In 2025, GCERF-supported programmes reached hundreds of thousands of people in communities on the frontline of violent extremism. Behind these numbers are individuals rebuilding their lives after conflict, young people choosing opportunity over violence, and communities finding ways to resolve tensions before they escalate.

What we see consistently is that violent extremism does not begin with ideology — it begins with grievance, exclusion, and a search for identity and belonging. Our work addresses these drivers directly, through locally led solutions that are both credible and sustainable.

But this report also highlights a fundamental tension. While the need for prevention is growing, the resources available to support it remain uncertain. Too often, funding arrives late, is narrowly earmarked, or fails to match the long-term nature of the challenge.

This is why GCERF is evolving — from a grant-maker to an investment catalyst, working with governments, civil society, and new partners to mobilise more flexible and sustainable resources for prevention.

Our new Strategy 2026–2029 reflects this shift. It is grounded in what we have learned but also shaped by a clear recognition: that prevention must adapt if it is to remain effective and convincing in an uncertain world.

The message of this report is therefore both one of confidence and of urgency. We know what works. The question is whether we are prepared to act on it.

In 2025, GCERF-supported programmes reached hundreds of thousands of people in communities on the frontline of violent extremism. Behind these numbers are individuals rebuilding their lives after conflict, young people choosing opportunity over violence, and communities finding ways to resolve tensions before they escalate.

What we see consistently is that violent extremism does not begin with ideology — it begins with grievance, exclusion, and a search for identity and belonging. Our work addresses these drivers directly, through locally led solutions that are both credible and sustainable.

But this report also highlights a fundamental tension. While the need for prevention is growing, the resources available to support it remain uncertain. Too often, funding arrives late, is narrowly earmarked, or fails to match the long-term nature of the challenge.

This is why GCERF is evolving — from a grant-maker to an investment catalyst, working with governments, civil society, and new partners to mobilise more flexible and sustainable resources for prevention.

Our new Strategy 2026–2029 reflects this shift. It is grounded in what we have learned but also shaped by a clear recognition: that prevention must adapt if it is to remain effective and convincing in an uncertain world.

The message of this report is therefore both one of confidence and of urgency. We know what works. The question is whether we are prepared to act on it.

Violent extremism continues to adapt, intersecting with conflict, displacement, and new forms of polarisation, including in digital spaces. At the same time, multilateralism is experiencing one of the biggest crises since the present system was established after World War II.

In this very difficult environment, GCERF stands out as a model of what effective international cooperation based on equal partnership can achieve: a platform that aligns global resources with national priorities and local leadership.

The Board remains confident in GCERF’s direction, impact, and continued relevance. The organisation’s community-based approach has demonstrated clear results, while its governance model ensures both accountability and strategic oversight.

As we look to the future, our collective task is to sustain and scale what works — ensuring that prevention remains central to international efforts to address violent extremism. This will require continued commitment from partners, as well as openness to innovation in how we finance and deliver prevention. GCERF is well-positioned to meet this challenge.

Violent extremism continues to adapt, intersecting with conflict, displacement, and new forms of polarisation, including in digital spaces. At the same time, multilateralism is experiencing one of the biggest crises since the present system was established after World War II.

In this very difficult environment, GCERF stands out as a model of what effective international cooperation based on equal partnership can achieve: a platform that aligns global resources with national priorities and local leadership.

The Board remains confident in GCERF’s direction, impact, and continued relevance. The organisation’s community-based approach has demonstrated clear results, while its governance model ensures both accountability and strategic oversight.

As we look to the future, our collective task is to sustain and scale what works — ensuring that prevention remains central to international efforts to address violent extremism. This will require continued commitment from partners, as well as openness to innovation in how we finance and deliver prevention. GCERF is well-positioned to meet this challenge.

GCERF thanks its donors, Board, Country Support Mechanism members, civil society partners and all other stakeholders for their engagement and generous support.

GCERF was established in 2014 to counter and prevent violent extremism (PVE) by investing in people and grassroots initiatives that are typically beyond the reach of the international community. With these investments, GCERF addresses the local, social, economic, and political drivers of radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist and violent extremist groups, providing better alternatives.

In an age of globalisation and borderless digital spaces, GCERF’s work contributes to community security well beyond the countries that receive investments.

Over a decade, investments reached 23 countries across 7 regions. Scroll to see where the funding went.

The Sahel leads at 24% of total investment, followed by South-East Asia at 20% and Eastern Africa at 18%.

Together, these investments have reached communities at the frontline of radicalisation and recruitment, creating resilience from the ground up.

Four countries in the Western Balkans received 12% of total investment, led by Kosovo at $7M — the region’s single largest allocation.

The Sahel is now the largest regional concentration. Mali alone accounts for over a third of the region’s investment at $10.5M, with Burkina Faso ($7.1M) and Niger ($5.6M) close behind.

Nigeria leads with $12M (10% of global investment), tied with Kenya as the largest single-country recipient. Ghana contributes a further $3.1M.

Despite a later start in 2018, Eastern Africa is now the third-largest region. Kenya alone accounts for more than half the region’s total at $12.1M.

Investments span Iraq ($6.2M), Tunisia ($4M), Yemen ($2M), and Syria ($1.4M) — concentrated in countries facing the deepest conflict-driven vulnerabilities.

Bangladesh ($10.2M) and the Philippines ($10M) together represent 17% of global investment, with Indonesia and Sri Lanka rounding out the region.

The most recent expansion — Kyrgyzstan — marks a new direction for GCERF’s geographic reach, with partnerships from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan set to follow.

In 2025, GCERF awarded USD 8M across 70 active grants — deepening partnerships with 228 civil society organisations on the front lines of prevention. Nearly a third of those CSOs are led by women.

Beyond direct funding, the partnership opened doors: 41% of GCERF-supported CSOs went on to secure additional resources for PVE work, and 89% credit their GCERF experience with helping them land that funding — multiplying the reach of every dollar invested.

Behind every number is a story. In 2025, GCERF’s programmes reached communities vulnerable to radicalisation to build resilience from the ground up.

Across Central Asia, the risks of violent extremism are shaped by shared socio-economic challenges and cross-border dynamics, which facilitate the spread of polarising narratives online. Additional factors, including ethnic tensions, labour migration, community detachment, and discrimination, further exacerbate vulnerabilities that violent extremist groups exploit.

After 1990, Central Asia became a source of regional conflict-driven migration, with a subsequent wave to the Middle East after the 2011 Arab uprisings.

Kyrgyzstan repatriated and started the reintegration of families of former terrorist fighters, demonstrating both political commitment and a human rights-based approach. Since June 2024, GCERF has invested USD 2 million in Kyrgyzstan, supporting national and local actors to address the drivers of violent extremism through community cohesion initiatives and socio-economic reintegration for returnee women and children.

In parallel, GCERF’s Governing Board has approved partnership requests from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, with investments in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan set to begin in the first half of 2026.

Across Central Asia, the risks of violent extremism are shaped by shared socio-economic challenges and cross-border dynamics, which facilitate the spread of polarising narratives online. Additional factors, including ethnic tensions, labour migration, community detachment, and discrimination, further exacerbate vulnerabilities that violent extremist groups exploit.

After 1990, Central Asia became a source of regional conflict-driven migration, with a subsequent wave to the Middle East after the 2011 Arab uprisings.

Kyrgyzstan repatriated and started the reintegration of families of former terrorist fighters, demonstrating both political commitment and a human rights-based approach. Since June 2024, GCERF has invested USD 2 million in Kyrgyzstan, supporting national and local actors to address the drivers of violent extremism through community cohesion initiatives and socio-economic reintegration for returnee women and children.

In parallel, GCERF’s Governing Board has approved partnership requests from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, with investments in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan set to begin in the first half of 2026.

Terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya, Somalia, and Mozambique are driven by a combination of socio-economic, political, and ideological factors.

In Somalia, al-Shabaab remains the dominant extremist group, threatening and using violence as well as exploiting weak state institutions, clan divisions, and limited economic opportunities to sustain its influence.

Kenya, particularly its coastal and northeastern regions, experiences spillover effects from Somalia, compounded by local grievances related to unemployment, historical marginalisation, and perceptions of exclusion.

In Mozambique, the insurgency in the northern part of the country, especially in Cabo Delgado, is fuelled by local discontent over inequality, underdevelopment, and limited benefits from natural resources exploitation.

Across all three countries, violent extremist groups capitalise on socio-economic grievances, offer financial incentives, and exploit identity-based divisions. Structural challenges such as limited access to justice and economic opportunities, low trust in public institutions, and governance gaps can heighten individuals’ susceptibility to radical narratives. Gender-based marginalisation and youth exclusion also contribute to the appeal of violent extremist and terrorist narratives.

Terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya, Somalia, and Mozambique are driven by a combination of socio-economic, political, and ideological factors.

In Somalia, al-Shabaab remains the dominant extremist group, threatening and using violence as well as exploiting weak state institutions, clan divisions, and limited economic opportunities to sustain its influence.

Kenya, particularly its coastal and northeastern regions, experiences spillover effects from Somalia, compounded by local grievances related to unemployment, historical marginalisation, and perceptions of exclusion.

In Mozambique, the insurgency in the northern part of the country, especially in Cabo Delgado, is fuelled by local discontent over inequality, underdevelopment, and limited benefits from natural resources exploitation.

Across all three countries, violent extremist groups capitalise on socio-economic grievances, offer financial incentives, and exploit identity-based divisions. Structural challenges such as limited access to justice and economic opportunities, low trust in public institutions, and governance gaps can heighten individuals’ susceptibility to radical narratives. Gender-based marginalisation and youth exclusion also contribute to the appeal of violent extremist and terrorist narratives.

Violent extremism across Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Tunisia continues to be shaped by political fragility, socio-economic disparities, protracted conflict, and regional tensions.

In Iraq and Northeast Syria, the aftermath of the territorial defeat of Islamic State (IS) has generated complex humanitarian and security dynamics. Families of former fighters were relocated to camps, including Al Hol and Al Roj. Al Hol’s population increased from approximately 9,800 to 73,000 in 2019. Overcrowding, exposure to trauma, and limited access to services and livelihoods have heightened protection concerns and increased vulnerability to radicalisation, particularly among children and adolescents.

The Government of Iraq has continued the voluntary repatriation of its nationals from Al Hol, conducting 15 returns in 2025 and 32 in total since 2021. Earlier rounds facilitated the return of around 19,000 Iraqis, including 12,564 who completed rehabilitation processes.

The broader context in Northeast Syria remains administratively complex, characterised by evolving governance arrangements, periodic security incidents, and constrained humanitarian access.

In Yemen, rising political tensions, intermittent armed confrontations, and regional spillover effects — largely linked to intensified Houthi activity and continued engagements with government-aligned and international actors — have compounded an already severe humanitarian situation. Widespread displacement, economic deterioration, and limited public services have increased susceptibility to recruitment by armed groups, particularly among marginalised youth. Former child combatants face persistent reintegration challenges.

In Tunisia, 2025 was marked by significant progress in the fight against terrorism, confirming the declining influence of extremist groups despite an uncertain regional and international context. However, persistent economic and political challenges continue to fuel latent frustrations that could give rise to radical movements, underscoring the importance of strengthening preventive and inclusive approaches.

In this context, vulnerability factors have been transformed into positive dynamics through innovative, transformative, community-based initiatives. The implementation of projects supported by GCERF’s second investment strategy in Tunisia has helped consolidate a proactive approach to preventing violent extremism, carried out in close collaboration with government partners.

Violent extremism across Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Tunisia continues to be shaped by political fragility, socio-economic disparities, protracted conflict, and regional tensions.

In Iraq and Northeast Syria, the aftermath of the territorial defeat of Islamic State (IS) has generated complex humanitarian and security dynamics. Families of former fighters were relocated to camps, including Al Hol and Al Roj. Al Hol’s population increased from approximately 9,800 to 73,000 in 2019. Overcrowding, exposure to trauma, and limited access to services and livelihoods have heightened protection concerns and increased vulnerability to radicalisation, particularly among children and adolescents.

The Government of Iraq has continued the voluntary repatriation of its nationals from Al Hol, conducting 15 returns in 2025 and 32 in total since 2021. Earlier rounds facilitated the return of around 19,000 Iraqis, including 12,564 who completed rehabilitation processes.

The broader context in Northeast Syria remains administratively complex, characterised by evolving governance arrangements, periodic security incidents, and constrained humanitarian access.

In Yemen, rising political tensions, intermittent armed confrontations, and regional spillover effects — largely linked to intensified Houthi activity and continued engagements with government-aligned and international actors — have compounded an already severe humanitarian situation. Widespread displacement, economic deterioration, and limited public services have increased susceptibility to recruitment by armed groups, particularly among marginalised youth. Former child combatants face persistent reintegration challenges.

In Tunisia, 2025 was marked by significant progress in the fight against terrorism, confirming the declining influence of extremist groups despite an uncertain regional and international context. However, persistent economic and political challenges continue to fuel latent frustrations that could give rise to radical movements, underscoring the importance of strengthening preventive and inclusive approaches.

In this context, vulnerability factors have been transformed into positive dynamics through innovative, transformative, community-based initiatives. The implementation of projects supported by GCERF’s second investment strategy in Tunisia has helped consolidate a proactive approach to preventing violent extremism, carried out in close collaboration with government partners.

The Sahel remains one of the most deprived and fragile regions of the world. It encompasses several conflict-affected states, all of which rank low on the United Nations Human Development Index and face a complex web of overlapping crises. These challenges have created fertile ground for terrorism, violent extremism, and organised crime to flourish.

The region has also become a hotspot for illicit activities, including human trafficking and the smuggling of people, drugs, and weapons. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, the Sahel region accounted for 51% of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2024 — a significant increase from 47% in 2023 and a dramatic rise from just 1% in 2007, underscoring the region’s deepening security crisis.

Over the past 15 years, terrorism-related fatalities in the Sahel have risen sharply, reflecting the expanding influence of extremist groups and the challenges faced by local governments in addressing the threat.

Key fragilities in the region include high levels of youth unemployment, recurrent farmer-herder conflicts, and longstanding governance-related grievances. Terrorist and violent extremist groups exploit these vulnerabilities by promoting narratives of injustice and offering protection in exchange for allegiance, thereby further destabilising already fragile communities.

The Sahel remains one of the most deprived and fragile regions of the world. It encompasses several conflict-affected states, all of which rank low on the United Nations Human Development Index and face a complex web of overlapping crises. These challenges have created fertile ground for terrorism, violent extremism, and organised crime to flourish.

The region has also become a hotspot for illicit activities, including human trafficking and the smuggling of people, drugs, and weapons. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, the Sahel region accounted for 51% of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2024 — a significant increase from 47% in 2023 and a dramatic rise from just 1% in 2007, underscoring the region’s deepening security crisis.

Over the past 15 years, terrorism-related fatalities in the Sahel have risen sharply, reflecting the expanding influence of extremist groups and the challenges faced by local governments in addressing the threat.

Key fragilities in the region include high levels of youth unemployment, recurrent farmer-herder conflicts, and longstanding governance-related grievances. Terrorist and violent extremist groups exploit these vulnerabilities by promoting narratives of injustice and offering protection in exchange for allegiance, thereby further destabilising already fragile communities.

Violent extremism in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia is driven by political tensions, socio-economic vulnerability, and identity-based divisions — with each country presenting distinct dynamics.

In the Philippines, the security situation remains fragile in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Tensions ahead of the 2026 BARMM Parliament elections, localised rivalries, and unresolved land disputes contribute to sporadic violence. Armed groups, including the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Daulah Islamiyah, remain active. Internally displaced people, particularly in Marawi, are at heightened risk of radicalisation due to displacement, limited access to livelihoods, and socio-economic exclusion.

In Sri Lanka, the impact of the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks continues to influence social cohesion. While no terrorist attacks have occurred for the fifth consecutive year, ethno-religious tensions, misinformation, and online polarisation — especially among youth facing economic hardship — require ongoing preventive measures. Political efforts rejecting divisive rhetoric have improved stability, but hate speech and digital radicalisation remain challenges.

In Indonesia, violent extremism is gradually declining. Multi-generational militant Islamist networks and Indonesians participating in foreign conflicts continue to pose risks, while online environments expose youth to a wider range of extremist ideologies, including foreign or non-religious narratives. The disbandment of sixteen senior leaders of the Jemaah Islamiyah organisation has contributed to a reduction in attacks, while national and provincial PCVE frameworks increasingly prioritise prevention through whole-of-society and whole-of-government approaches.

Violent extremism in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia is driven by political tensions, socio-economic vulnerability, and identity-based divisions — with each country presenting distinct dynamics.

In the Philippines, the security situation remains fragile in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Tensions ahead of the 2026 BARMM Parliament elections, localised rivalries, and unresolved land disputes contribute to sporadic violence. Armed groups, including the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Daulah Islamiyah, remain active. Internally displaced people, particularly in Marawi, are at heightened risk of radicalisation due to displacement, limited access to livelihoods, and socio-economic exclusion.

In Sri Lanka, the impact of the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks continues to influence social cohesion. While no terrorist attacks have occurred for the fifth consecutive year, ethno-religious tensions, misinformation, and online polarisation — especially among youth facing economic hardship — require ongoing preventive measures. Political efforts rejecting divisive rhetoric have improved stability, but hate speech and digital radicalisation remain challenges.

In Indonesia, violent extremism is gradually declining. Multi-generational militant Islamist networks and Indonesians participating in foreign conflicts continue to pose risks, while online environments expose youth to a wider range of extremist ideologies, including foreign or non-religious narratives. The disbandment of sixteen senior leaders of the Jemaah Islamiyah organisation has contributed to a reduction in attacks, while national and provincial PCVE frameworks increasingly prioritise prevention through whole-of-society and whole-of-government approaches.

In Nigeria, groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) continue to fuel a protracted insurgency in the northeast, exploiting limited economic opportunities and community grievances. In the north-central and northwestern regions, rising banditry and intercommunal tensions further complicate the security environment. Emerging links between longstanding criminal networks and IS-aligned cells have heightened volatility in states including Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina. In December 2025, coordinated Nigerian and U.S. operations targeted insurgent camps in Sokoto State, reflecting the government’s intensified counterterrorism posture and international concern over extremist activity.

In northern Ghana, communities face growing risks from both internal and external factors. Ethnic, chieftaincy, and land disputes, poverty, youth unemployment, and perceptions of marginalisation create local vulnerabilities. Porous borders with Sahel countries — particularly Burkina Faso — expose northern communities to spillover effects, including displacement and the risk of extremist infiltration. Illegal small-scale mining has drawn unemployed youth, creating unregulated spaces where weapons proliferation and economic exploitation could be leveraged by violent extremist groups.

Given the complexity of these threats, authorities are adopting a combined approach of security measures and preventive interventions. Strengthening community engagement, addressing underlying socio-economic grievances, and promoting local resilience remain critical to preventing violent extremism — particularly in areas affected by displacement, cross-border movement, and economic marginalisation.

In Nigeria, groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) continue to fuel a protracted insurgency in the northeast, exploiting limited economic opportunities and community grievances. In the north-central and northwestern regions, rising banditry and intercommunal tensions further complicate the security environment. Emerging links between longstanding criminal networks and IS-aligned cells have heightened volatility in states including Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina. In December 2025, coordinated Nigerian and U.S. operations targeted insurgent camps in Sokoto State, reflecting the government’s intensified counterterrorism posture and international concern over extremist activity.

In northern Ghana, communities face growing risks from both internal and external factors. Ethnic, chieftaincy, and land disputes, poverty, youth unemployment, and perceptions of marginalisation create local vulnerabilities. Porous borders with Sahel countries — particularly Burkina Faso — expose northern communities to spillover effects, including displacement and the risk of extremist infiltration. Illegal small-scale mining has drawn unemployed youth, creating unregulated spaces where weapons proliferation and economic exploitation could be leveraged by violent extremist groups.

Given the complexity of these threats, authorities are adopting a combined approach of security measures and preventive interventions. Strengthening community engagement, addressing underlying socio-economic grievances, and promoting local resilience remain critical to preventing violent extremism — particularly in areas affected by displacement, cross-border movement, and economic marginalisation.

In the Western Balkans, extreme-right movements continue to draw on post-war grievances, institutional weaknesses and socio-economic challenges, often organised through networks of nationalist groups, veteran associations and fringe political actors. Their narratives frequently combine historical revisionism, anti-migrant and anti-EU rhetoric, and connections with far-right actors in Europe and Russia — facilitating propaganda, coordination, and funding while allowing adaptation to each country’s political context.

These groups employ a range of tactics, including street demonstrations, online campaigns, and efforts to influence mainstream parties or to participate in local elections, to normalise their views and recruit supporters. Addressing these dynamics requires strengthening the rule of law, promoting civic education, countering online radicalisation, and supporting independent media and civil society initiatives.

Disinformation targeting NATO and the European Union also circulates across regional media, often amplified by political actors who exploit historical grievances and identity-based divisions. Although limited in volume, such content contributes to polarisation and can influence public perceptions of democratic institutions and Euro-Atlantic partnerships.

Prison-based deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes, supported by the Council of Europe and the European Union, target individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences and returnees from Syria and Iraq. Integrated approaches linking prison initiatives with community reintegration aim to reduce recidivism and limit the spread of extremist ideologies.

In the Western Balkans, extreme-right movements continue to draw on post-war grievances, institutional weaknesses and socio-economic challenges, often organised through networks of nationalist groups, veteran associations and fringe political actors. Their narratives frequently combine historical revisionism, anti-migrant and anti-EU rhetoric, and connections with far-right actors in Europe and Russia — facilitating propaganda, coordination, and funding while allowing adaptation to each country’s political context.

These groups employ a range of tactics, including street demonstrations, online campaigns, and efforts to influence mainstream parties or to participate in local elections, to normalise their views and recruit supporters. Addressing these dynamics requires strengthening the rule of law, promoting civic education, countering online radicalisation, and supporting independent media and civil society initiatives.

Disinformation targeting NATO and the European Union also circulates across regional media, often amplified by political actors who exploit historical grievances and identity-based divisions. Although limited in volume, such content contributes to polarisation and can influence public perceptions of democratic institutions and Euro-Atlantic partnerships.

Prison-based deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes, supported by the Council of Europe and the European Union, target individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences and returnees from Syria and Iraq. Integrated approaches linking prison initiatives with community reintegration aim to reduce recidivism and limit the spread of extremist ideologies.

Since its inception in 2014, GCERF has been proud to be supported by a growing community of donors and partners. Total contributions across 2014–2025 are led by the European Union (USD 40.5M), the United States (USD 36.2M), and Germany (USD 24.2M).

In-kind contributions and additional support from partner foundations and governments continue to extend the reach and resilience of GCERF’s mission.

GCERF has made it a priority to diversify its partnership base, working with a broader range of countries and organisations to enable the delivery of its mission. In 2024, Luxembourg became a new Board Member and donor; the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a peer organisation, also joined the Board. These efforts continued in 2025 and should yield further results in 2026 and 2027.

At the GCERF replenishment conference in September 2025, donors, partner countries, and an individual contributor pledged USD 40.6 million. Prior to the event, USD 6.8 million had already been confirmed, with an additional USD 1.3 million committed or confirmed afterwards.

For 2026, a funding gap of approximately USD 7 million remains — underscoring the need for continued financial engagement from GCERF’s donors.

GCERF has made it a priority to diversify its partnership base, working with a broader range of countries and organisations to enable the delivery of its mission. In 2024, Luxembourg became a new Board Member and donor; the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a peer organisation, also joined the Board. These efforts continued in 2025 and should yield further results in 2026 and 2027.

At the GCERF replenishment conference in September 2025, donors, partner countries, and an individual contributor pledged USD 40.6 million. Prior to the event, USD 6.8 million had already been confirmed, with an additional USD 1.3 million committed or confirmed afterwards.

For 2026, a funding gap of approximately USD 7 million remains — underscoring the need for continued financial engagement from GCERF’s donors.

In 2025, GCERF signed contracts for financial support totalling USD 19.8 million, of which around 43% was considered flexible — unearmarked or softly earmarked, according to earmarking definitions set out in the Grand Bargain, which GCERF has adopted.

This funding gives GCERF additional flexibility to: allocate funds independently, based on needs analysis, ensuring regions and communities not on the radar of the international community are also served; unlock support and award grants rapidly in the face of emerging crises; and manage its treasury more efficiently.