

GCERF Country Strategy for Investment in Tunisia

Highlights

This document is guided by GCERF’s “Strategy to Engage Communities and Address the Drivers of Violent Extremism (2017-2020)” (the GCERF Strategy); the Government of Tunisia’s “National Strategy against Extremism and Terrorism” (National Policy Framework), developed by the [National Counterterrorism Commission \(CNLCT\)](#); key stakeholder feedback; and desk research on the current situation in Tunisia. This document responds to the GCERF Governing Board’s 4 September 2017 request (in [ED.09.17/DEC.01](#)) to the GCERF Secretariat to work with Tunisia to implement the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM).



Figure 1: Map of Tunisia. Source: <https://cdn.thinglink.me/api/image/857701757596205056/1240/10/scaletowidth>

Demographic, Geographic, and Thematic Focus of GCERF Funding in Tunisia

WHO:

- **youth** ages 15-35 (females and males), including: unemployed; school drop-outs; vocational, higher, tertiary, college, & university-level; vulnerable to crime & violence
- **women** ages 36 and above
- **influential community-level actors**
- **violent extremist offenders**
- **returning foreign fighters**

WHERE:

- hard-to-reach areas in the **southern, western, and border governorates**

WHAT:

- building P/CVE capacity among **local institutions & higher education structures**
- rehabilitation of: **violent extremist offenders; and returning foreign fighters**

HOW:

- **Tunisian national-level NGOs, as well as local, community-based organisations** that would likely not succeed in securing bilateral donor funding
- **local authorities**

GCERF IN TUNISIA

In Tunisia, the threat of violent extremism comes from multiple sources and continues to change and transform over time.¹ These dynamics were highlighted during the GCERF Secretariat's in-country consultations² with a spectrum of key stakeholders, including the Government of Tunisia, members of Tunisian civil society, donors,³ international non-governmental organisations, members of the private sector, academia/research structures, and the United Nations in July and October in 2017, and January and April 2018. During this time, the Secretariat surveyed current and planned P/CVE programming efforts.

Consultations were held with the Government of Tunisia, specifically with the National Counterterrorism Commission (CNLCT), which has a legal mandate to coordinate P/CVE and counterterrorism efforts of the different ministries in implementing the National Policy Framework that emphasises prevention as one of its core pillars. The CNLCT emphasised the need to support programmes that focus on prevention and are at scale, with a focus on sustainability. The CNLCT pointed out that civil society organisations are very active in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) activities, but it should be the government that leads on service delivery.

On 6 May 2018, Tunisia held its first free municipal elections in 350 municipalities, all of which now have elected councils. In support of the local implementation of the Government of Tunisia's National Policy Framework, GCERF proposes to work in partnership with local authorities to ensure that GCERF-funded programming complements their broader community security strategy – of which P/CVE is a part. This could also assist local authorities to: (1) develop and implement local P/CVE action plans; (2) strengthen their P/CVE capacity and relationships with civil society actors; and (3) enhance their legitimacy within the communities by demonstrating concrete progress in addressing drivers of violent extremism.

In this regard, GCERF may support – either through its grantees or through directly funding – relevant regional/local ministerial structures and local authorities. This support could range from facilitating programme design (by integrating and/or supporting the implementation of the

¹ Counter Extremism Project, (2018). Tunisia: Extremism & Counter-Extremism. [online] Available at: <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/tunisia> [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018];

Human Security Collective (2018). Building Youth Resilience in Tunisia and The Netherlands. [online] Available at: <http://www.hscollective.org/building-youth-resilience-in-tunisia-and-the-netherlands/> [Accessed 20 Mar. 2018];

Megally, H. (2016). The Tunisia Conundrum: Sowing dictatorship, harvesting terrorism. [online] Center on International Cooperation. Available at: http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/tunisia-conundrum-sowing-dictatorship-harvesting-terrorism [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018];

International Republican Institute (2017). *Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia*. http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2017-6-1_vea_report_-_beja.pdf and Aliaga, L and Tricot O'Farrell, K. (2017). Counter-terror in Tunisia: a road paved with good intentions? [pdf] Saferworld. Available at: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58921b4b6b8f5bd75e20af7e/t/59c15b3de5dd5b8068d8a208/1505844036342/tunisia-v2-counter-terror-in-tunisia-v2.pdf> [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018].

² During the consultations, it was agreed that the Chatham House Rule applies. However, the names of key stakeholders are known to the writers of the GCERF Country Strategy for Investment in Tunisia.

³ Australia; Canada; European Union; France; Japan; Netherlands; Qatar; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United States of America

P/CVE elements of the local security plans), to building their P/CVE capacity. GCERF support in Tunisia builds on the work and relevant good practices documents of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), notably the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism.

THE GCERF FUNDING MODEL

The most effective solutions to the locally specific challenge of violent extremism should be proposed, developed, and implemented by the communities themselves.⁴ In order to responsibly and sustainably build local P/CVE capacity, GCERF does not implement activities directly; rather, GCERF provides grants and capacity building to: (1) small, local, community-based organisations

GCERF's Goal
Grant making and management in hard-to-reach areas, and building the P/CVE capacity of small, local, community-based organisations

that would likely not succeed in securing bilateral donor funding; and (2) local authorities.

GCERF in Tunisia operates through the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM), which allows GCERF to fund P/CVE programmes at the local level through

a consortium approach. Here's how it works: In order to reach small, local, community-based organisations, GCERF provides grants to larger, Tunisian national-level non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – which, in turn, form, lead, and sub-grant to a group of smaller, local, community-based organisations that would likely not succeed in securing bilateral donor funding. (GCERF can also provide grants to local authorities that implement programmes directly.) It is the local consortia that identify the specific violent extremist threat in the proposed communities of work, and design the programmatic responses accordingly. GCERF does not prescribe or provide a set of activities for grantees to implement but, rather, ensures that activities meet P/CVE objectives. Each consortium's programme design is based on evidence. As part of the application process, GCERF grantees will conduct a Community Needs Assessment (CONA) that provides the evidence base for interventions along the demographic, geographic, and thematic priorities below. Further, GCERF will establish a condition that a significant proportion of funds be allocated to local-level women- and youth-initiated activities within each consortium.

“WHO”: THE DEMOGRAPHIC PRIORITIES TO BE IDENTIFIED IN CALL FOR PROPOSALS

- **youth** ages 15-35 (females and males), including: unemployed; school drop-outs; vocational, higher, tertiary, college, & university-level; vulnerable to crime & violence). These categories are not static but, rather, based on initial discussions and can be amended to align to the local context.
- **women** ages 36 and above

⁴ Oriot-Scappaticci, L. and Schumicky-Logan, L. (2018) *Power to the People: Civil Society's Role in Preventing Violent Extremism*. News Deeply Peacebuilding Deeply. <https://www.newsdeeply.com/peacebuilding/articles/2018/06/26/power-to-the-people-civil-societys-role-in-preventing-violent-extremism>

Women are key to preventing violent extremism.⁵ In Tunisia, mothers may be the first respondents to a crisis related to their sons and daughters, according to key stakeholders.⁶

- **influential community-level actors**, including but not limited to civil society, cultural, educational, and religious leaders
Influential community-level actors can build a bridge between the community and national and local authorities, and promote community agency through establishing regular dialogue forums.
- **rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders**
Engaging violent extremist offenders in incarceration facilities is essential, to divert them from violent extremism and to prepare them for life “outside.”⁷
- **returning foreign fighters**
While GCERF is aware that, in some Tunisian communities, some members of the community turned against them, intentionally including this population in P/CVE activities can help enhance community resilience.⁸

“WHERE”: THE GEOGRAPHIC PRIORITIES TO BE IDENTIFIED IN CALL FOR PROPOSALS

- hard-to-reach areas in the **southern, western, and border governorates**

According to key stakeholders interviewed by GCERF, the Tunisian P/CVE landscape is highly crowded by many current and planned P/CVE programming efforts of significant scale across the country. Many of these activities focus on greater Tunis and the northern area of the country. GCERF is fully aware that other donors provide significant P/CVE funding to Tunisian civil society and international NGOs, for example: The Government of Netherlands supports an international NGO to work in the northwest area of Tunisia; the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation provides support to organisations in the southeast; and the U.S. Government is preparing to launch more than one multi-year programme covering a wide variety of geographic areas (including outside of Tunis).

Nevertheless, there are hard-to-reach areas of the country in which P/CVE programming can be significantly enhanced – and where prevention can have a significant impact – such as the **southern, western, and border governorates**. According to relevant stakeholders and recent research,⁹ many young violent extremists come from areas of rural exodus and social marginalisation.

⁵ This has been demonstrated in the GCTF document “Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism”.

⁶ This has been also outlined in the GCTF document “The Role of Families in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Strategic Recommendations and Programming Options”.

⁷ The importance of this is outlined in, for example, the GCTF document “Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders”.

⁸ This has been outlined in the GCTF document “Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon”.

⁹ Ayari, M. (2017). Analytical Review. Violent Extremism and Its Motivating Factors in Tunisia in the 2010s. Tunisia. United Nations. And Malka, H., and Balboni, M. (June 2016). Violence in Tunisia. <http://foreignfighters.csis.org/tunisia/violence-in-tunisia.html>

In the suggested geographic areas, as of July 2018, no P/CVE funding is channeled directly to local authorities. However, the Government of Netherlands provides support for a project in the Jendouba Region, which works with municipalities; but funding is not channeled to the local authorities directly. Similarly, the Government of Canada funded projects in Dehiba and Ben Gardene (along the Libyan border), where they cooperated with the governorate of Medenine, as well as municipal authorities. In the same time, the Government of Canada also funded projects in selected municipalities in six governorates to develop an understanding of the drivers of radicalisation, followed by a sub-granting mechanism to local community groups.

“WHAT”: THE THEMATIC PRIORITIES TO BE IDENTIFIED IN CALL FOR PROPOSALS

1) BUILDING P/CVE CAPACITY AMONG LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND INSTITUTIONS

According to key stakeholders, P/CVE efforts specifically focused on local authorities has been limited, and no funding has been channeled to them directly. Notably, the Government of Canada has funded projects working with: local municipalities on community-oriented policing; and with imams, training them on issues of radicalisation, and building on previous work with the Ministry of Religious Affairs and higher education institutions. If GCERF grantees choose to work on this theme, they could build on these existing efforts and support widening their scope.

2) BUILDING P/CVE CAPACITY AMONG HIGHER EDUCATION STRUCTURES

According to some stakeholders, not many P/CVE activities focus on Tunisian universities. Yet university students have been recruited to violent extremist groups. It is crucial to strengthen resilience to violent extremism among university students, as well as to build the capacity of university structures – for example, to detect early signs of recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism among students, and provide them with appropriate support (e.g. psychosocial). In addition, working with the Tunisian scientific community within universities and research structures can contribute to: enhancing the understanding of violent extremism in Tunisia; and designing empirical, evidence-based responses that are adapted to the needs of communities in Tunisia.

3) REHABILITATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST OFFENDERS

Another area of GCERF focus will be the rehabilitation¹⁰ of violent extremist offenders, including working with host communities; according to the CNLCT and other key stakeholders, this area is not yet covered sufficiently. However, there is potential in seeking synergies with a few ongoing pilot projects in this area, and to build on their results to ensure wider impact and sustainability. GCERF will cooperate with and build on the work of women’s and youth groups, and religious institutions, in small-scale rehabilitation activities.

4) REHABILITATION & INTEGRATION OF RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS

The extent of the foreign fighter phenomenon has grown substantially since 2011.¹¹ GCERF is aware that, in some communities where returning foreign fighters reside, some

¹⁰ “Reintegration” presupposes that the individual has once been integrated into the community, which may not always be the case. In addition, reintegration turns the individual a passive entity to whom reintegration can be done, instead of an active participant in the integration process.

¹¹ Global Terrorism Index 2017

members of the community turned against them, and threatened their physical safety. GCERF grantees that propose to engage returning foreign fighters (and/or working in their communities) will conduct a Community Needs Assessment (CONA) to highlight potentials risks, threats, and responses. Given the sensitivity of the subject, this would be carefully consulted with national authorities.

How GCERF Proposes to Work in Tunisia

OUR PARTNER: CNLCT

This GCERF Country Strategy for Investment in Tunisia addresses the priorities laid out in the National Policy Framework, namely: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. GCERF will primarily support the prevention and response pillars of the National Policy Framework by working hand in hand with the CNLCT, which would establish the Tunisia Country Support Mechanism (CSM).¹²

CNLCT ESTABLISHES THE TUNISIA COUNTRY SUPPORT MECHANISM (CSM)

There is no need to create a separate platform for multi-stakeholder collaboration in support of GCERF funding in Tunisia, given that the CNLCT is mandated to coordinate the P/CVE efforts of the various ministries and civil society actors. The CNLCT confirmed that they are ready to establish and lead the Tunisia CSM by inviting members of different ministries, such as Civil Society and Human Rights, Education, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Labour, and Social Affairs, just to name a few. The CNLCT will also invite members of civil society, the international community, the private sector, and academia/research structures. This would complement the existing coordination mechanisms, as it would involve other actors, broadening the scope of perspectives and experiences.

THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE TUNISIA CSM

The Tunisia CSM will, in a structured manner, bring together government, civil society, the international community, and the private sector, in support of the CNLCT's efforts to increase coordination, communication, information sharing, and transparency. The CNLCT is also the policy development arm of the government on P/CVE and counterterrorism. Given the efforts undertaken by the United Nations and other actors to build the capacity of the CNCLT, GCERF looks to the CNCLT to ensure that the CSM becomes a policy champion – a specific need expressed by multiple key stakeholders.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

- To identify, support, and work through local authorities, Tunisian national-level NGOs, and local, community-based organisations to ensure contextualised, sustainable P/CVE programming
- To coordinate closely with other donors and their platforms, including the “G7+” mechanism
- To ensure that the support provided for various activities are in line with good practices and recommendations of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)

¹² For more information, please see: <http://www.gcerf.org/grants/country-support-mechanism/>

- To work in collaboration with, and building on planned and ongoing P/CVE efforts, especially the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and UNICEF
- To protect and foster Tunisia's culture of service and volunteerism
- To strengthen the programme management and P/CVE capacity of GCERF grantees to ensure their sustainability after the GCERF grant concludes, and support them to become experts in the field of P/CVE
- To ensure a localised, multi-stakeholder approach, beginning with a Community Needs Assessment (CONA)
- To offer more equal opportunities to women, girls, boys, and men to make their own choices in the identification of needs and the proposed interventions to respond to those needs
- To avoid duplication and replication of ongoing and planned P/CVE efforts through; working in the less saturated areas; and funding local authorities and community-based organisations that would likely not succeed in securing bilateral donor funding

GCERF's Strategic Guidance to Future Grantees

- GCERF's Tunisia Strategy defines the **overall approach** that GCERF proposes to take in Tunisia.
- However, **programme activities are always community-driven and proposed by GCERF grantees**, in order to ensure that they correspond to each community's specific violent extremism challenge – and each grantee's unique organisational capacities.
- GCERF works with its grantees to ensure that activities are designed to meet **P/CVE objectives**.
- Below, please find the four leverage points that GCERF has prioritised to address drivers of violent extremism. Again, **it is up to GCERF grantees to propose programme activities**.

Building tolerance and acceptance where violent extremists recruit the marginalised

Community solidarity is widely considered a key asset for Tunisia, but various factors have weakened this asset since 2011, including the increasing socio-economic gap between the elite and the masses that manifests through the unequal distribution of power and influence, as well as rural-urban disparities and social marginalisation in deprived peri-urban areas.¹³ People living in remote areas, such as border areas and the greater part of southern Tunisia, may perceive themselves as marginalised by the capital and by larger urban centres. Indeed, at the 7th meeting of the GCERF Governing Board, the Board member for Tunisia, head of the CNLCT, referenced GCERF's niche in Tunisia by saying that the challenge is not in cities but in remote areas that are hard to reach. To this end, social cohesion among populations in remote areas can be strengthened through the promotion of dialogue and tolerance, and through the development of alternative dialogue platforms. It can build on activities promoting positive social and economic

¹³ Ayari, M. (2017). Analytical Review. Violent Extremism and Its Motivating Factors in Tunisia in the 2010s. Tunisia. United Nations.

opportunities, community agency, and critical thinking and life skills. Women and youth can be called on to play an active and important role in building social cohesion, including by raising awareness of violent extremism and effective responses.

Community agency where violent extremists exploit governance challenges

Decentralised local governance structures are critical entry points for development initiatives. Recent local elections conveyed a clear message: Tunisians would like to see strong local governments that are able to support better access to public services and rule of law in their localities. GCERF aims to: strengthen the capacity of communities to mobilise, organise, and represent their own interests; and increase the number of communities that actively and effectively engage with authorities on topics that are relevant to them. Community agency can be strengthened through engagement with national and local authorities, and influential community-level actors – including but not limited to civil society, cultural, educational, and religious leaders – thereby contributing to more effective dialogue between state authorities, other stakeholders, and local communities. While seeking to improve community agency for all members of society, including youth, GCERF-funded programming can strive to ensure the genuine participation, leadership, and empowerment of women, through programmes that: aim to improve the social position of women and girls; and explicitly improve their agency.

Positive social and economic alternatives to what violent extremists claim to offer

The Government of Tunisia and the private sector are keen to advance public-private partnerships, not only to rebuild Tunisia's image, but also to invest in human capital. There is special interest among the private sector in the tourism industry, which provided 6.6% of Tunisia's total GDP in 2016, and other untapped areas of the economy.¹

Youth unemployment continues to be a problem (15.5% by the fourth quarter of 2017),¹ but partnerships with the private sector and social entrepreneurs will provide new opportunities that will improve directly the livelihoods of the participants in GCERF-funded activities and their families – which will be of particular importance in the rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders. Stakeholders suggested that, based on a market analysis, GCERF should focus on shifting the mind-set of young people to value vocational employment in trades that have insufficient numbers of qualified/skilled applicants (which requires training not only on the trade itself, but also the entire value chain,¹⁴ entrepreneurship, digital skills, and accessing financial institutions).

Rather than replicate ongoing livelihoods programmes, instead, through coordination with GCERF Board members, GCERF will link its grantees to existing: (1) livelihoods initiatives that train on specific trades in demand in Tunisia; and (2) entrepreneurship initiatives (e.g. I Have a Project, Moubadiroun, Open Start Up Tunisia) and social entrepreneurs. Partnerships with technical companies and social entrepreneurs, linking youth to established job platforms and youth employment initiatives (including microfinance), and Tunisia's robust start-up community will be vital to improving access to social and economic opportunities.

¹⁴ For example, if people are trained how to make carpets, they are also taught how to retrieve wool from the sheep, treat, and prepare it for use in carpets. They are also taught how to market their products, etc., to reflect market standards.

Critical thinking and life skills to resist violent extremism

Perceived or real marginalisation, and lack of opportunities, lack of hope for the future, and an increased level of aggression negatively impact the sense of self of many, especially youth, in Tunisian society – thereby making them more vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups. GCERF-funded programmes strengthen their sense of purpose by providing individuals with confidence, critical thinking, and the ability to seek inner strengths – as well as specific trainings on life skills to decrease the level of reactive aggression – that can enhance their self-worth and resilience to violent extremist agendas. As with GCERF-funded programming in other countries, such skills – when paired with activities to raise awareness of violent extremism and effective responses – can be supported with activities related to mediation. Given the potential for university settings to reflect national political tensions, it will be crucial to engage student unions and associations, promote their members’ participation in relevant GCERF-funded activities, and enhance positive peer pressure.

Funding Scenarios

To move forward GCERF’s Strategy for Tunisia, GCERF will need adequate funding. Three possible funding scenarios will define programme implementation, depending on available financial resources.

Scenario 1: Funding levels for Tunisia are around USD 1 million or less but minimum USD 300,000 through the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM)

In this scenario, USD 1 million or less is invested to provide funding directly to local authorities to develop and implement local P/CVE plans of action. With the support of the Government of Tunisia, donors, and UN authorities (especially UNDP), pilot districts will be identified to receive small grants directly through the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM). In line with Tunisia’s National Policy Framework, the CFM will enable local authorities to operationalise and contextualise the National Policy Framework at the district level. To complement existing district development plans, local authorities will be engaged and capacitated to develop local P/CVE plans of action, in collaboration with civil society actors. Through the CFM, they will receive grants directly from GCERF to implement elements of the local P/CVE plans of action.

Scenario 2: Funding levels for Tunisia are less than USD 5 million but minimum USD 2 million through the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM)

In this scenario, less than USD 5 million, but a minimum of USD 2 million, is invested for a first round of three-year grants through the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM). In contrast with Scenario 3 below, the demographic, geographic, and thematic focus of GCERF funding will be significantly narrowed, based on priorities identified by the Tunisia CSM and other key stakeholders. Otherwise, the CFM process is the same as in Scenario 3 below.

Scenario 3: Funding levels for Tunisia up to USD 5 million through the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM)

In this scenario, up to USD 5 million for a first round of three-year grants through the Core Funding Mechanism (CFM). This will enable GCERF grantees to work in critical geographic locations across Tunisia, focusing on the border, rural, and deprived peri-urban areas along the coast. It will also enable grantees to work across thematic areas – for instance, not only on preventing recruitment to violent extremism, but also on the rehabilitation and integration of returning foreign fighters and violent extremist offenders (and their host communities). The Tunisia Country Support Mechanism (CSM) will launch a call (or calls) for proposals from: Tunisian civil society organisations, to form and lead a consortium of local, community-based organisations; and/or, where appropriate, other actors (such as local authorities and higher education structures). After an initial screening, the GCERF Secretariat will undertake a rigorous due diligence process to identify Potential Principal Recipients (PPRs) for validation by the CSM. GCERF will provide PPRs with capacity strengthening in the area of proposal development, P/CVE, gender mainstreaming, and M&E. Each proposal is based on a Community Needs Assessment (CONA), supported by GCERF. GCERF's international Independent Review Panel (IRP) provides a rigorous assessment of funding proposals to ensure they meet P/CVE objectives, and intensive feedback to PPRs throughout the process.

Annex 2: OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Potential Risks and Mitigation Strategies

To move forward GCERF's Strategy for Tunisia, GCERF will need to address or put in place plans to mitigate certain key risks that could threaten this strategy's implementation. As explained below, there are risks at both the programmatic and institutional levels, as GCERF has learned from its ongoing P/CVE grant management experience in Bangladesh, Kosovo, Mali, and Nigeria.

Programmatic Assumptions and Risks

The table below includes possible programmatic risks, but is not exhaustive. Identified risks will be monitored and reviewed on a quarterly basis.

Potential Risk	Mitigation Strategies
Lack of funding to launch GCERF programming that results in reputational damage of GCERF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Actively lobby for funding for Tunisia through the GCERF Governing Board, private sector actors, and foundations.
Lack of repeat/ongoing funding has the same risk to reputation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Actively lobby for funding for Tunisia through the GCERF Governing Board, private sector actors, and foundations.
The Tunisian P/CVE landscape is highly crowded by many current and planned P/CVE programming efforts of significant scale across the country, thereby rendering GCERF funding or -funded programmes duplicative, replicative, or unnecessary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As a global fund exclusively supporting P/CVE programmes, GCERF's consortium and capacity building approach benefits smaller, local, community-based organisations. In addition, working in the less crowded areas, GCERF can assist in avoiding duplication and replication, while maximising synergies and reinforcing ongoing and planned P/CVE efforts.
Failure to meet expectations among key stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop a clear in-country communications strategy, in consultation with key stakeholders. Periodic revision of communications strategy.
Unintended and harmful consequences, such as: an increase to women and girls' time burden; economic backlash, reputational risk, and operational security risk for grantees; and participants targeted because of participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct gender audits with PR and SRs. Ensure that women, girls, boys, and men are included in all phases of project/programme design and implementation; in particular, help communities to identify where, when, and how those directly affected by the activities perceive and experience risks related to the activities that may change existing power dynamics at the community and household levels. Monitor for unintended and harmful consequences by establishing strong

	<p>gender responsive monitoring mechanisms.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support grantees in developing policies/strategies that mitigate risk to participants.
Worsening of the security situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Routinely monitor and assess security threats, and encourage PRs and SRs to do the same at their local level. • Capacity building for the Tunisia CSM and for grantees on security.
Electoral contingencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Routinely monitor and assess security threats and encourage PRs and SRs to do the same at their local level. • Ensure programme implementation plans consider the timing of elections and include appropriate programmes to implement during the election season. • Ensure flexibility in programme design to adapt activities as necessary to account for potential civil unrest.
Return of foreign fighters and their families to the proposed area of work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate closely with the national government, local authorities, and civil society to ensure GCERF-funded activities complement relevant efforts to address the specific needs of this population.
Lack of capacity of PRs to deliver expected outcomes and outputs and to manage and oversee grant implementation effectively and efficiently	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rigorous due diligence process put in place to select PRs that have the capacity to deliver expected outputs and outcomes. • Consider adapted models to allow for direct grantees and/or closer technical support. • Routinely monitor grantees through visits, virtual meetings, and joint risk analysis. • Capacity building for grantees on grant management, including M&E, finance, and compliance. • End of programme evaluations and regular financial examinations.

Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity

GCERF will encourage grantees to design and implement conflict sensitive programming. Conflict sensitivity goes beyond Do No Harm; however, Do No Harm is an important principle of conflict sensitivity.¹⁵

GCERF will ensure that it monitors Do No Harm¹⁶ principles to identify potential negative consequences, take steps to prevent them whenever possible, and propose corrective actions when necessary. These elements will be included in the development of proposals and will be monitored on a regular basis. This includes conducting CONA and/or baselines before programme start up. Any activities with potential negative impacts will not be pursued or promoted.

Institutional Risks for the GCERF Secretariat

Contextual Risks

General elections are planned for 2019, and the electoral campaign season and the election period itself will present a number of new risks to GCERF's operational context. In particular, new security risks will need to be considered during this time period, especially in the southern part of Tunisia. A specific security plan relating to the elections will be developed to guide GCERF Secretariat travel to and within Tunisia. It is important to note that once grant making concludes, the elections may impact grantee activities. Therefore, mitigation strategies will be put in place for any disruptions linked to the elections. Mitigation measures will include flexible programme design that can be easily adapted to evolving dynamics.

Security Risks

Certain security risks exist for GCERF Secretariat staff responsible for grant making and grant management (in particular, physical security in certain parts of Tunisia, especially in the border areas, in the southern part of the country, and certain neighbourhoods in urban areas). These risks must be addressed and mitigated in advance of field missions. As programming is to be launched in Tunisia, a comprehensive security assessment must be conducted and periodically updated.

Other security issues related to some of the proposed zones of intervention, including civil unrest, must also be addressed. To mitigate these risks, in addition to soliciting information from grantees, local authorities, and other stakeholders, a security plan will be developed by the GCERF Secretariat for each intervention area.

¹⁵ The Do No Harm framework is generally used by a group of practitioners familiar with the context and project/programme. In this sense, most data is drawn from the participants. However, there are times when information gaps are identified and data is collected from other sources to improve the quality of the analysis.

¹⁶ To do no harm and to support local capacities for peace requires: (1) careful analysis of the context of conflict and the aid programme, examining how aid interacts with the conflict, and a willingness to create options and redesign programmes to improve its quality; and (2) careful reflection on staff conduct and organisational policies so that the "implicit ethical messages" that are sent communicate congruent messages that strengthen local capacities for peace. <http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/do-no-harm-local-capacities-for-peace-project/>

Financial Risks

The fluctuation of the Tunisian dinar against the U.S. dollar over the last year, and the increasing inflation in Tunisia (7.6% in March 2018), are unlikely to change in the near future; as such, these add new financial risks that will need to be addressed as this strategy is rolled out.¹⁷ To mitigate this risk, GCERF will work closely with grantees to better analyse these financial risks, and make changes to the work plans and budgets on a regular basis.

Fiduciary Risks

As with all funding, there is a risk that funds entrusted to the grantees are not used for the intended purpose and/or in compliance with applicable principles and legal requirements including through fraud and/or unreliable reporting on use of funds. In Tunisia, GCERF will apply its usual mitigating mechanism processes embedded in its grantee selection, proposal development, grant agreement development, and grant management processes.

GCERF's current approach to grant financial management includes: a clear set of financial management guidelines and templates that are regularly updated to respond to lessons learned and changes in the grantee environment; a regular assessment of financial risks, including the risk of loss or misuse, at grantee and GCERF levels; clear processes to support grantees in the planning and management of programme budgets and cash resources, and the improvement of their internal control systems (including regular monitoring visits and financial examinations conducted by an external audit firm retained by GCERF). GCERF uses every opportunity to meet with grantees during grant development and during the life of the grant, to enhance the capacity of grantees to manage GCERF funds in accordance with GCERF standards.

Reputational Risk

Although GCERF has been invited by the Government of Tunisia to support P/CVE activities in Tunisia by making and managing grants to Tunisian civil society organisations and other actors, and GCERF will roll out this strategy under the larger umbrella of the Government's own National Policy Framework, this association is not without some risk.

The Tunisia CSM will be established and led by the CNLCT. While the CNLCT is mandated to coordinate all ministries on P/CVE and counterterrorism activities, some ministries may try to circumvent them, and leverage their own power over GCERF grantees and funded activities. Also, GCERF's association with the Government of Tunisia may pose a challenge for GCERF in certain participating communities. To mitigate these risks, GCERF will support the CSM in the discharge of its duties, according to the CSM Guidelines. Further, as mentioned above, GCERF appreciates the efforts undertaken by the United Nations and other actors to build the capacity of the CNLCT

¹⁷ Consumer prices in Tunisia advanced 7.6 percent year-on-year in March of 2018, following a 7.1 percent rise in the prior month. It was the highest inflation rate since January of 1992. Prices rose faster for food & non-alcoholic beverages (8.7 percent vs 7.7 percent in February); housing & utilities (4.4 percent vs 4.2 percent) and transport (10.0 percent vs 9.5 percent). Also, cost increased further for clothing & footwear (8.0 percent vs 6.9 percent); furniture & household equipment (7.4 percent vs 6.9 percent) and miscellaneous goods & services (9.4 percent vs 8.7 percent). In addition, prices continued to rise for restaurants & hotels (8.6 percent vs 8.2 percent) and recreation & culture (7.8 percent vs 7.6 percent). Meantime, prices eased for communication (2.5 percent vs 2.6 percent) and health (5.2 percent vs 5.6 percent) while inflation was steady for education (7.2 percent, the same as in February). <https://tradingeconomics.com/tunisia/inflation-cpi>

to ensure that the CSM becomes a policy champion, and GCERF welcomes any relevant opportunities to collaborate with these actors in this regard.

While risks are an important consideration to ensure the proper implementation of this strategy, ultimately, the impact of this strategy in Tunisia will also depend on the scale of GCERF's intervention in Tunisia. Given Tunisia's size and the breadth of the issues, GCERF will need to invest significant funding to have a meaningful impact in P/CVE at scale. In addition, it is essential for GCERF to maintain complementarity to donors that invest more resources to support P/CVE activities in Tunisia.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

GCERF's business model is designed to improve the evidence base around strengthening community resilience. The investment cycle allows GCERF to review the understanding of the drivers of violent extremism, and provides a dynamic and long-term perspective.

Members of Tunisian civil society reported that M&E of P/CVE programming is extremely challenging due to the lack of common indicators, as well as the limited M&E capacity of the organisations in this specific field. Therefore, GCERF will provide technical capacity strengthening and oversight to grantees to improve their M&E capabilities.