Strategy:

Enhancing Youth Engagement and Resilience (Pillar 2, Objective 2)

Somalia's youth, like their peers in other countries, want opportunities to be educated and employed.²⁶ The strategy recognises that "young people should not be seen merely as a liability, vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment to violent extremism, but as critical and active partners in bolstering community resilience and advancing P/CVE objectives".²⁷

GCERF is not best placed to fund education and employment generation programmes on a significant scale but will seek to partner with and complement the efforts of other initiatives. For example, we will not prioritise using our limited resources to fund a small number of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) activities but instead seek to engage with young people who have taken part in other TVET initiatives and not yet been able to enter the job market or maintain their own micro, small or medium enterprise (MSME). This focus is particularly relevant from a P/CVE perspective given the evidence that vulnerability to radicalisation and recruitment can be heightened by unfulfilled expectations or aspirations.²⁸

Gender Mainstreaming and Women's Empowerment (Pillar 2, Objective 6)

A focus on community governance mechanisms and leaders generally translates to engagement with actors who are men and structures dominated by them. As in the National Strategy, there is consensus that the involvement of women is key to the success of P/CVE efforts in Somalia. GCERF will ensure that activities funded by this strategy recognise the complexity of gender within Somalia, including women's roles in passively or actively supporting or enabling VE.²⁹ Grants will seek to empower women in a manner that is informed by an ambition to contribute to gender transformation efforts, whilst being informed by cultural realities. We will work with grantees and the Capacity Strengthening Partner to ensure that we do not unintentionally reinforce patriarchal norms or encourage/ create token positions without real decision-making power.

Private Sector Engagement (Pillar 2, Objective 5)

The World Bank estimates that Somalia's private sector accounts for 95% of the jobs created in the economy.³⁰ Therefore, in seeking to increase economic opportunities for young people, it will be important to identify how GCERF and civil society can effectively engage with the private sector. As identified in the National Strategy, like citizens, the private sector is also subject to extortion by Al-Shabaab through various means³¹ and so there is also a business interest for them to support P/CVE efforts.

Objective 3: Enhanced production and awareness of messaging that reinforces positive narratives

Under Pillar 3 of the National Strategy, a National Communications Strategy on P/CVE will be developed, which we will ensure is reflected in the design of relevant grants. GCERF has identified that the programming we fund will align with the following objectives under the National Strategy:

Religious Leaders Engagement (Pillar 2, Objective 1)

As identified in the National Strategy, religious leaders can use their authority to “encourage individuals to act humanely, promote shared values and provide public messaging, counternarratives and religious interpretation”.³² GCERF will work closely with grantees to ensure that evidence regarding (the effectiveness of) alternative narratives is sufficiently reflected in activity design. All engagement in religious affairs, including messaging, will be done in a manner that is responsible and conflict sensitive. The capacity strengthening partner will assist in monitoring messaging (e.g. local religious leaders engaged with funded programmes) to ensure that narratives do not contradict or undermine agreed messaging.

Traditional Elders Engagement (Pillar 2, Objective 7)

Elders are considered “the custodians of the community’s culture and traditions and the repositories of its history and collective knowledge” and have played “an invaluable role in crafting solutions to the community’s problems in the absence of functioning government”.³³ In contributing towards positive narratives that will support nation building and inter-communal relationships, traditional elders will be powerful assets, particularly in rural communities. As above, recognising that elders are generally men, and in line with our ambitions on gender and women’s empowerment, we will also seek opportunities to engage with female community leaders.

P/CVE Community Platforms (Pillar 2, Objective 10)

As expressed in the National Strategy, Tubsan intends to establish “forum[s] for exchange on community concerns... and grievances that either contribute to an environment conducive to radicalisation or pose actual motivations for communities or individuals to sympathise with and support violent extremist groups. The P/CVE platforms [will] offer civil society and community representatives a forum to raise these issues with government representatives. The government subsequently, through district, state and federal level coordination structures on P/CVE and with representatives of relevant line ministries in the lead, aims to address these challenges with community-based solutions, prioritising issues identified as most pressing”.³⁴

In line with GCERF’s commitment to whole-of-society approaches, grants may seek to support and engage with these platforms.

Promotion of Disengagement from Violent Extremism (Pillar 4, Objective 3)


There is recognition from the FGS that DDDR efforts must include non-military activities to be successful. Other initiatives, including ones linked to support in NRAs, often combine DDDR messaging in their stabilisation efforts. GCERF foresees incorporation of disengagement messaging within efforts to promote positive narratives.

Climate change

Whilst the issue of climate change does not feature within the National Strategy, Somalia is assessed to be one of the ten countries most “at risk of climate disaster” by the International Rescue Committee.³⁵ In consultations for this strategy, responding to its impact was highlighted by civil society partners as being one of the most urgent needs of communities. Despite assumed certainty that climate change and related shocks play a role in exacerbating the drivers of VE, there is limited evidence. **GCERF is currently implementing partner on a GCTF Initiative led by Kenya and Germany** that aims to use East Africa and the Horn as a case study to develop a globally relevant Framework Document that will include

actionable recommendations on the nexus between the two. The findings and recommendations from this Initiative will be incorporated into the grants invested under this strategy.

Theory of Change



The overarching objective that the portfolio seeks to achieve is 'to increase the ability and willingness of youth, women, community leaders, and relevant government counterparts to prevent radicalisation and recruitment by violent extremists in Somalia through a multi-sectoral programmatic approach'. Grants will contribute to the outcomes via a pathway of change defined below:

IF GCERF engages diverse community members in P/CVE activities to address the drivers of violent extremism (VE), including reducing the sense of marginalisation;

IF GCERF works on identification of and support to community-based mechanisms for individual-level and collective reconciliation, creates an enabling environment and provides resources for return, reintegration and re-socialisation;

IF GCERF supports the provision of social and economic opportunities that present alternatives to those violent extremists claim to offer;

IF GCERF supports engagement of authority figures, including faith leaders, in P/CVE efforts and ensures youth participation in local governance and building bridges between elders and youth;

AND the following assumptions hold true:

- Successful (re)integration of former combatants depends on community-based reconciliation and restoration efforts that are locally led, sufficiently resourced, and recognised as legitimate, and that navigate clan-based grievances to foster acceptance and co-existence;

- Development and reintegration opportunities that are responsive to the needs of vulnerable individuals and former AS members contribute to reducing stigma and promoting inclusion and community harmony;
- Targeted psychosocial and mental wellbeing support can help individuals displaying aggressive or violent behaviour develop healthier coping mechanisms and adopt constructive roles within their communities;
- Lack of income opportunities remains a key driver of recruitment; market-relevant vocational training and economic (re)integration are likely to reduce vulnerability to recruitment; and
- Collective reconciliation processes that are inclusive of youth, elders, and local leaders, and that actively engage traditional and religious authorities, are more likely to foster community acceptance of former combatants and contribute to long-term sustainable peace when linked to national reconciliation frameworks.

Then the following overarching **outcomes** should be achieved at the end of implementation:

Outcome 1: Increased positive engagement between members of different groups through improved effectiveness of conflict prevention and reconciliation mechanisms

Relationships within and between communities are improved through reconciliation and (re)integration. Community conflicts, fuelled by historical grievances and/or scarce resources, will be reduced and inter-communal relationships are improved. Sense of purpose and belonging is enhanced among MVGs to increase their resilience to attempted radicalisation or recruitment.

Outcome 2: Improved socio-economic opportunities for young people and women who are at risk of radicalisation and/or recruitment

Vulnerable individuals, including youth and low-level defectors of AS have access to alternative economic solutions, including post-TVET opportunities. Socioeconomic inclusion is improved; communities have access to sustainable livelihoods and increase their resilience against climate shocks.

Outcome 3: Enhanced production and awareness of messaging that reinforces positive narratives

There are reduced opportunities for VE groups to exploit gaps in governance and false narratives, communities have more agency to resist VE groups through increased awareness on VE groups' tactics and access to public services.

Outcome	Indicators
Outcome 1	% of community members who report that they trust people from other groups
	% of community members who indicate that they accept low-level AS defectors to be integrated into the community
	% of conflict cases brought before the peacebuilding structures that are resolved

Outcome 2	% of people who reported they have improved access to income on a more regular basis post-intervention
Outcome 3	% of religious or community leaders, local government officials who have actively taken action/ initiative in positive narrative building
	% of community members who report change in opinion following engagement with/ exposure to awareness campaigns

Geographic Scope

As shown in 2024 data collated by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), there is limited AS activity in the Northern member states of Puntland and Somaliland. Given that, at the time of writing, AS remain the VE group posing the greatest risk to stability and security in Somalia by a considerable margin, GCERF intends to fund grants in the FMS in which they are most active: **Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland and South West**.

Conflict dynamics in **Galmudug** are shaped by inter-clan rivalries, competition over political representation, and disputes over access to natural resources, especially in Galkayo and surrounding areas. These tensions are compounded by weak governance structures and limited state presence in rural areas, creating openings for Al Shabaab to exploit local grievances. The group has also used the porous coastline around Hobyo for smuggling and logistical operations, further entrenching its influence. Efforts to counter violent extremism must address the root causes of marginalisation and support reconciliation between divided communities.

Violent extremism in **Hirshabelle** is deeply intertwined with clan-based conflicts over land, water, and political power, especially in areas like Matabaan, Adale, and Feerfeer. The region's strategic importance, due to the Shabelle River and fertile agricultural zones, makes it a contested space for both local actors and extremist groups like Al Shabaab. Limited infrastructure, weak local governance, and frequent flooding further destabilise communities, allowing violent groups to provide parallel services and narratives. Strengthening local dispute-resolution and supporting traditional leadership structures are crucial to reducing extremist appeal.

In **Jubaland**, violent extremism is driven by a mix of territorial contestation, borderland dynamics and clan rivalries—especially in Lower Juba, along the border with Kenya. The presence of Al Shabaab remains strong, particularly in rural areas where state presence is limited. Smuggling routes and cross-border trade are frequently exploited by militant groups to finance operations. Local resentment towards security operations, perceived marginalisation, and underdevelopment provide fertile ground for extremist narratives. Regional cooperation and community-based approaches are essential to restoring trust and reducing recruitment.

South West State experiences persistent insecurity due to Al-Shabaab's entrenched presence, especially in Bay and Bakool regions. The group capitalises on longstanding clan tensions, historical marginalisation, and disputes over land and water to maintain influence. In areas where state services are minimal, Al Shabaab often provides rudimentary governance, justice, and taxation systems, reinforcing its control. Recurring displacement due to conflict and drought further erodes community resilience. Addressing both immediate

security threats and underlying socio-economic drivers is critical for sustainable counter-extremism efforts in the region.

Across all FMS, activities will need to ensure that they are sustainable in the face of recurrent climate-related challenges like flooding, drought and environmental degradation: key contextual stressors that extremist groups often exploit.

Demographic Focus

To prevent violent extremism in Somalia, it is essential to address the unique vulnerabilities of particular groups, including **marginalised minority groups, women and girls, youth, IDPs, the urban poor, disabled persons as well as community and religious leaders**. These groups face different but deep-rooted challenges/ circumstances that extremists often exploit, making them more susceptible to influence and recruitment or offer opportunities that can be capitalised to foster positive change.

1. Marginalised Minority Groups

Minority clans, such as the Jareerweyne, Eeylo, Tumaal and Yaxar face systemic discrimination, including in political representation, access to justice and resource distribution. This exclusion fosters dissatisfaction, especially given the perception that state structures favour dominant clans in allocating power and resources.³⁶ Perceptions of injustice and marginalisation make individuals from minority groups more vulnerable to narratives used by AS that promise empowerment or redress, thus increasing their risk of engagement. It is noteworthy that who is considered a minority or marginalised may change between and within geographic areas.

2. Women and Young Girls

In 2023, the UNDP Gender Inequality Index ranked Somalia as 4th last.³⁷ Women and young girls across Somalia, especially those in rural and minority communities, experience heightened vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), despite the existence of protective social norms.³⁸ In addition to limited access to security and justice, poverty further constrains women's and girls' access to education and economic independence, intensifying their susceptibility to and fear of violence and/or exploitation.³⁹ Extremist groups may target these vulnerabilities, framing recruitment as a means of protection or financial security.

3. Youth

75% of Somalia's population is estimated to be under the age of 35.⁴⁰ Somalia's youth face critical socioeconomic challenges, including limited education and employment opportunities, that leave them vulnerable to violent extremism.⁴¹ Many young people feel disillusioned by a lack of agency and a scarcity of viable pathways to self-sufficiency, especially in underserved areas. Unemployment and a lack of social integration lead many young people to perceive violent groups as offering a sense of purpose or economic stability. This is particularly pronounced amongst youth from marginalised backgrounds, who may feel overlooked or disadvantaged.

4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the Urban Poor

In general, IDPs and the urban poor, regardless of their clan affiliations, are particularly vulnerable to extremism due to their precarious living conditions, risk of eviction and lack of access to essential services.⁴² Many IDPs reside in overcrowded camps with minimal

resources, limited legal economic opportunities or reliable access to healthcare and education. These hardships contribute to a pervasive sense of instability and disempowerment. Extremist groups often exploit these conditions, offering IDPs economic incentives or social belonging in exchange for compliance or recruitment.

5. **Persons with disabilities**

Persons with disabilities in Somalia face social exclusion and economic marginalisation, compounded by cultural biases that limit their integration into community and economic life. Without access to vocational opportunities or support networks, individuals who are disabled often find themselves isolated and impoverished. Extremists may exploit this isolation, targeting them with narratives that offer a sense of inclusion or purpose.

6. **Religious and community leaders**

Community elders and religious leaders hold substantial influence in Somalia, especially in areas where formal justice systems are limited or absent. Traditional conflict management mechanisms led by elders are widely respected, seen as legitimate by many, and act as symbols of unity within communities.⁴³ Similarly, religious leaders are viewed as authoritative figures in conflict resolution due to their knowledge of Islamic teachings on peace and their capacity to enforce decisions as a result of their social standing. These leaders play crucial roles in maintaining social and cultural structures and norms – and they are also targeted by extremist groups seeking to undermine local unity. By eroding the authority of respected leaders or co-opting their roles, extremist groups can manipulate traditional systems of social influence to advance their agenda or undermine positive messaging with distorted interpretations of religious text. In this sense, supporting the legitimacy and capacity of these leaders is critical to prevent the influence of extremists, as they are often within the first line of defence against community destabilisation.

Country Coordination and Resource Allocation

Effective coordination with a diverse range of stakeholders will remain an important aspect of our approach. The Country Support Mechanism (CSM) will play an important role in ensuring this and GCERF representatives will continue to take part in ongoing coordination platforms.

As funding becomes available for Somalia, GCERF will work with the CSM to identify how to invest it. In cases where a donor gives an **earmarked** contribution to GCERF's Somalia portfolio, the Secretariat is responsible for ensuring that the conditions of the funding are complied with. The CSM will be engaged in subsequent grant-making and grant-management processes, recognising that the donor will have ultimate decision-making authority.

As **unearmarked** funds become available, the CSM will use the following criteria to assess how they should be allocated:

1. Scale of funding

Due to the administrative burden associated with grant management, it is suggested that, as 'standard practice', grant making should only be undertaken where more than \$1,000,000 USD is available. Below this threshold, grant-making should only take place in exceptional

circumstances and where specifically requested by the CSM or donor. In addition to the management considerations, the impact of the terms of funding and scale of activities on the possibility of programmatic results must also be considered (as described in the Lessons Learned section).

The GCERF Secretariat retains the ability to allocate up to \$300,000 USD to an existing grant to extend the grant period or increase activities and notify the CSM.

2. Rapid needs assessments

Before any funding is committed to a particular thematic or geographic area, both GCERF and the CSM are clear on existing gaps and planned initiatives by the Somali government or international partners to address them.

With support from the Capacity Strengthening Partner (CSP), GCERF will undertake or commission rapid needs assessments (RNA) to identify gaps in the P/CVE landscape to inform the CSM's decision-making. RNAs will be based on alignment with the GCERF Strategy for Investment in Somalia, analyses of the context and existing evidence, mapping of existing P/CVE-related initiatives and consultations with CSM members. As much as possible, insights and perspectives from communities in the intended geographic areas of investment will be incorporated and considered.

3. Decision of the CSM

GCERF's model is based on effective collaboration with in-country stakeholders. Therefore, the allocation of unearmarked funding allocated to the Somalia portfolio will be decided upon by the CSM, in line with the agreed ToR.

The GCERF Secretariat maintains responsibility for compliance and results and will undertake necessary measures to ensure their delivery. This will include financial audits and spot checks, as well as external monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercises such as TPMs and evaluations.

All stakeholders, including beneficiaries and grantees (primary and sub-recipients, PRs and SRs) are able to raise concerns to GCERF through our Integrity Line.

Capacity Strengthening and Learning

Tailored Capacity Strengthening for CSOs

Strengthening the capacities of local CSOs and existing community structures is and will remain a key aspect of GCERF-funded programmes in Somalia. A capacity assessment and strengthening tool is used to evaluate the 'baseline' capacities of CSOs provide them with tailored training and on-the-job support. GCERF reviews the quarterly narrative and financial reports of grantees, and the National Advisor seeks to conduct regular monitoring visits to assess progress and offer in-person support.

In Somalia, the changeable security situation and logistical challenges mean that it has not been possible for GCERF to conduct monitoring visits and offer in-person capacity strengthening support in the same manner as in other countries. To mitigate this, the Secretariat will undertake grant-making over the course of 2025 to identify a Capacity Strengthening Partner (CSP) that will:

- Develop and maintain a system to monitor activities in 'difficult to reach' locations;

- Offer training and technical support to stakeholders at the local level on P/CVE; and
- Deliver targeted research and analytical support to GCERF and the CSM, such as RNAs to inform grant design.

To ensure economies of scale, this CSP will also cover some GCERF grantee activity in Northern Kenya.

Thematic and Technical Training

GCERF will support technical and thematic knowledge of grantees and their Sub-Recipients (SRs) by linking them to global, regional and national knowledge and expertise (virtually and in-person, when feasible). Trainings cover both thematic and technical topics. Depending on grantees' needs, this could include communications, security and risk analysis and mitigation, programme management, finance and compliance as well as monitoring and evaluation.

Global and Thematic Knowledge Sharing

In addition to training, GCERF also organises global and thematic **Communities of Practice** (CoPs) where GCERF partners from the region will meet either online or in-person to share challenges, lessons learned and good practices.

CoPs sometimes take the form of training as mentioned above or are more reflective workshops to learn from and build on each other's work in the region or on a particular theme. In addition, GCERF's Secretariat organises quarterly virtual Global COPs. GCERF invites all grantees and other stakeholders to attend its Global CoPs which allow grantees from around the world to share insights, raise challenges and suggest solutions to common problems related to VE.

The Global Action Platform (GAP) has also launched working groups to connect its PRs and SRs across the world on the topics of climate change, livelihood support, rehabilitation and community-based integration. Grantees from Kenya, Mozambique and Somalia formed their own GAP in 2025, coordinated by GCERF, to share lessons and good practices.

GCERF's Independent Review Panel (IRP), a group of P/CVE practitioners and experts from around the world, supports the Secretariat with proposal review, learning events and capacity strengthening of partners. The IRP Chair also serves as a member of GCERF's Governing Board. The IRP supports the grant-making review process to ensure quality, impact, value for money and alignment with national strategies and provides direct support to CSM members and grantees through structured inputs and capacity building.

Monitoring and Evaluation

GCERF's work is anchored in evidence and good practice, but GCERF recognises the complexity of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in a context as logistically challenging as Somalia. GCERF's approach to monitoring results, programme evaluation, and learning is guided by inclusivity, context-relevant knowledge, and evidence-driven adaptive management. GCERF, therefore, continuously develops its M&E systems to best suit its grantees' programming thematic and desired results.

GCERF grantees in Somalia will develop strong M&E systems relevant to GCERF-supported grants. Principal recipients (PRs) that work in consortia will be responsible for establishing M&E frameworks that include SRs in the process of monitoring and evaluation of the activities,

and reporting to GCERF on the aggregated results. The PR will also provide qualitative insights on progress through regular quarterly reports.

The CSP will enable GCERF to adapt our M&E approach in Somalia to include more regular monitoring capacity and adoption of additional tools and approaches such as geotagging.

GCERF provides dedicated support to PRs in M&E through design guidelines, ongoing support throughout grant making and management, in particular through the National Advisor and Regional Manager. During grant making, the core elements that GCERF supports its PRs with are the development of:

1. Theory of Change in line with GCERF's Strategy for Investment. During grant-making, all grants will receive guidance to develop a theory of change in line with the local needs and the priorities set under this strategy.
2. Results Framework (RF) including outcome and output design and indicator development. In defining results areas for measurement, GCERF co-develops the RF with selected grantees. This will be at both the output and outcome levels. Selected grantees will have some standard indicators incorporated into their respective results framework linked to this strategy (as appropriate with the programme).
3. Data collection and analysis plans to produce RF indicator values.
4. Guidance on outcome assessment for outcome indicator measurement to support claims of project/grant achievements.

During **grant management**, the following take place:

1. Baseline assessment: Programme implementation will be preceded by a comprehensive baseline assessment. Grantees will be supported to employ robust assessments.
2. Capacity building: At the heart of GCERF's approach is strengthening capacity, which is based on grantees' needs. This will be one of the key activities during the grant management period. Through these, it is expected that the grantees will have increased capacity to define measures of success, collect quality data to assess performance, and programmatically adapt their approach whenever needed.
3. Third-party monitoring: To verify the effectiveness and quality of activities implemented by grantees, GCERF will commission independent third-party monitors for selected activities of the different grants.

At the **end of grants**, GCERF ensures that the following are implemented:

1. Endline assessment. The end of each grant will be preceded by an endline assessment. This assessment will mainly be conducted by the grantees with technical support from GCERF. It will focus on assessing progress made in relation to indicators set at baseline.
2. Independent evaluation. Following the end of grant endline assessments, GCERF will select one or more grants to be evaluated, and will commission an independent country level criteria-based evaluation to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of grants.

GCERF's current approach to grant **financial management** includes:

1. A clear set of financial management guidelines and templates that are regularly updated to respond to lessons learned and changes in the grantee environment;
2. A periodic assessment of financial risks, including the risk of loss or misuse, at grantee and GCERF levels;

3. Clear processes to support the grantees in the planning and management of programme budgets and cash resources, and the improvement of their internal control systems (including regular monitoring visits and financial spot-checks);
4. Annual financial audits (named financial examinations, but which include quality programmatic data controls) are conducted by an external audit firm retained by GCERF. GCERF uses every opportunity to meet with grantees during grant development and during the life of the grant, to enhance the capacity of grantees to manage GCERF funds.

Sustainability and Transition Planning

Sustainability

GCERF's approach to grant making and management, including our efforts to strengthen grantee capacity and learning opportunities are a key part of our approach to sustainability. As per the Board Information note produced for the June 2022 meeting (BM.16/DOC.06), GCERF defines sustainability of PVE programming as "the extent to which:

- Communities demonstrate ownership of activities by continuing, expanding, or replicating them to reduce radicalisation and/or recruitment by violent extremist (VE) groups; [and/or]
- A mechanism, policy, or process is integrated into institutions so that it will continue to reduce radicalisation or recruitment by VE groups beyond the end of the grant, sustaining and/or increasing the intended result(s)."⁴⁴

Achieving this for all investments under this strategy will underpin the design and implementation of all programmes. In addition to the steps identified in the note, we also:

- *Continue engagement with partners after grants end:* Building on the Global Communities of Practice's success, GCERF invites grantees to join the Global Action Platform (GAP), a club of P/CVE practitioners, to share good practices and lessons learned, exchange ideas, access resources and actively engage through a virtual platform.
- *Connect former grantees to other actors:* GCERF has signed a non-binding agreement with other multilateral agencies that aim to take on the CSO partners of GCERF that have been equipped with the necessary capacity. UNOCT and others propose engaging, fundraising, and working with former GCERF grantees in coordination with the Secretariat.

Within the context of Somalia, it is recognised that sustainability of P/CVE initiatives is also dependent on the wider security and humanitarian contexts in a particular geographic area. During the course of implementation, our grantees face a range of challenges to the sustainability of their interventions that are outside their control, for example, displacement of beneficiaries as a result of natural disasters such as floods or drought.

Transition Planning

GCERF determines that its support to a country is no longer required either when the GCERF model (locally driven, community focused P/CVE practices linked directly to national level policies) is integrated into domestic responses, or when local actors are otherwise demonstrably capable of building community resilience and implementing effective

programmes independently of GCERF. Transition from a country may also be triggered by low performance and/or lack of support or engagement from state or non-state partners.

GCERF has designed this strategy conscious of the need to ensure sustainability and capacity strengthening to enable a responsible transition out of Somalia – although **it is not foreseen that this transition is imminent**. By building capacities at national and local level and preparing these actors for passing on that knowledge further, GCERF’s investments in Somalia should encourage the development of sustainable P/CVE capacities and enable actors to respond to future challenges. The strategy also aims to strengthen collaboration between state authorities and civil society actors to ensure they are able to maintain established P/CVE initiatives.

The following criteria have been identified to assess GCERF’s ongoing support for in-country programming:

- i. **Ineligibility:** A country becomes ineligible for GCERF funding, either because there is no longer a need, no longer demand, it is no longer feasible, or the country becomes ODA ineligible;
- ii. **Value addition and complementarity:** GCERF’s approach continues to add value and complement existing efforts (including national and donor-supported programming);
- iii. **Grantee performance:** Quarterly Grant Performance Assessments enable the GCERF Secretariat to assess improvements in grantee capacity and determine when no further support is required;
- iv. **Government support:** GCERF’s model has been effectively adopted by state-level actors and the CSM has become a sustainable coordination mechanism for community-led P/CVE programming;
- v. **Donor support:** GCERF donors want to continue investing in the country (this is considered along with all other indicators above to ensure relevance);
- vi. **Outcomes/ Impact:** Programming continues to contribute to achieve GCERF’s stated country-level objectives;
- vii. **Policy development:** Clear national P/CVE policy (or a plan to adopt one) and openness to CSO participation.

In the case of Somalia, GCERF believes there is still a strong justification for GCERF’s continued engagement.

Timeline

The timeline for implementation is 2025–2028. This will allow GCERF four years of investment.

Annexes

Annex A. Summary of Grants Issued to Date

Annex B. Risk and Mitigation Measures





Annex A. Summary of Grants Issued to Date

Beled Hawa Women for Peace and Development (BHWPD)		\$500,000 USD
<i>Gedo, Jubaland</i>		June 2021 – June 2023
Results Achieved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Youth, women and girls learned about civic rights and responsibilities and gender equality. This has increased effective public participation and awareness. Community advocacy training helped people feel more empowered to take control of their own lives and provided practical support to overcome health and social care problems. Two 'Youth and Women Champions for Change' associations were established and they monitor the community and report cases of PVE that have been challenged within the community. Community dialogues and town hall meetings between youth, women and local leaders improved interaction between community members and created new links. Three hundred beneficiaries were supported in agriculture, making them more resilient to climate change. 	
Horn of Africa Peace Network (HAPEN)		\$1,600,000 USD
<i>Beled Hawo & Kismayo, Jubaland</i>		January 2022 – February 2025
Results Achieved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SWERC Business Network established and operationalised Increased capacity of youth entrepreneurs and access to employment opportunities for youth Increased understanding of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) among mental health paraprofessional trainees Increased knowledge of mental health and emotional regulation strategies among young people Young people and their families have improved knowledge of psychosocial coping strategies to respond to mental health stressors in emergency situations. Community members gain increased knowledge of mental health and socio-economic strategies to integrate young people. 	
Somali Lifeline Organisation (SOLO)		\$800,000
<i>Kismayo, Jubaland</i>		December 2022 – December 2024
Results Achieved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity of community committees in governance, leadership, peacebuilding, and PVE strengthened Evidence-based knowledge generation and sharing for PVE and peacebuilding stakeholders is conducted Increased dialogue opportunities for stakeholders to improve their understanding and trust Inclusive coordination platform for stakeholders established Youth have the capacity on peacebuilding and PVE to advocate for and effectively participate for youth priorities Small-scale community PVE action plan produced through platform 	




	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PVE and peacebuilding sensitisation activities for non-state actors and government on PVE conducted
African Network for the Prevention and Protection Against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) <i>Baidoa & Xudur, South West</i>	\$1,000,000 USD January 2024 – December 2025
Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened peacebuilding infrastructures and improved relationships within and between liberated communities, leading to reconciliation and integration • Improved socio-economic conditions and increased inclusion of vulnerable individuals, reducing the appeal of extremist groups and ideologies as viable alternatives • Increased awareness and capacity in the local government to support communities with reconciliation and reintegration processes
Elman Peace Centre (EPC) <i>Jowhar, Adan Yabal & Matabaan, Hirshabelle</i>	\$1,000,000 USD January 2024 – March 2026
Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced capacity of women and youth leaders to play a more proactive role in community reconciliation structures, and P/CVE activities • Improved trust and collaboration among communities through a set of sustainable, local-driven CBR to foster reconciliation, conflict resolution, with the facilitation from youth and women leaders • Women and youth contribute to economic diversification and access to livelihoods, there is a business network in place to link provide basic services and commodities

Annex B. Risks and Mitigation Measures

NB – A risk scoring key is provided at the end of this annex.



RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
<p>DENIAL OF ACCESS TO PROGRAMME AREA DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER/ NATURAL DISASTER EVENT.</p> <p>LIKELIHOOD – POSSIBLE (3)</p> <p>IMPACT – MODERATE (3)</p> <p>OVERALL RISK RATING – MEDIUM</p>	<p>Somalia is at risk of several natural hazards, including drought, floods and cyclones. From 2020 to 2023 drought pushed the country dangerously close to famine with about 43,000 deaths in 2022, half of whom were children under five. Following the severe drought, the historic Deyr rains and flooding in late 2023 affected nearly half of the country's districts, impacting 2.5 million people and submerging over 1.5 million hectares of farmland. In Luuq (Gedo district), unprecedented rainfall submerged practically every building, leaving hundreds of families stranded on rooftops.^{xiv}</p>	<p>All grantees are expected to have business continuity plans in place for programme delivery, which includes identifying those locations most at risk, making provision for temporary re-location and potential temporary delivery of programme activities by other means, e.g. remotely. Grantees are also encouraged to conduct monitoring for such events to take pre-emptive action.</p>	<p> Sustained flooding threatening risk to life directly affecting one or more programme areas.</p> <p> Isolated heavy rainfall causing temporary flooding and localised disruption affecting a single programme area.</p> <p> Periodic adverse weather causing minimal disruption and managed by GCERF's grantees through Business-as-Usual activities.</p>
<p>FIDUCIARY (CORRUPTION) RISK – FUNDS OR MATERIALS ENTRUSTED TO GRANTEE ARE NOT USED FOR THE INTENDED PURPOSE AND/OR IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND</p>	<p>Somalia is currently ranked 180th out of 180 countries on Transparency International's 2023 Corruption Perception Index.^{xvii} According to the 2024 US State Department Investment Climate Statement on Somalia, 'corruption is rampant in all sectors of government, particularly government procurement and anti-corruption efforts remain ad hoc, with little</p>	<p>Monitoring visits will be carried out by the National Advisor and the Regional Manager.</p> <p>Quarterly grantee reports include both narrative and financial details. A well-established, third-</p>	<p> GCERF has a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption. All cases will be thoroughly investigated and reported to the GCERF</p>

RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
<p>LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND/OR THAT REPORTING ON THE USE OF FUNDS IS MISREPRESENTED. RESOURCES MAY ALSO BE DIVERTED (INCLUDING TO CRIMINAL/ TERRORIST GROUPS) OR MISUSED. THE CORRUPTION RISK MAY ALSO INCLUDE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM WHICH CREATES A CONFLICT OF INTEREST.</p> <p>LIKELIHOOD – POSSIBLE (3)</p> <p>IMPACT – MODERATE (3)</p> <p>OVERALL RISK RATING – MEDIUM</p>	<p>deterrence for persons and entities that act with impunity'.^{xlvii} The 2023 Humanitarian Outcomes report on Somalia, paints a similar picture, indicating that the identification of local partners, and the awarding of contracts (to private contractors and humanitarian agencies), are two points of particularly significant corruption risk in the country.^{xlviii}</p>	<p>party audit company undertakes regular financial examinations of the grantees and final audits. The grant agreement specifies conflict of interest policies and codes of conduct to deter, prevent and manage occurrences of fraudulent practice.</p> <p>In addition, GCERF has a dedicated 'Integrity Line' for whistle-blowers to anonymously contact the organisation through the website and report complaints about the behaviour of staff or grantees. This assists with ensuring the wellbeing of any complainants.</p>	<p>Finance and Audit Committee and then to the GCERF Governing Board. If misappropriated, efforts will be made to ensue recovery of funds. Depending on the magnitude of the misappropriation, the grant may be terminated.</p>




RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
<p>SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATES TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS UNSAFE FOR GCERF STAFF TO TRAVEL TO CONDUCT MONITORING VISITS AND/OR MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR GRANTEE/S TO IMPLEMENT ACTIVITIES.</p> <p>LIKELIHOOD – LIKELY (4)</p> <p>IMPACT – MAJOR (4)</p> <p>OVERALL RISK RATING – HIGH</p>	<p>The fundamental risks in this respect concern the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attacks by armed groups or militias in programme areas which could pose a threat (direct or indirect) to GCERF-funded programmes, putting at risk the lives of grantees' staff, programme participants, and that of visiting GCERF staff. • Kidnapping of grantees' staff, programme participants or visiting GCERF staff. • Clan conflict causing denial of access. • Violent crime threatening grantees' staff, programme participants or visiting GCERF staff • Overthrow or collapse of government authorities. <p>GCERF bases its Travel Risk Management system on the travel security risk ratings provided by International SOS and cross-referenced with UNDSS ratings where necessary. International SOS assesses Somalia as being EXTREME risk, except for Hargeisa (MEDIUM), Western Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland (HIGH). All Somalia programme areas are rated EXTREME risk.</p> <p>There are two main Islamist militant groups currently active in Somalia – Al-Shabaab (AS) and Islamic State in Somalia (IS-Somalia). AS administers parts of south-central Somalia and retains the capability to launch attacks within areas ostensibly controlled</p>	<p>To a certain degree, security risks for grantees are reduced due to selection of local partners that have credibility and a broad base of legitimacy and acceptance in the communities where activities are carried out. However, the importance of continuous monitoring for changes to the residual risk is recognised. Accordingly, the SRCS undertakes 'horizon scanning' for all beneficiary countries - monitoring for emerging security and health threats, which pose a potential threat to GCERF operations. In addition, grantees are required to have in place a security focal point, risk assessments for programme activities, an incident response plan and a pre-identified/ trained incident management team and access to a warning and informing system, which allows real time access to alert information. Alongside this, partners are encouraged to become members of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) in Somalia, enabling them access to a suitable alert system, security and incident</p>	<p> Potential security incidents, including VE attacks target grantee and GCERF staff because of their engagement in GCERF's PVE initiatives triggering suspension of an event or programme.</p> <p> An emerging pattern of security incidents in a given area, or information which suggests the likelihood of an attack, triggering postponement of an event, or operation by alternative means (e.g. remotely).</p> <p> Minor security risks managed by GCERF's grantees in a timely manner and as per GCERF's requirements.</p>


RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
	<p>by forces aligned to FGS and FMS authorities. Early 2025 has seen an increase in the tempo of attacks by AS, in Mogadishu (such as the attack on the President's convoy on 18 March 2025) as well as in the FMS (Bakool, Bay and Lower Shabelle). It is not yet clear what implications of this increase in tempo may mean.</p> <p>IS-Somalia primarily operates in Puntland although it has some presence in southern Somalia, with a concentration in Afgooye in the Lower Shabelle region. It has maintained its presence in the country since 2015 and increased its operations significantly throughout 2018, when it began carrying out attacks in Mogadishu, particularly assassinations. Recent security operations in Puntland have led to ISIS elements regrouping and the conduct of small scale IED attacks in the Bari Region (March 2025).^{xlix}</p> <p>There is a high risk of kidnapping throughout Somalia, including in regions bordering Kenya and Ethiopia. Terrorists and criminal groups, including piracy groups, are involved in kidnapping, both of foreign nationals and of personnel of Somali descent.</p> <p>Clan conflict is a frequent occurrence in Somalia and specifically in the programme regions of Galmadug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland and South West, all of which have seen prolonged periods of clashes and heightened tensions in 2024 and in March 2025, along the Galgaduud-Gedo boundary¹ Furthermore,</p>	<p>management training opportunities and advice and guidance on security and incident management.</p> <p>The National Advisor and the grantees, in consultation with the SRCS, will monitor the residual risks and take appropriate proactive action in the event that risk triggers are activated.</p> <p>To ensure the security of GCERF and grantees' staff GCERF has designed adaptive policies and procedures and ensures staff and grantees are aware of and are able to apply them. In brief these measures are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support, guide and advise grantees in relation to safety and security where necessary. Capacity building with respect to security management training, where the need is identified. • Risk assessment for all GCERF Secretariat travel • 'Horizon scanning' and incident monitoring by the Security, Risk 	


RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
	<p>clan conflicts do not always receive local media attention and hence are likely to be under-reported.ⁱⁱ</p> <p>International SOS considers that the risk of violent crime is a serious concern, largely due to the prevalence of militant groups, consistent insecurity and wide availability of firearms.ⁱⁱⁱ</p> <p>The predominant risk for Somalia in relation to stability is a return to the factional fighting of the 1990s, which primarily befell the central and southern parts of the country. According to the Fragile States Index, Somalia has remained amongst the top 3 most fragile states for 18 years, achieving top spot in 2024.ⁱⁱⁱ</p> <p>A separate scenario not considered in the above, is the escalation of tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, which could affect inbound travel. Any such disruption is assessed to be possible, albeit temporary in nature.</p>	<p>and Compliance Specialist (SRCS)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety and security training for visiting personnel, including Hostile Environment Awareness training. • Use of vetted accommodation and transport providers and/ or security provider support where necessary • Access to ISOS security and medical support, 'active monitoring' by a 3rd party provider, and documented incident management procedures. 	

RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
<p>RISK OF SUSPENSION, POSTPONEMENT, OR DELAY OF PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES DUE TO A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN (PHEIC).</p> <p>LIKELIHOOD – POSSIBLE (3)</p> <p>IMPACT – MODERATE/ MAJOR (3/4)</p> <p>OVERALL RISK RATING – MEDIUM/ HIGH</p>	<p>There have been two global pandemics since 2000 – the Swine Flu pandemic (2009-10) and the Covid pandemic, which illustrate that the risk of such events occurring is possible.</p> <p>According to the International Rescue Committee, Somalia struggled to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic, owing to a lack of resources, the spread of false or incomplete information about Covid-19, and the unequal distribution of the vaccines.^{liv}</p>	<p>A newly emerging infectious disease or a significant adverse change to the Covid pandemic, could have a substantial impact on programme activities, however the experience of Covid, has meant that GCERF is better prepared in dealing with such eventualities. 'Horizon scanning' by the SRCS includes monitoring for health threats. Pandemic contingency procedures have been developed, which will aid the response to any future such event. With the knowledge of Covid, the Regional Manager and National Advisor, are aware of the necessity to work closely with grantees to identify the support and resources that GCERF can provide to aid continued programme delivery.</p> <p>Where feasible, implementation of PVE initiatives will be adapted to ensure compliance with the local safety and health requirements. For example, instead of large-scale community gatherings, smaller, physically distanced group meetings will be encouraged. Use of online tools for information</p>	<p> No or little possibility to adapt and maintain the implementation of PVE initiatives due to new waves of COVID-19, or a newly emerging pandemic, with related restrictions triggering suspension of the programme in specific or all locations for longer than 6 months. Projects to repurpose up to 5% of budget to support communities.</p> <p> Implementation of some PVE initiatives is delayed for less than 6 months due to COVID-19, or other newly emerging pandemic restrictions. Implementation of other initiatives is possible at a limited scale and/or with some acceptable adaptations to comply with health and safety requirements.</p>

		<p>dissemination and awareness raising will also be recommended where possible.</p> <p>Regular calls, in-country monitoring (if travel is allowed) will be performed to follow up the development of the situation and ensure appropriate adaptation of PVE initiatives.</p>	<p> Mild restrictions are in place and implementation of PVE initiatives with some minor adaptations are unhindered.</p>
<p>INSUFFICIENT/ DECREASED POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT TO ENABLE GCERF TO DELIVER AGAINST ITS STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES.</p> <p>LIKELIHOOD – UNLIKELY (2)</p> <p>IMPACT – MAJOR (4)</p> <p>OVERALL RISK RATING – MEDIUM</p>	<p>The Government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has made the fight against AS its primary focus. In August 2023, the FGS established Tubsan and launched the National Strategy in 2024, showing the level of political buy-in and commitment to P/CVE within the administration. The Director of the Centre is designated as Somalia’s representative on GCERF’s Governing Board and the Chair of the CSM.</p> <p>Tubsan and GCERF have built strong working relationships and remain closely aligned in partnership.</p>	<p>GCERF maintains close coordination through the Country Support Mechanism. Dialogue includes discussion on strategic direction of activities and intervention. We ensure the grants funded remain apolitical in serving communities. The Risk will be further reduced by the occurrence of CSM meetings, relationship building between GCERF staff and officials, and briefings on GCERF’s operations by the Deputy Executive Director and Head of Portfolio Management, the Regional Manager/ National Advisor and other relevant staff.</p>	<p> GCERF funded PVE initiatives in Somalia become unwanted by the respective government/s and recommended adjustments jeopardise adherence to GCERF’s strategic principle of political independence, triggering postponement of the programme.</p> <p> The government counterparts are unresponsive to GCERF’s requests for feedback and information. No support is provided to GCERF’s P/CVE initiatives in Somalia.</p>

			 Government counterparts are responsive and supportive of GCERF's P/CVE initiatives in Somalia.
RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
<p>INCREASING GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION</p> <p>LIKELIHOOD – LIKELY (4)</p> <p>IMPACT – MODERATE (3)</p> <p>OVERALL RISK RATING – HIGH</p>	<p>In Civicus Monitor's 2023 Global Findings report, civic space in Somalia is rated 'repressed', the penultimate highest restrictive rating.^{iv} In its 'Freedom in the World 2024' report, Freedom House similarly rates Somalia as being 'Not Free'.^{lv} Freedom House indicates that journalists regularly face harassment, arbitrary detention, suspension, fines, and violence from both state and non-state actors.^{lvii} In its 2023 report on Human Rights in Somalia, the US Department of State, declared that government officials on occasion restricted NGO operations and that they also faced disruption and hampering from Al Shabaab.^{lviii}</p>	<p>The risk remains but will be reduced by regular contact with partner country officials and CSM members.</p> <p>GCERF, as an impartial and non-political organisation, will discuss with the government at various levels to ensure support/ buy-in for the P/CVE initiatives and the work of the grantees.</p> <p>GCERF requires that its grantees comply with the requirements of the country legislation, including mandatory reporting to government entities at FGS and FMS levels.</p> <p>GCERF will encourage its grantees to build and maintain good working relationship with government entities and will facilitate information sharing between them by organising virtual and in-country meetings,</p>	<p> Security threats, harassment and arrests of grantee staff and/or programme participants by security agencies due to engagement in GCERF's P/CVE initiatives. Major restrictions on the implementation of P/CVE initiatives and/or demands of personal data of grantee staff and/or programme participants by the security agencies.</p> <p> Unsubstantiated demands of excessive reports and information by security and other government entities beyond the reporting requirements of legislation without hampering the</p>

		<p>briefings on progress of PVE initiatives, etc.</p> <p>Quarterly Country Reports will be shared by GCERF with the CSM members highlighting key achievements, lessons learned, and future plans. Country reports will be developed based on the grantee reports, country visits by GCERF staff and various events and activities undertaken by GCERF and its grantees. The potential principal grantees will also be invited to present the progress of the programme to the CSM.</p> <p>GCERF ensures alignment of PVE initiatives with the priorities and/or P/CVE strategy of the beneficiary government. GCERF will review its programmes to ensure alignment, and adherence to GCERF's strategic priorities and leverage points.</p>	<p>implementation of P/CVE initiatives.</p> <p> Regular reporting (e.g. quarterly) required by the legislation.</p>
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RISK DESCRIPTION	RISK ASSESSMENT	RISK CONTROLS	GCERF'S THRESHOLD
<p>FAILURE TO PREVENT, DETECT AND MANAGE CASES OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, ABUSE AND HARASSMENT (SEAH) IN RELATION TO GCERF PROGRAMMES IN SOMALIA. THIS INCLUDES CONSIDERING THE RISKS OF (I) SEAH OCCURRING IN GCERF OPERATIONS, (II) INSTANCES OF SEAH NOT REPORTED OR UNDER REPORTED, (III) PROTECTION FROM SEAH IS NOT GIVEN DUE ATTENTION AND (IV) INCIDENTS OF SEAH ARE NOT WELL MANAGED BY GCERF.</p> <p>LIKELIHOOD – POSSIBLE (3)</p> <p>IMPACT – MAJOR (4)</p> <p>OVERALL RISK RATING – HIGH</p>	<p>According to the EU's 2023 Country Report on Somalia, sexual violence against women and girls is described as pervasive.^{lix} The US Department of State report cited above, states that internally displaced persons and members of marginalised clans and groups suffer disproportionately from gender-based violence.^{lx}</p>	<p>GCERF has a PSEAH Regulation which details the principles and guidelines to safeguard staff, Principal Recipients, other partners and beneficiaries. The Regulation details preventive measures and reporting and investigation.</p> <p>The Code of Conduct for Recipients of GCERF Funding specifies the prohibition against exploitation and abuse. Grantees are required to detail their PSEAH measures in the grantees' risk assessment and the Grant Agreement stipulates the requirement to have measures to prevent such activity.</p>	<p> GCERF has a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual abuse, harassment or exploitation through its programmes. All cases will be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted where possible.</p>

Appendix A: Likelihood and impact key

	IMPACT				
People	Injuries or ailments not requiring medical treatment.	Minor injury or First Aid treatment cases.	Multiple injuries but not life threatening	Single death, multiple casualties with life threatening/ changing injuries	Multiple deaths and persons with severe injuries.
Reputation	No media enquiries, internal review only	Media interest from one local source	Local media coverage with some adverse content, internal review	Intense public, political, media scrutiny	Irreparable damage to reputation, adverse national media, public court of inquiry
Business Processes and Systems	Negligible temporary impairment of a programme	Minor/ temporary impairment of a single programme	The ability to operate one key programme is affected	The ability to operate several key programmes is affected	Total inability to maintain all or significant parts of the programme
Financial	<\$1K	<\$5K	<\$20K	<\$100K	Loss of all allocated budget funding
	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Catastrophic

Historical			1	2	3	4	5
Happens on a frequent basis	5	Almost certain	L	M	H	E	E
Occurs periodically	4	Likely	L	M	H	H	E
Has happened at some point in organisational memory and has been experienced by comparable organisations	3	Possible	L	M	M	H	H
Has not happened in the organisational memory but has occurred to organisations in comparable sectors	2	Unlikely	L	L	M	M	M
Has not happened in the organisational memory nor to equivalent organisations	1	Rare	L	L	L	L	L

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