1. Indonesia Strategy Addendum-Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE)

Following the development of Composite Violent Extremism[1] in Indonesia in 2025, The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) sets its intention to supplement the Country Investment Strategy in Indonesia to support the Republic of Indonesia's National Programme in preventing and countering this new form of violent extremism with focus on nihilistic violence.

This addendum is guided by the principles of complementing the existing programming in the country, responding to gender and conflict sensitivities, seeking durable solutions, and aligning with internationally recognised good practices.

Background

Indonesia's violent extremism landscape has historically been characterised by organised ideological movements, particularly networks associated with Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), and other groups influenced by transnational jihadist ideologies. These organisations traditionally relied on structured recruitment, ideological indoctrination, hierarchical command structures, and coordinated operational planning. Over the past decade, sustained counterterrorism operations, law enforcement actions, and prevention initiatives have significantly disrupted many of these legacy networks, contributing to a marked decline in organised terrorist activity.

At the same time, the evolving digital environment is creating new challenges for prevention efforts. Recent publicly reported incidents involving adolescents, together with growing concerns regarding young people's exposure to harmful online content and violence-glorifying digital communities, suggest that pathways to violence may be becoming increasingly decentralised, individualised, and digitally mediated. Rather than following traditional organisational structures, some individuals appear to be influenced by a combination of online subcultures, personal grievances, identity struggles, and symbolic imitation of previous acts of violence. These trends do not replace the continued threat posed by religiously motivated violent extremism but rather complement it by highlighting the diversification of pathways that may lead individuals towards violence. As online environments continue to shape how young people consume information, form identities, and interact with peers, prevention approaches must evolve accordingly.

For GCERF, these developments present an opportunity to complement Indonesia's existing prevention architecture by supporting locally led, community-based interventions that strengthen youth resilience, improve digital literacy and online safety, integrate psychosocial support, establishes a referral network, works with rule of law authorities and generate evidence on emerging forms of violent extremism. Such investments would build upon Indonesia's National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP-PCVE) 2026–2029 while addressing emerging vulnerabilities that are not yet fully reflected in existing prevention programming. Strengthening collaboration among government institutions, civil society organisations, educators, researchers, technology stakeholders, and local communities will therefore be

[1] Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE), "salad bar" extremism, participatory memetic violence, misanthropic and nihilistic violent extremism (M/NVE), "violence for violence's sake," hybrid violent extremism, and related concepts describe forms of radicalisation in which individuals draw on and combine disparate and sometimes contradictory ideological currents rather than adhering to a single coherent extremist doctrine. These may include nihilistic or violence-oriented beliefs, extreme-right and extreme-left ideologies, jihadist narratives, misogynistic worldviews, and other grievances or identity-based beliefs that resonate with an individual's personal worldview. The "salad bar" metaphor captures this eclectic mixing of ideological elements, while NVE places greater emphasis on violence itself as an end or source of meaning rather than to achieve a clearly defined political or ideological objective.

essential to ensure that Indonesia's PCVE efforts remain adaptive and responsive to the changing threat environment.

GCERF will support the following activities:

I. **Strengthen youth-focused resilience programmes and stakeholders' capacity to prevent and respond to online extremist subcultures, including referral systems [2]**
II. **As part of the referral systems, integrate psychosocial support into CoVE detection, prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration efforts**
III. **Strengthen digital literacy and online safety initiatives, including Improve monitoring and research on emerging online sub-cultures**

Table 1 below outlines GCERF's proposed approach:

WHAT: Enabling prevention and resilience-building of different groups against Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE) by building vertical social cohesion through 1) Detection, peer learning and caretakers' education 2) online and offline community agency development, and 3) monitoring and research on emerging sub-cultures	
1. Minors and youth aged 8-30; **2.** Guardians & Teachers **3.** Frontline workers in child and youth protection (psychologist, social workers, school counselors, law enforcement officials) **4.** Rule of law authorities	**WHERE** Jakarta (Rehabilitation centers); All provinces of Indonesia; Internet, with specific attention to the Indonesian web subcultures
HOW: Providing grants to Indonesian CSOs to prevent nihilistic violent extremism, supporting rehabilitation and reintegration of youth perpetrators, and addressing online NVE radicalisation	

2. Drivers and Characteristics of Composite Violent Extremism in Indonesia

a. Definition

Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE) is a conceptual framework established to describe acts committed by individuals "who threatened, plotted, or carried out acts of terrorism or violent extremism, or otherwise illegally supported a terrorist organization, and who appeared to adhere to a mixture of ideologies and beliefs"[3]. This mixture of ideologies and beliefs was conceptualized into a typology made of four categories in relation to the mixture of ideologies and beliefs: *ambiguous, mixed, fused or convergent*. In their foundational article, the authors are clarifying "what the concept of composite violent extremism does not cover: At one end of a spectrum, composite violent extremism does not encompass violent extremists who possess a discernible

[2] This strategy considers the following to be prevention actors: rule of law and local authorities, educators, parents, social workers, school-based staff, guardians, and peers

[3]Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Andrew Zammit, Emelie Chace-Donahue & Madison Urban (2025) Composite Violent Extremism: Conceptualizing Attackers Who Increasingly Challenge Traditional Categories of Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 48:12, 1343-1369, available at DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2023.2194133

ideology that is not combined with other sentiments or cooperation with adherents of other ideologies (…). At the other end, composite violent extremism does not cover violent actors who do not remotely demonstrate any ideological adherence", which means that many mass shooters are excluded.
"The CoVE framework categorizes based on *expressed or exhibited* beliefs that *appear to influence* an individual's worldview and outlook".
The categories of *ambiguous, mixed, fused or convergent mixtures of ideologies and beliefs* are distinct.
Ambiguous "applies to violent extremists whose worldview does not appear to be influenced by any clearly discernible ideologies, but rather by an amalgamation of prejudices, grievances, and subcultures that may undergird various extremist ideologies (e.g., misogyny, racism, antisemitism, conspiracy theories, or mass violence)".
Mixed "applies to violent extremists whose worldview appears to be influenced by multiple distinct and discernible ideologies alongside other prejudices, grievances, or subcultures. This includes individuals who adhere to multiple discernible ideologies or a combination of traditional and functional ideologies."
Fused "applies to violent extremists whose worldview is based on one clearly discernible ideology, but who appear to fuse this core ideology with other distinct prejudices or grievances."
Convergent "applies to violent extremists who adhere to one distinct ideology that has convergent prejudices and grievances with other ideologies, and thus support or seek to work with other ideological groups without necessarily adhering to their ideology"[4].
As another author noted in 2003 about lone wolves, the authors of such crimes" often come up with their own ideologies that combine personal vendettas with religious or political grievances"[5]. This is precisely where the intersection with Nihilistic Violence lies.

Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE) is part of CoVE. The term describes violence that is not primarily directed toward a coherent political or religious objective, but is associated with misanthropy, violence for its own sake, notoriety, status, provocation and belonging within digitally mediated subcultures. The emerging threat is increasingly youth-centred and online, requiring prevention and safeguarding responses alongside counterterrorism, cybercrime and criminal-justice approaches[6].
Across the Indo-Pacific, NVE is emerging as a youth-centred and digitally mediated risk, with cases and indicators reported in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Online gaming, social media and violent digital subcultures can provide spaces for socialisation into violence, while recognition, status and belonging may function as important behavioural drivers[7].

[4] Ibid.
[5] Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 172. Cited in Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Andrew Zammit, Emelie Chace-Donahue & Madison Urban (2025) Composite Violent Extremism: Conceptualizing Attackers Who Increasingly Challenge Traditional Categories of Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 48:12, 1343-1369, available at DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2023.2194133
[6] Beyond Extremism: Platform Responses to Online Subcultures of Nihilistic Violence – GNET. Full report Link: GNET-nihilistic-violence_web.pdf ; Conclusions Paper: Joint meeting for TP 1 and TP 3 :Nihilistic Extremism in the Digital Age - Migra… Full Report Link: 695d0e13-943a-405c-bb95-e4e3310d0fce_en
[7] See The Soufan Centre: Nihilistic Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia; DOJ sounds alarm over online grooming for nihilistic violent extremism - Philippine Information Agency or Gaming community tips seen aiding fight vs online extremism | Philippine News Agency

b. *A transnational online risk*

Harmful actors and peer networks move across social media, encrypted networks, gaming and adjacent spaces, short-video platforms and e-commerce ecosystems within the Indo-Pacific region. Albeit disconnected geographically and in time, their acts are bound by "systematic premeditation, deliberate planning, aesthetic curation, and a pronounced desire for notoriety derived from committing mass violence"[8].

c. *Rarely ideology-first*

Cases can involve grievance, alienation, attacker worship, gore aesthetics, coercion and identity-seeking rather than a coherent political or religious ideology. "Nihilistic violent extremism can be understood as a form of violence in which the act itself becomes the primary objective, rather than a means to achieve a political, explicitly ideological, or religious goal. As highlighted in expert interventions, perpetrators are often motivated by a misanthropic worldview, a fascination with violence and gore, transgression, and a desire for recognition and status within online communities rather than clear ideological motif"[9].

d. *A maze of thinly connected networks and a response gap*

Traditional Counterterrorism indicators focused on group affiliation or doctrine may miss rapid, decentralised and youth-facing pathways to violence, making national-only or single-platform responses insufficient. The literature is mentioning a few known networks.

The Com network is "a set of decentralised online ecosystems which encourage and engage in cybercrime, extortion and swatting, and increasingly, acts of violence. The Com often targets vulnerable children and young people, coercing victims to conduct self-harm, serious violence and other forms of extreme criminality"[10].

764 is "an organised network of online groups that engage in sextortion and violence glorification. Emerging from the Com network in 2021, it comprises a constantly shifting set of chats, groups and forums across multiple platforms. Between 2020 and 2025, 200 individuals connected to this network were arrested in 28 countries for sextortion, CSAM[11] possession or violence"[12].

True Crime Community (TCC) is "a loosely connected online fandom which venerates mass violence and its perpetrators regardless of ideology. Its users memorialise and lionise serial killers, terrorists and mass murderers, encouraging others to conduct similar acts of violence. TCC does overlap with adjacent ecosystems such as gore communities and extreme-right Saints Culture aesthetics but is motivated by misanthropy and violence fixation rather than supremacist worldviews".

TCC has been connected to a phenomenon of "copycats", replicating mass shootings or violent crimes, or inspired by them, often spread by cultural memes[13]. Occurrences were highest in the USA but also appeared in other continents and countries. Researchers have called this "memetic violence"[14]. Some depict it as "participation in narratives disseminated within emergent online networks and subcultures", (…) going from content consumption to content production to offline action"[15].

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[8] Munira Mustaffa: Cosplaying Columbine: How Memetic Violence Transformed Southeast Asia's Extremist Threat – GNET.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Beyond Extremism: Platform Responses to Online Subcultures of Nihilistic Violence – GNET

[11] CSAM: Child Sexual Abuse Material

[12] Beyond Extremism: Platform Responses to Online Subcultures of Nihilistic Violence – GNET

[13] According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a meme can be defined as an image, video or piece of text, typically humorous in nature, that is copied and spread by internet users, often with slight variations (What is a meme? - BBC Bitesize)

[14] Memetic violence: How the True Crime Community generates its own killers - Institute for Strategic Dialogue

[15] Participatory Memetic Violence: Legend, Ostension, and Ideologically Diffuse Violence – GNET

Recent cases include the SMAN 72 Jakarta explosions[16] in November 2025, a Garut teenager linked to bomb-making materials[17] in December 2025, and a Sungai Raya West Kalimantan student Molotov attack in February 2026[18].

Publicly reported indicators related to these attacks point to attacker imitation, far-right symbolism, True Crime Community influence and online copycat dynamics.

CoVE is not currently classified by Indonesian authorities as a distinct operational threat category and is framed as a prevention-oriented behavioural risk discussion, according to GCERF sources in the country.

NVE, participatory memetic violence and True Crime Communities can overlap, but they should not be treated as identical[19].

e. A growing phenomenon

- Beyond the cases mentioned hereabove, in October 2025, Indonesia's Special Detachment 88 Counterterrorism Unit identified 70 children connected to online communities collectively known as the True Crime Community (TCC), across 18 provinces. Most were between 11 and 19[20]. Cases are multiplying in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore as well[21]. Even if some of the incidents occurred in Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore, there were common traits: using e-commerce platforms to orders weapons, purchase tactical gear or accessing bomb-making materials online; mimicking perpetrators of violent acts committed tens of thousands of kilometres away, some with reference to white supremacists[22], like attacks committed in New Zealand (Christchurch 2019) or in the US (Columbine 1999). A lack of ideology and presence of memetic behaviour. They used firearms or knives to perpetrate attacks. They were seeking notoriety, were radicalised online. All the attackers were young, vulnerable, some were bullied. They were highly online. They did not belong to any known offline terrorist network.

f. Why is it happening here and now?

COVID 19 confinements Influence –Algorithm amplification

Youth's online presence has increased during the pandemic. Mechanically, the consultation of violent content grew. In turn, it led to more violent content proposed by Internet platforms.

Masculinity, Powerlessness, and Hyperviolence

Most of the perpetrators are males facing mental health issues or rejection, or bullying. Their sustained exposure to violent content validates violent responses, which are also validated or valued by their online communities.

Digital access to forms of violence present elsewhere

The Internet has accelerated the dissemination of cultural content worldwide, providing access to forms of violence not existing in the perpetrators' own cultural spaces.

Online marketplaces

The sourcing of copycat materials is made easier by digital marketplaces[23].

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[16] SMAN 72 School Bombing in Indonesia - Jamestown

[17] From Mosques to Schoolyards: Indonesia's Evolving Terror Threat - Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies

[18] Four Explosions Reported at West Kalimantan School - En.tempo.co

[19] Memetic violence: How the True Crime Community generates its own killers - Institute for Strategic Dialogue

[20] True Crime Community and the Rise of Nihilistic Violent Extremism in Indonesia | RSIS

[21] Munira Mustaffa: Cosplaying Columbine: How Memetic Violence Transformed Southeast Asia's Extremist Threat – GNET.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

3. Indonesian Portfolio Objectives (for CoVE)

I. Strengthen youth-focused resilience programmes and stakeholders' capacity to prevent and respond to online extremist subcultures, including referral systems [24]

Firstly, **GCERF** programmes in Indonesia will **adapt youth-led PVE programmes to include CoVE**. An innovative aspect will be designing programmes with gamers and youth leaders. The participating CSOs will create specific digital critical thinking skills programmes for CoVE. Programming will ensure inclusion of the detection of manipulation, gore content and attacker glorification, pause-check-share, emotional regulation and safe bystander response, carried through credible messengers: youth, educators, community leaders and journalists.

Secondly, the activities will **advocate for and participate to enhancing earlier detection and youth safeguards through collaboration with online platforms and guardians' education. Online,** they will promote the use of behavioural indicators and online entry points, age-bucketed accounts, parental controls and AI age verification, youth-specific messaging and safer user protection. Complementary **offline activities** will increase awareness and training of Local community Stakeholders: Parents and guardians, teachers, community and political leaders, students, religious leaders.

A cornerstone of the programmes will be strengthening family resilience including training of rule of law and local authorities, educators, parents, social workers, school-based staff, guardians, and peers on digital resilience and family resilience. Parental communication and digital parenting will be core components of the training.

The programmes will aim to cover the whole of Indonesia, including capacities to deploy and advise local authorities and taskforces when incidents arise locally.

II. Integrate psychosocial support into CoVE detection, prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration efforts as part of the referral systems

The programmes will build and **promote protective referral systems into detection, prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration existing systems**, coalescing relevant stakeholders whose actions against CoVE are currently sparse, and insufficiently coordinated, because of the emerging and complex nature of the phenomenon. This includes counterterrorism authorities, child protection authorities, the judiciary including juvenile delinquency specialists, psychosocial workers, civil society (among which parents-teachers associations and youth-led organisations), and actors of the gaming and online spaces, among others. CoVE is frequently perplexing for stakeholders in charge of the response, who wonder whether it falls within terrorism or child protection or delinquency, especially with victims who can also be perpetrators.

The programmes are expected to reinforce the capacity of regional social rehabilitation centres workers, under the leadership of the Handayani Rehabilitation Centre.

The programmes will align with the national Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (RAN-PE) 2026-2029, as well as with the relevant Regional Action plans (RAD-PE), and other applicable national policies and priorities.

Like many experts, GCERF believes that the most important is to liaise dispersed expertise to create new dynamics and mobilization, disrupting the ability of CoVE to thrive in the grey areas of traditional prevention

[24] This strategy considers the following to be prevention actors: rule of law and local authorities, educators, parents, social workers, school-based staff, guardians, and peers

and response. As recommended by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, "while occupying parallel digital spaces and producing similar types of harm, online **subcultures of nihilistic violence are distinct from ideologically motivated extremism**. This unique threat requires bespoke platform interventions rather than expansions and adaptations of existing terrorism- and violent extremism-focused frameworks"[25]. **Building bespoke taskforces of existing actors that may not yet be used to work together will be a major success factor for these interventions**.

The programmes will build protective referrals linking schools, families, CSOs, social workers, psychologists and local authorities, identify early warning signs without securitising children's counselling. They will promote and create mentorship and reintegration support for youth at risk, focusing on psychosocial support. They will broaden existing local Taskforces: leverage the broad existing mandate of Women and Children Issues Task Forces (Satuan Tugas Perlindungan Perempuan dan Anak) to strengthen their capacity to identify, respond to, and refer cases involving children affected by radicalisation and terrorism, while reinforcing collaboration with other relevant child-protection and PCVE stakeholders.

Expand PCVE taskforces to include youth mental health, juvenile delinquency professionals, child protection specialists. Alongside, they will adapt or create rehabilitation pathways and centres for underaged CoVE perpetrators, establish digital platforms and Specialists Partnerships. Finally, they will identify pathways to quickly escalate situations and remove violent content, ensuring identified victims or perpetrators are referred to appropriate institutions.

III. Strengthen digital literacy and online safety initiatives, including Improve monitoring and research on emerging online sub-cultures

Offline, GCERF programmes will enlist youth-led organisations and peer experts like gaming influencers, web subcultures specialists and users of youth-oriented platforms to train taskforces experts and to support adapted digital literacy trainings targeting youth at risk.

They will promote **online** safety initiatives, connect platforms, CSOs, government and researchers. Activities will improve local trust and online safety relevance, connect community-level insight to tech safety and policy conversations, reporting, provide peer support and safer behaviours. When needed, the activities may support the creation of online safety networks or alliances, with preventative and curative objectives.

This component will pay particular attention to data privacy and security. Governmental agencies like National Research and Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional) will be approached to collaborate with the programme.

Another priority will be engagement with digital platforms, in cooperation with the government.

4. Geographical Scope

- Jakarta (Rehabilitation centers); All provinces of Indonesia; Internet, with specific attention to the Indonesian web subcultures.
- Numbers of victims or perpetrators may be low, but geographically spread, which may allow to cover the whole territory. This may require a mobile team.

5. Demographic Focus

1. Minors and youth aged 8-30;
2. Guardians & Teachers

[25] Beyond Extremism: Platform Responses to Online Subcultures of Nihilistic Violence – GNET

3. Frontline workers in child and youth protection (psychologist, social workers, school counselors, law enforcement officials)
4. Rule of law authorities

6. Programmatic Focus

I. Strengthen youth-focused resilience programmes and stakeholders' capacity to prevent and respond to online extremist subcultures
II. Integrate psychosocial support into CoVE detection, prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration
III. Strengthen digital literacy and online safety initiatives

7. Funding and Investment Scenarios

Table 1: Investment scenarios Phases	Level of Funding	Geographic Location	Interventions[26]	Population Groups
Phase 1: Initial programming	Up to USD 500,000	Jakarta (Rehabilitation centers); All provinces of Indonesia; Internet, with specific attention to the Indonesian web subcultures	**1. Strengthen youth-focused resilience programmes and stakeholders' capacity to prevent and respond to online extremist subcultures** Firstly, **adapt youth-led PVE programmes to include CoVE**. An innovative aspect will be designing programmes with gamers and youth leaders. The participating CSOs will create specific digital critical thinking skills programmes for CoVE. Programming will ensure inclusion of the detection of manipulation, gore content and attacker glorification, pause-check-share, emotional regulation and safe bystander response, carried through credible messengers: youth, educators, community leaders and journalists. Secondly, the activities will **advocate for and participate to enhancing earlier detection and youth safeguards through collaboration with online platforms and guardians' education**. Support youth engagement initiatives, including peer education, leadership development, and community-based activities that promote positive identity formation and resilience against harmful online influences. **Online**, promote the use of behavioural indicators and online entry points, age-bucketed accounts, parental controls and AI age verification, youth-specific messaging and safer user protection. **Offline**, activities will increase awareness and training of Local community stakeholders. Programmes must conduct systemic awareness-raising and targeted capacity building for teachers, guardians, and other accompanying adults, in cooperation with public institutions, to strengthen their understanding of Composite Violent Extremism and equip them with practical tools to protect young people, recognise early signs of possible affiliation, respond safely, alert relevant services, and coordinate with families, schools, psychosocial and child-protection services, and local authorities. The programmes will aim to cover the whole of Indonesia, including capacities to deploy and advise local authorities and taskforces when incidents arise locally. **2. Integrate psychosocial support into CoVE detection, prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration** The programmes will build and **promote protective referral systems into detection, prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration existing systems**, coalescing relevant stakeholders whose actions against CoVE are currently sparse, and insufficiently coordinated, because of the emerging and complex nature of the phenomenon. This includes counterterrorism authorities, child protection authorities, the judiciary including juvenile delinquency specialists, psychosocial workers, civil society (among which parents-teachers associations and youth-led organisations), and actors of the gaming and online spaces, among others. The programmes will build protective referrals linking schools, families, CSOs, social workers, psychologists and local authorities, identify early warning signs without securitising children's	**1.** Youth aged 8-25; **2.** Guardians & Teachers; **3.** Frontline workers in child and youth protection (psychologists, social workers, school counselors, law enforcement officials).

[26] Please see the Programmatic focus section for the details of proposed activities.

Table 1: Investment scenarios Phases	Level of Funding	Geographic Location	Interventions[26]	Population Groups
			counselling. They will promote and create mentorship and reintegration support for youth at risk, focusing on psychosocial support. They will broaden existing local Taskforces: leverage the broad existing mandate of Women and Children Issues Task Forces (Satuan Tugas Perlindungan Perempuan dan Anak) to strengthen their capacity to identify, respond to, and refer cases involving children affected by radicalisation and terrorism, while reinforcing collaboration with other relevant child-protection and PCVE stakeholders. Alongside, they will adapt or create rehabilitation pathways and centres for underaged CoVE perpetrators, establish digital platforms and Specialists Partnerships. Finally, they will identify pathways to quickly escalate situations and remove violent content, ensuring identified victims or perpetrators are referred to appropriate institutions. **3. Strengthen digital literacy and online safety initiatives** **Offline**, the programmes will enlist youth-led organisations and peer experts like gaming influencers, web subcultures specialists and users of youth-oriented platforms to train taskforces experts and to support adapted digital literacy trainings targeting youth at risk. They will promote **online** safety initiatives, connect platforms, CSOs, government and researchers. Activities will improve local trust and online safety relevance, connect community-level insight to tech safety and policy conversations, reporting; provide peer support and safer behaviours. When needed, the activities may support the creation of online safety networks or alliances, with preventative and curative objectives. Activities may also include expansion of projects that equip young people with the skills to critically assess online content, recognise harmful narratives, and resist exposure to online communities that normalise or glorify violence. Strengthen collaboration between government agencies, researchers, and civil society organisations to better understand digital environments where violent narratives circulate, including communities associated with violence glorification.	
Phase 2 Expansion of scope to Regional Cooperation or Regional Programming, including the Philippines, potentially other non-partner countries	Up to USD 1 million	Indonesia, Philippines	Same as above, with more regional trainings	